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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 This chapter is based on Kavanagh, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Barnes, Holmes, D. 
(accepted). The study of perspective-taking: Contributions from mainstream psychology and 
behavior analysis. The Psychological Record. 
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Perspective-taking has long been considered pivotal for human socialization (Mead; 
1934; Piaget, 1948) in terms of enabling an individual to overcome early egocentrism 
and to adjust their behaviour according to the expectations of others. The ability to take 
another’s perspective is crucial in: competitive settings (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; 
Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008); the establishment and maintenance of 
healthy interpersonal relations (Arriaga & Rusbult, 1998; Hughes, & Leekam, 2004); 
and strengthening social bonds (Galinksy & Ku, 2004; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 
2003). Indeed, there is evidence that perspective-taking deficits are associated with 
significant impairments in social skills (e.g. Tager-Flusberg & Anderson, 1991).   
Perspective-taking has been broadly defined as the ability to interpret and 
predict the thoughts, emotions or behaviours of oneself and of others (Carpendale & 
Lewis, 2006) in terms of being able to ‘assume an alternative perspective’ where 
necessary. While most research on perspective-taking has investigated the ability to 
assume the perspective of another (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000), 
the metacognitive (self-based) aspect of perspective-taking has also been emphasised 
(for a review see Bernstein, Hadash, Lichtash, Tanay, Shepherd, & Fresco, 2015). When 
both self- and other-based aspects of perspective-taking are acknowledged, the key skill 
is often perceived as the ability to put oneself in the ‘mental shoes’ of others in terms of 
imagining how they perceive, think or feel about an object or event (Moll & Meltzoff, 
2011a) and to understand that these beliefs/perceptions may be different from one’s own 
(Sigman & Capps, 1997).  
The key purpose of this introductory chapter is to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the literature on perspective-taking from within mainstream psychology 
and behaviour analysis. The primary focus will be on the behaviour-analytic approach 
to perspective-taking, which will be divided into what may be described as: (1) 
traditional behaviour analysis and (2) an area within behaviour analysis that is 
concerned specifically with human language and cognition, known as relational frame 
theory (RFT). The review begins by summarising the main ways in which traditional 
psychological research has studied perspective-taking. 
The Mainstream Psychology Approach to Perspective-taking 
 12 
 
Perspective-taking abilities have been sub-divided into three domains: visual or 
spatial perspective-taking (Flavell, 1992; Moll & Tomasello, 2006; Tversky & Hard, 
2009); affective or emotional perspective-taking (Dunn & Hughes, 1998; Wellman, 
Phillips, & Rodriguez, 2000); and cognitive perspective-taking (Flavell, 2004; Gopnik 
& Slaughter, 1991; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Although these domains are 
often studied independently, all three appear to be involved, to varying degrees, in the 
ability to take the perspective of another. 
Visual perspective-taking. Visual perspective-taking is often also referred to 
as spatial perspective-taking, with the two terms used interchangeably. Flavell (1977) 
proposed two distinct levels in its development. Level 1 involves appreciating what 
others see only from that specific viewpoint (e.g. recognizing that you may be able to 
see something that someone else cannot see). In a typical task assessing Level 1, a child 
is asked to position an object so that another person cannot see the object, or to 
determine whether another individual can see an object that the child can see. 
Competence on tasks of this kind has been observed in children as young as twelve-and-
a-half-months (Luo & Baillargoen, 2007; Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007).  
Level 2 of visual perspective-taking involves appreciating that even when two 
people can see the same object, they may do so from different vantage points. Typical 
tasks of this level are similar to Piaget’s Three Mountain Problem, in which a child must 
choose the photograph that matches what another person sees, rather than what the child 
sees (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). Competence on this type of task has been observed in 
children aged four years and older (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981).  
The large gap in the ages at which competence in Levels 1 and 2 of visual 
perspective-taking has been observed (12 months versus four years) is generally 
consistent with other evidence of variations in age-based outcomes for this skill (see 
Frick, Möhring, & Newcombe, 2014 for a review), and may pertain to the use of 
different methodologies. For example, using a more child-friendly task than the Three 
Mountain Problem, Moll and Meltzoff (2011a) reported that children as young as three 
years old show Level 2 visual perspective-taking.  
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Affective perspective-taking. Affective perspective-taking is often also 
referred to as emotional perspective-taking, again with the two terms used 
interchangeably. Affective perspective-taking involves the ability to recognise the 
emotional state of someone else (particularly when this differs from the emotional state 
of oneself), and to understand the relationship between different situations and the 
specific emotions they typically elicit (Cutting & Dunn, 1999). For example, a child 
capable of affective perspective-taking can recognise that, while they could be happy 
after winning a race, other children in the same race may feel sad because they lost. 
Competence in this regard has been observed in children aged between two and three 
years old (Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Sadovsky, 2006), and is typically associated with the 
emergence of simple emotion-based words, such as “happy” and “sad” (Dunn, 
Bretherton, & Munn, 1987). Indeed, affective perspective-taking is believed to be 
associated with social and emotional functioning (Arsenio, 2003; Izard et al., 2001), 
especially the ability to show varied and empathic responses to the distress of others 
(Eisenberg et al., 2006). For example, Wellman et al. (2000) have shown that two to 
three year olds can determine whether someone has received a desirable or undesirable 
object based on their emotional reactions to that object.  
It is perhaps not surprising that the conceptual and empirical work conducted to 
date on affective perspective-taking has highlighted the difficulties in separating this 
ability from related skills, such as empathy (e.g. Farrant, Devine, Maybery, & Fletcher, 
2012) and having a theory of mind (e.g. Cutting & Dunn, 1999). Indeed, many affective 
perspective-taking tasks require relatively sophisticated cognitive and linguistic skills, 
and thus result in floor effects when presented to young children (Eisenberg et al., 2006). 
In addition, affective perspective-taking tasks often require an understanding of conflict 
between one’s own emotional response to a situation and the emotional response of 
another (Harwood & Farrar, 2006), which is hard to distinguish from an understanding 
of false belief. It is perhaps, in part, for this reason that some authors have proposed an 
overlap between affective and cognitive perspective-taking as described below (e.g. 
Harwood & Farrar, 2006). On balance, other authors maintain that these complex 
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repertoires are better understood as two distinct forms of social cognition (e.g. Cutting 
& Dunn).  
Cognitive perspective-taking. Almost all of the research on cognitive 
perspective-taking has been conducted under the rubric of theory of mind (ToM), with 
the core skill believed to involve the correct attribution of mental states to oneself and 
others as a means of explaining and predicting behaviour (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000; 
Harrington, Siegert, & McClure, 2005). While the term ToM was first coined by 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) in research with chimpanzees, the ability to form a theory 
of mind is believed to be universal only in human adults (see Call & Tomasello, 2008, 
for a review).  
Cognitive perspective-taking and ToM skills are typically divided into two 
levels (Baron-Cohen, 2001). First-order false beliefs refer to assumptions made about 
another person’s beliefs and second-order false beliefs refer to another person’s 
assumptions about beliefs held by a third party (Boucher, 2012), with the latter deemed 
to be the more complex. Consider the first-order false belief scenario presented in the 
Sally-Anne Test, in which a child is asked about a protagonist known to hold a false 
belief (e.g. that there is a cookie in the cookie jar, rather than the jar containing nuts) 
about a situation because this belief differs from the child’s own true belief (e.g. that the 
cookie jar contains nuts). Wellman et al. (2001) reported that children aged four years 
typically pass the Sally-Anne Test, thus showing first-order false belief attribution. 
Second-order false beliefs are typically assessed through change in location stories and 
determine a child’s understanding that someone can hold a false belief about someone 
else’s belief (e.g. Flobbe, Verbrugge, Hendricks, & Krämer, 2008). Consider the 
following scenario from the Unexpected Transfer Task. The child is presented with the 
following scenario: ‘Mary and Simon are given a chocolate bar to share. Both put the 
chocolate in the fridge before going out to play. Soon after, Simon returns to the kitchen 
and takes the chocolate out of the fridge and puts it in his bag. Later, both children are 
told that they can eat their chocolate bar.’ Then the child is asked: “Where does Simon 
believe that Mary believes that the chocolate is?” The correct response ‘Simon believes 
that Mary believes that the chocolate is in the fridge’ indicates the attribution of a 
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second-order belief (see Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994). Astington, 
Pelletier, and Homer (2002) demonstrated competence in second-order false belief 
attribution in children aged six-seven years.  
Relatively recent research has focused less on ToM directly in terms of when it 
is present in a child’s repertoire and more on the developmental pre-cursors that are 
necessary for ToM to emerge in the first place. For example, Brooks and Meltzoff 
(2015) reported that infant joint attention (i.e. tracking another’s eye gaze or finger 
pointing in order to co-ordinate attending to a stimulus, such that the learner and the 
instructor have some element of shared experience regarding that stimulus) predicts 
mental-state term usage (e.g. using phrases such as “she knows” and “he thinks”) at two 
years and competence in ToM at four-and-a-half years (see also Colonnesi, Rieffe, 
Koops, & Perucchini, 2008; Kristen, Sodian, Thoermer, & Perst, 2011). Declarative 
pointing (i.e. pointing that functions as a means for a child to achieve joint reference 
with the addressee) in infancy also predicts ToM in preschool activities (Sodian & 
Kristen-Antonow, 2015). 
Cognitive perspective-taking in atypical development. Similar to the research 
noted above, a small number of studies have examined the impact of congenital deafness 
on the subsequent development of ToM. For example, Schick, de Villers, de Villers and 
Hoffmeister (2007) found that hearing-impaired infants, born to hearing-abled parents, 
show delays in passing false belief tasks at the typical age. Most of the ToM literature 
has explored other types of developmental deficits in atypical populations (e.g. 
Broekhof et al., 2015), including: attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD, 
Uekermann et al., 2010) and autism spectrum disorder (ASD, Frith, Morton, & Leslie, 
1991). In particular, research on the potential deficits in ToM in individuals with ASD 
has led to the “Impaired ToM” Hypothesis (see Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). 
This suggestion is based on evidence that at least some children with ASD fail to shift 
from their own perspective to the perspective of another (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1989), and 
that some older children and even adolescents from this group fail ToM tasks that can 
be passed by typically-developing children as young as four years (see Peterson, 
Wellman, & Liu, 2005). 
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In contrast, there exists a considerable body of evidence that questions the view 
that ToM is typically deficient in individuals with ASD. For example, Boucher (2012) 
reviewed a number of studies in which individuals from this group passed both first- 
and second-order false belief tasks, as well as other types of assessments of ToM, 
involving metaphor, faux pas and sarcasm (e.g. Scheeren, de Rosnay, Koot, & Begeer, 
2013). In support of these outcomes, Happé (1995) suggested that verbally-competent 
individuals with ASD can pass false belief tasks when given ample time because their 
core deficits may lie more broadly in social affective information processing (see also 
Tager-Flusberg, 2007). 
 In the ToM literature, it is widely accepted that ToM skills emerge in tandem 
with biological maturation (e.g. Grosse Wiesman, Schreiber, Singer, Steinbeis, & 
Firederici, 2017). Some support for this view comes from evidence that older children 
and adults generally show greater speed and flexibility in perspective-taking than 
younger children (Apperly, Back, Samson, & France, 2008; Im-Bolter, Agostino, & 
Owens-Jaffray, 2016). On balance, competence in ToM in children is susceptible to 
training and thus may be influenced as much by specific developmental contexts as 
broad maturational changes (see Hoffman et al., 2016).  
In any case, the relationship between perspective-taking and maturation does 
not appear entirely one-dimensional, because some evidence shows that under certain 
conditions even adults show slower responding and make more errors on ToM tasks 
than would generally be expected for their maturity (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006). 
The findings in this regard may be summarised as follows. (1) Attributing beliefs to 
others is slower than attributing beliefs to oneself (Bradford, Jentzsch, & Gomez, 2015). 
(2) Switching from self-perspective to other-perspective is slower than switching from 
other-perspective to self-perspective in the context of false belief (Bradford et al., 2015). 
(3) More complex tasks produce more errors (Bull, Phillips, & Conway, 2008) and non-
mentalistic, reality-based tasks are completed more quickly (Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, 
Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006). (4) Greater demands on cognitive load generate more 
errors and longer reaction times (McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007). (5) Tasks requiring 
inhibitory control of self-perspective take longer (than non-inhibitory control tasks, 
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Birch & Bloom, 2007; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). Taken together, numerous authors 
have argued that these differential outcomes highlight the role of executive functioning 
in ToM, and suggest that at least some of the weak ToM performances observed in 
adults and atypical samples reflect broader deficits in executive functioning, rather than 
in ToM per se (e.g. German & Hehman, 2006; McKinnon & Moscovitch). Other 
researchers working under the rubric of relational complexity (RC) theory have 
proposed that variability in outcomes on perspective-taking and ToM tasks in typical 
and atypical individuals depends upon the level of relational complexity that is 
comprised of the number of variables that are to be related in a given task (Andrews, 
Halford, Bunch, Bowden, & Jones, 2003; Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 1998).  
Cognitive perspective-taking in psychological suffering (psychopathology). 
According to Vaskin et al. (2015), different error patterns in ToM tasks may help to 
distinguish clinical from non-clinical populations, especially those diagnosed with 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) or schizophrenia. Specifically, given that 
disturbances in interpersonal relationships and the misreading of the intentions of others 
are believed to be core characteristics of BPD, it is perhaps not surprising that some 
individuals have shown different ToM outcomes, relative to controls (see Németh et al., 
2018 for a review). However, the findings in this regard are again inconsistent, with 
some studies showing that individuals with BPD perform better than control participants 
(e.g. Fertuck et al., 2009) and potentially highlighting ‘hypervigilance’ to social cues, 
but others showing that individuals with BPD perform worse than controls (e.g. Sharp 
et al., 2011), thereby suggesting ToM deficits. Similar to the developmental evidence 
discussed above, the ToM competencies of this clinical group appear to be influenced 
by the type of ToM task employed. For example, Preißler, Dziobek, Ritter, Heekeren 
and Roepke (2010) found that individuals with BPD were more likely to make ToM-
based errors on ecologically valid tasks with greater complexity than on simpler tasks. 
Indeed, Roepke, Vater, Preißler, Heekeren and Dziobek (2013) argued that the more 
complex tasks may be necessary to tease out ToM deficits in this group.  
 Several studies have reported that individuals with schizophrenia have also 
produced different outcomes on ToM tasks, relative to controls (e.g. Savla, Vella, 
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Armstrong, Penn, & Twamley, 2013). That is, some have found weaker performances in 
the attribution of thoughts or intentions to others, and particularly in the attribution of 
emotional states (e.g. Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007), and others have found correlations 
between negative symptoms and the attribution of overly simplistic mental states to others 
(Montag et al., 2011; Pickup & Frith, 2001). Positive symptoms have also been associated 
with the attribution of overly complex mental states to others (Fretland et al., 2015). 
However, as noted previously, these performances are also influenced by task-specific 
features, suggesting that they may not be reflecting ToM deficits per se in this population. 
For example, on the Reading the Mind in the Eye Test, Scherzer, Leveille, Achim, 
Boisseau and Stip (2012) found no significant difference in ToM performances between 
individuals with schizophrenia and a group of non-clinical controls. However, 
performance on the Hinting Task was significantly more impaired for individuals with 
schizophrenia compared to the non-clinical group. Once again, generic deficits in 
executive function may be at play, in that numerous studies have found a correlation 
between poor ToM and deficits in inhibition and cognitive flexibility in this sample (for 
a review see Pickup, 2008).  
The mainstream psychology approach to the potential ‘processes’ involved 
in perspective-taking. The reviews above of the developmental and clinical literatures 
on perspective-taking and ToM highlight the difficulty of ruling out the potential role 
of broader cognitive concepts and capabilities, of which perspective-taking may be a 
component. As a result, the field of perspective-taking appears to have struggled to 
formulate an operational definition of what these skills involve (Davis et al., 2004). 
Davis et al. summaried the core steps involved in perspective-taking as follows: (1) 
imagining what the observer themselves would do in that position; (2) imagining similar 
circumstances from the observer’s own past; (3) imagining what the other person would 
do based on the observer’s knowledge of the other person’s history; and (4) following 
general social rules about what others might typically do in that type of scenario. 
 In a similar vein, Epley and Caruso (2009) proposed three possible steps in 
perspective-taking that highlight three points at which an individual may falter. (1) The 
first step involves successfully activating the ability to perspective-take. That is, a 
 19 
 
person may fail to identify an instance where another’s perspective should be considered 
and this may result from factors such as the absence of sufficient effort or training (e.g. 
Idson et al., 2004). (2) The second step involves adjusting one’s own egocentric 
perspective to accommodate that of another, with failure to do so rendering judgements 
biased in the direction of the initial self-perspective (for reviews, see Epley, 2004; 
Keysar & Barr, 2002). Indeed, Davis et al. (2004) found that explicit instructions to 
adopt another’s perspective increase the accessibility of self-related thoughts. 
Furthermore, egocentric biases increase when individuals are asked to respond quickly, 
but decrease when financial incentives accompany correct responding (Epley, Keysar, 
Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004). (3) The third step in perspective-taking depends upon 
the information about others that is provided, which ranges from idiosyncratic 
knowledge about specific individuals to general information and even stereotypes 
(Ames, 2004).  
Summary. In mainstream psychology, the broad concept of perspective-taking 
has been sub-divided into visual perspective-taking, emotional perspective-taking and 
cognitive perspective-taking (usually referred to as ToM). Visual perspective-taking has 
been observed as early as 12 months. Affective perspective-taking emerges later, 
usually around age two, and cognitive perspective-taking (ToM) comes even later 
around age four, with false belief understanding observed around age six. However, 
there have been wide variations in the ages at which these skills are typically first 
observed, with outcomes apparently sensitive to both methodological variations and 
broader individual differences, especially in executive functioning. There is evidence of 
weaker perspective-taking performances in samples with a diagnosis of ASD, BPD and 
schizophrenia, but these too appear to be influenced by task-specific features and 
broader executive functioning abilities. Indeed, the reviews above of the developmental 
and clinical literatures highlight the difficulty of ruling out the potential role of broader 
cognitive concepts and capabilities in assessments of perspective-taking. These 
difficulties perhaps account for why mainstream psychology has not yet reached 
consensus on the processes involved in perspective-taking. The current chapter 
continues by summarising the ways in which traditional behaviour analysis has studied 
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perspective-taking, and, as will become clear, the basic (behavioural) processes in 
perspective-taking are only now beginning to attract attention in that field. 
The Traditional Behaviour-analytic Approach to Perspective-taking 
In the field of behaviour analysis, the ability to respond to one’s own responding 
is pivotal to an understanding of the concept of ‘self’. The earliest behavioural writings 
on self include those by Skinner (e.g. 1974), who proposed that self-knowledge 
develops through shaping by the knowledge of others and by social contingencies that 
reinforce the discrimination of one’s own behaviour. By asking questions such as “How 
are you feeling?”, other members of the verbal community, in effect, shape an 
individual’s ability to discriminate their own behaviour. Across such exemplars, an 
individual is believed to become more self-aware, thus acquiring better prediction and 
control over their own behaviour (see Skinner). However, it is perhaps surprising that 
the empirical support typically cited for Skinner’s interpretation of self-awareness has 
come from studies with non-humans, such as Lattal’s (1975) demonstration that the 
behaviour of pigeons may be brought under the control of their own previous patterns 
of responding.  
Few in the behaviour-analytic community have explicitly attempted to connect 
the Skinnerian concept of self with the skills involved in perspective-taking, even 
though they appear intuitively linked. However, some researchers have attempted to 
interpret ToM tasks and performances using behavioural concepts. For example, 
Spradlin and Brady (2008) interpreted ToM performances in terms of Sidman’s (e.g. 
1971) equivalence relations. Similarly, Okuda and Inoue (2000) and Schlinger (2009) 
attempted to interpret these performances in terms of operant stimulus control. And, 
DeBernardis, Hayes and Fryling (2014) offered an interbehavioural interpretation that 
emphasises the importance of analysing the complex interbehavioural history between 
the perceiver and the target other.  
Most of the behavioural work on perspective-taking has focused on the 
remediation of deficits in these abilities, based on the broad assumption that perspective-
taking repertoires may be established or remediated through the acquisition of an 
appropriate learning history. Two studies have investigated the use of video modelling 
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interventions to establish perspective-taking in children with ASD. Specifically, 
LeBlanc et al. (2003) presented three children with a variation of the Sally-Anne Test. 
Whilst all three initially failed, the video modelling served to produce highly competent 
performances in all cases, although generalisation to untrained tasks was recorded for 
only two of the children. Using a similar procedure again with three children, but 
including a number of training exemplars, Charlop-Christy and Daneshvar (2003) 
produced similar outcomes, but were more successful at promoting generalisation to 
novel stimuli and novel responses. In a related study also using a variation of the Sally-
Anne Test, and including prompts for training purposes, Gómez-Becerra, Martín, 
Chávez-Brown and Greer (2007) presented the task to five children with ASD, five with 
Down Syndrome (DS) and five who were typically-developing, all aged between four 
and six years. Three of the typically-developing children passed without prompts, with 
the remaining two requiring prompts to pass, as did all five children with DS. The five 
children with ASD all failed even with prompts. Further analyses of the data indicated 
that only those children with ASD or DS who had language deficits produced weak 
performances before or after prompting. 
Developmental behavioural researchers have devoted considerable attention to 
the likely pre-cursors to perspective-taking (Novak, 1996, 1998; Novak & Pelaez, 
2004), with a particular focus on joint attention and social referencing (Moll & Meltzoff, 
2011b; Slaughter & McConnell, 2003). Joint attention, as the name implies, involves 
tracking another’s eye gaze or finger pointing in order to co-ordinate attending to a 
stimulus, such that the learner and the instructor have some element of shared 
experience regarding that stimulus (see also Lowenkron, 1998, for a relevant functional-
analytic description of joint control). According to Dube, MacDonald, Mansfield, 
Holcomb and Ahearn (2004), this joint stimulus orientation results from a relevant 
history of consequences, including solidarity play. Indeed, there is evidence that joint 
attention can be established when found to be deficient or absent. For example, 
MacDonald et al. (2006) investigated joint attention responding and initiation in 21 
typically-developing children and 26 children with ASD, aged two to four years. When 
required to respond to joint attention involving gestures, both groups performed well, 
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with some superiority observed with advanced age. However, when required to initiate 
joint attention, the children with ASD, especially the younger ones, showed 
considerably weaker performances than the typically-developing children. In a related 
remediation study of joint attention and its initiation, Whalen and Schreibman (2003) 
trained five children with ASD aged four years, using components of Discrete Trial 
Training (DTT) and Pivotal Response Training (PRT). Baseline performances indicated 
considerable impairments relative to typically-developing peers, especially in joint 
attention initiation. However, training facilitated significant improvements in all 
children on joint attention, and in four of the children on joint attention initiation, 
including generaliation to novel settings and novel adults. In a similar study, Gould, 
Tarbox, O’Hora, Noone and Bergstrom (2011) evaluated the use of multiple exemplars 
of Conditional Discrimination Training (CDT). During the baseline, all three children 
failed to demonstrate joint attention, but the interventions facilitated rapid acquisition 
of the target performances and generalisation to untrained stimuli for all participants. 
However, generalisation in the natural environment was much more limited. Hahs 
(2015) replicated this study, but failed to find generalisation to untrained stimuli. 
Social referencing involves orienting to another person’s expression and then 
responding to a stimulus on the basis of that expression (Peláez-Nogueras & Gewirtz, 
1997), with the expression thus functioning as a setting event (Peláez, 2009). For 
example, if a child discriminates a fearful expression on their mother’s face as the child 
reaches towards a dog, the child may be less likely to touch the dog given this 
expression. Social referencing, therefore, enables learners to predict the potential 
reinforcement of stimuli or events without the need for direct contact with the stimulus. 
Peláez, Virues-Ortega and Gewirtz (2012) investigated social referencing in which 
maternal facial expressions signaled either positive or negative consequences of the 
reaching behavior of 11 four- and five-month old babies. Whilst all of the infants failed 
the baseline, subsequent interventions established the mothers’ joyful expressions as 
discriminative for infant reaching, and fearful expressions as discriminative for not 
reacting, for all children. 
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Summary. In traditional behaviour analysis, the ability to respond to one’s own 
responding (i.e. acquire self-awareness) as an essential pre-cursor to perspective-taking, 
is shaped through a history of interacting with other members of the social/verbal 
community, although empirical support for this interpretation of self-awareness has 
tended to come from research with non-humans. Indeed, little behaviour-analytic 
research has explicitly attempted to connect the concept of self (or self-awareness) with 
perspective-taking skills in humans. While some researchers have offered behavioural 
interpretations of ToM performances in terms of equivalence relations and operant 
stimulus control, most research has focused on remediating deficits in perspective-
taking through the provision of appropriate learning histories. The outcomes show that 
video modelling interventions have enabled children with ASD to pass the Sally-Anne 
Test, although generalisation is more robust when training exemplars are included. 
Incorporating training prompts into the Sally-Anne Test has also produced positive 
outcomes, but prompts appear to be necessary or less effective for participants with 
language deficits. Developmental behavioural researchers have devoted considerable 
attention to joint attention and social referencing as pre-cursors to perspective-taking. 
There is evidence that joint attention responding and initiation can be established in 
children with ASD, although the latter is more likely to be deficient and more difficult 
to establish, and generaliation is not always observed. Interventions to establish social 
referencing have demonstrated positive outcomes in four- and five-month old babies. In 
general, as one might expect, there has been a far greater emphasis in behavioural 
psychology on prediction-and-influence of perspective-taking, which in a broad sense 
further complicates the literature in this area. That is, research from the mainstream 
literature has tended to produce relatively inconsistent results in attempting to tie 
deficits in perspective-taking to specific ages, populations and syndromes. The fact that 
behaviour-analytic research also shows that perspective-taking deficits are relatively 
amenable to change when targeted by behavioural interventions makes it even more 
difficult to draw firm conclusions about the very concept of perspective-taking itself. In 
turning to an area of behaviour analysis that has concerned itself specifically with 
human language and cognition, RFT, we will find an account of perspective-taking that 
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is unsurprisingly rooted in human language. As will become clear, this focus has 
recently generated a more process-oriented account of perspective-taking. 
Relational Frame Theory: A Language-focused Behaviour-analytic Approach to 
Self and Perspective-taking 
 Some behavioural researchers working under the rubric RFT (see Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001 for a book-length treatment) have proposed that self-
discrimination involves verbal processes that distinguish it functionally from the non-
verbal self-discrimination observed with non-humans. In other words, self-awareness 
requires a human to be “not simply behaving with regard to his behavior, but . . . also 
behaving verbally with regard to his behavior” (Hayes & Wilson, 1993, p. 297). 
According to RFT, this type of verbal self-discrimination and perspective-taking 
comprise repertoires of derived relational responding, which is the basis of language 
itself. This section of the chapter summarises the core concepts of RFT in order to 
provide the basis for the theory’s approach to perspective-taking as derived relational 
responding.  
Patterns of derived relational responding. At its most basic, RFT makes an 
important distinction between non-arbitrary and arbitrary relational responding. In 
simple terms, non-arbitrary relational responding involves relating one stimulus or 
event to another on the basis of a shared physical property. For example, you might say 
that two tennis balls are the same because they are the same shape, size an/or colour, 
although there may be other small physical properties on which the two balls differ. 
Non-arbitrary relational responding appears to be directly acquired through 
contingencies and is highly developed in non-humans (see Giurfa, Zhang, Jenett, 
Menzel, & Srinivasan, 2001). 
In contrast, arbitrary or derived relational responding is not based solely on 
physical stimulus properties and is more likely to be emergent (i.e. derived) in terms of 
its acquisition. For example, if you train a verbally-able child that ‘Tom is faster than 
David and David is faster than Ann’, with no direct contact with these stimuli, they can 
then derive, in the absence of reinforcement or prompting, that ‘Tom is faster than Ann’ 
and that ‘Ann is slower than Tom’. The technical term RFT uses to describe this type 
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of relational behaviour is arbitrarily applicable relational responding (AARR) and it 
appears, at the present time, to be largely unique to verbally sophisticated humans 
(Brino, Campos, Galvão, & McIlvane, 2014; but see also Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 
2014). RFT researchers have investigated a number of different patterns of AARR, 
including responding in accordance with relations of co-ordination, distinction, 
opposition, comparison, hierarchy and perspective-taking. These are summarised 
briefly below. In each case, an example of at least one study that has demonstrated the 
specific pattern of relational responding is provided. 
Responding in accordance with the relation of coordination appears to be the 
most basic form of AARR that infants learn (Lipkens, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993) around 
18-24 months (Luciano, Gómez-Becerra, & Rodríguez-Valverde, 2007). Consider the 
example, ‘If A is the same as B and B is the same as C, then A and C are most likely 
the same.’ O’Connor, Rafferty, Barnes-Holmes and Barnes-Holmes (2009) successfully 
employed multiple exemplar training (MET) to establish word-picture and picture-word 
co-ordination relations in 15 children with ASD, as well as three typically-developing 
children (see also Carr, Wilkinson, Blackman, & McIlvane, 2000).  
Responding in accordance with the relation of distinction requires responding 
to arbitrary differences among stimuli, along a particular dimension, by applying a 
relational cue such as ‘is different from’ (Dixon & Zlomke, 2005; Roche & Barnes, 
1996; Steele & Hayes, 1991). Consider the example, ‘If A is different from B, then B is 
different from A.’ Relations of distinction do not always specify the relevant dimension 
along which the stimuli differ and, of course, there are many ways in which this can 
occur. For example, you might tell someone that you are very different from your sister, 
with no need to say exactly how you differ. Dunne, Foody, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes and Murphy (2014) established contextual control for distinction responses 
with both non-arbitrary and arbitrary relations in two children with ASD.  
Responding in accordance with the relation of opposition requires the 
abstraction of a particular dimension along which stimuli can be differentiated at either 
end of a continuum (Steele & Hayes, 1991). As a result, opposition relations likely 
involve a higher level of complexity than co-ordination and distinction relations, for 
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example, because opposition relations involve co-ordination and/or distinction relations. 
For example, ‘If A is opposite to B (hence A and B are also different) and B is opposite 
to C’, A and C are most likely the same. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, 
Strand and Friman (2004) successfully employed MET to establish opposition relations 
in typically-developing children, while Dunne et al. (2014) established these relations 
in four children with ASD. Dymond, Roche, Forsyth, Whelan and Rhoden (2007) also 
demonstrated the derived transformation of avoidance functions in adults in accordance 
with opposition relations (see also Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 2004).  
Responding in accordance with the relation of comparison requires responding 
to one event in terms of quantitative or qualitative relations along a specified dimension 
with another event. For example, ‘If A is bigger than B and B is bigger than C’, A is 
bigger than C and C is smaller than A. Responding on the basis of comparison relations 
has successfully been established in typically-developing children (Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2004; Berens, & Hayes, 2007; Hayes, Stewart, & McElwee, 2016) and in children 
with ASD (Dunne et al., 2014; Gorham, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Berens, 
2009). Vitale, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes and Campbell (2008) also showed some 
variation in comparison responding in adults between specified and unspecified 
relations.   
Responding in accordance with temporal relations requires responding to the 
relationship between two events in terms of a specified temporal dimension, by applying 
a relational cue such as ‘before/after’ or ‘now/then.  For example, ‘If A occurs after B 
and B occurs after C’, C most likely occurs before A and A occurs after C. RFT-based 
research demonstrating patterns of temporal relational responding is limited, with only 
a few studies conducted with adults. Specifically, O’Hora, et al. (2008) found that 
successful completion of a temporal relations task predicted better performances on the 
Verbal Comprehension and Perceptual Organization indices of the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence-III (WAIS III) in an undergraduate sample. Similarly, 
O’Toole and Barnes-Holmes (2009) assessed flexibility in responding to temporal and 
comparison relations, using the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). The 
results indicated that faster responding in accordance with temporal and comparison 
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relations, as well as greater flexibility in these patterns, predicted higher scores on the 
Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (K-BIT). Several studies have also assessed the 
implications of temporal relations for instructional control (Brassil, Hyland, O’Hora, & 
Stewart, 2019; O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2004; Hyland, Smyth, 
O’Hora, & Leslie, 2014; McGreal, Hyland, O’Hora, & Hogan, 2016).  
Responding in accordance with the relation of hierarchy appears to be even 
more complex and again contains some of the relations described above. For example, 
‘If B is a member of group A’; A is a class containing B and any other members of A 
are likely to be similar to B, at least to some extent. For example, apples and oranges 
are both members of the food group fruit, but they differ in many other ways. Several 
studies have investigated hierarchical relations in adults (e.g. Gil, Luciano, Ruiz, & 
Valdivia-Salas, 2012; Gil, Luciano, Ruiz, & Valdivia-Salas, 2014; Griffee & Dougher, 
2002; Slattery & Stewart, 2014) and typically-developing children (Mulhern, Stewart, 
& McElwee, 2017). Some studies have also successfully trained hierarchical relational 
responding in typically-developing children aged five-six years (Mulhern, Stewart, & 
McElwee, 2018). 
A small number of studies have explored the possible sequence in which the 
above repertoires of AARR develop naturally, because this may have important 
developmental and educational implications (e.g. Cassidy, Roche, & Hayes, 2011; 
Dixon, 2014). For example, Dunne et al. (2014) assessed the repertoires in the following 
sequence with children with ASD: co-ordination, opposition, distinction and 
comparison. Their outcomes showed that all 10 children demonstrated co-ordination 
relations: four demonstrated opposition relations; and two demonstrated distinction, 
comparison and hierarchical relations, thus suggesting weaker performances as the 
relations became more complex. In addition, the number of training trials needed during 
the intervention phase to establish the target repertoires decreased steadily as more 
repertoires were established, thus implying that the earlier relational skills facilitated 
the latter.  
In a subsequent study, Kent, Galvin, Barnes-Holmes, Murphy and Barnes-
Holmes (2017) directly compared two training sequences. Training Sequence A 
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consisted of teaching co-ordination, distinction, comparison, opposition and then 
hierarchical relations, while Training Sequence B switched the order of the comparison 
and opposition relations (i.e. co-ordination, distinction, opposition, comparison and then 
hierarchy). The results indicated that participants who completed Training Sequence B 
(comparison before opposition) demonstrated significantly better performances on 
comparison relations than participants who completed Training Sequence A. This 
finding suggested that establishing opposition relations may facilitate the emergence of 
comparison relations.  
The RFT approach to perspective-taking. As some of the findings above 
suggest, once these core patterns of AARR emerge, they likely provide the basis for 
more complex relational repertoires, such as that involved in perspective-taking. For 
RFT, perspective-taking is also AARR that becomes abstracted through learning to talk 
about your perspective in relation to others (McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2004). Across multiple exemplars, this abstraction generates the constancy that 
characterises your perspective and once the perspective-taking relations are established, 
they become an intrinsic feature of almost all of our verbal behaviour (see Hayes et al., 
2001). Imagine a very young child who is asked “What did you have for lunch today?” 
while they eating an evening meal with their family. If the child responded simply by 
referring to what a sibling is currently having for dinner, they may well be corrected 
with “No, that’s what your brother is eating now, but what did you eat earlier today?” 
In effect, this kind of on-going refinement of the three deictic relations allows the child 
to respond appropriately to questions about their own behaviour in relation to others, as 
it occurs in specific times and specific places (e.g. McHugh et al., 2004). Thus, ‘having 
a perspective’ is a continuous experience and an individual is always operating from the 
same ‘self’ perspective (Hayes, 1984).  
For RFT, the core relations involved in perspective-taking are referred to as 
deictic (Hayes et al., 2001), and include responding from one’s own perspective in 
relation to others, time and place. Specifically, the interpersonal relations involve 
responding to I and you, the spatial relations involve responding to here and there, and 
the temporal relations involve responding to now and then. For RFT, the relational 
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properties of I vsersus you, here versus there, and now versus then become constants, 
against which environments that are continually changing in terms of time and space 
can be understood, categorised and communicated about.  
The original deictic relations protocol. Most of the empirical research on 
deictic relational responding has employed various iterations of a developmental 
protocol originally developed by Barnes-Holmes (2001)2. The original extensive 256-
trial protocol targeted the three deictic relations (I-YOU, HERE-THERE and NOW-
THEN), as well as three levels of relational complexity, referred to as: simple, reversed, 
and double reversed relations. In an attempt to reflect a typical developmental sequence, 
the protocol targeted the interpersonal I-YOU relations first, followed by the spatial 
HERE-THERE relations and finally the temporal NOW-THEN relations. Specifically, 
Level 1 first targeted simple I-YOU relations (e.g. “I have a red brick and you have a 
green brick. Which brick do I have? Which brick do you have?”), followed by reversed 
I-YOU relations (e.g. “If I have a red brick and you have a green brick and if I was you 
and you were me. Which brick would I have? Which brick would you have?”).  
Level 2 targeted HERE-THERE relations, including I-YOU relations from 
Level 1. Again, simple HERE-THERE relations were assessed first (e.g. “I am sitting 
here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. Where am I sitting? 
Where are you sitting?”), followed by reversed HERE-THERE relations (e.g. “I am 
sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If here was 
 
2 Guinther (2017) offered an experimental protocol for modelling perspective-taking that appears 
to require derived ‘mental rotation’ on behalf of typically-developing adult participants. More 
recently, Guinther (2018) extended the model to include false belief, but with mixed results (i.e. 
only two of four participants demonstrated false belief in the absence of direct training). As an 
aside, initially Guinther (2017) argued that the protocol developed by Barnes-Holmes (2001) and 
the derived mental rotation model constituted competing accounts of perspective-taking. More 
recently, Guinther (2018) appears to recognise that the two approaches are RFT-consistent, but 
are different in so many ways that it is difficult to argue that one is somehow more precise or 
better than the other. 
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there and there was here. Where would you be sitting? Where would I be sitting?”). 
Level 2 then combined the interpersonal and spatial relations in what was referred to as 
an I-YOU/HERE-THERE double reversal (e.g. “I am sitting here on the blue chair and 
you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was you and you were me and if here was 
there and there was here. Where would I be sitting? Where would you be sitting?”).  
Level 3 focused on the temporal relations and its relationship with interpersonal 
and spatial relations. Again, simple NOW-THEN relations were targeted first (e.g. 
“Yesterday I was watching television, today I am reading. What am I doing now? What 
was I doing then?”), followed by reversed NOW-THEN relations (e.g. “Yesterday I was 
watching television, today I am reading. If now was then and then was now. What was 
I doing then? What would I be doing now?”). It is notable from the examples above that 
even when presented in simple form, temporal relations do not combine I and YOU, 
instead only one is presented in any trial. This is because combining interpersonal and 
temporal relations leaves some relations unspecified. For example, if I tell you that ‘I 
was sleeping yesterday and my sister is working today’, you cannot know what my sister 
was doing yesterday and what I am doing today. Similar to Level 2, Level 3 also 
assessed HERE-THERE/NOW-THEN double reversals (e.g. “Yesterday I was sitting 
there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair. If here was there and 
there was here and if now was then and then was now; Where would I be sitting then? 
Where would I be sitting now?”). 
Empirical research using the deictic relations protocol with typically-
developing children. A large proportion of the research using the deictic relations 
protocol has presented it to typically-developing children (see Montoya-Rodríguez, 
Molina, & McHugh, 2017, for a review). The results of this body of research may be 
summarised as follows: (1) The data support the distinctions among the three types of 
deictic relations (McHugh et al., 2004); (2) The deictic relations vary on a continuum 
of complexity from simple relations to reversed relations and double reversed relations 
(McHugh et al.; Heagle & Rehfeldt, 2006); (3) There appears to be a developmental 
trend in which the interpersonal and simple relations emerge first (McHugh et al.); (4) 
Once established in typically-developing children, these perspective-taking repertoires 
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can generalise to both new stimuli and real-world conversational topics (Heagle & 
Rehfeldt); (5) Perspective-taking repertories can be successfully established in more 
natural language-like contexts, such as within a children’s story (Davlin, Rehfeldt, & 
Lovett, 2011); and (6) The establishment of the deictic relations may be enhanced when 
multiple exemplars of established cues for deictic responding are incorporated into the 
protocol (Montoya-Rodríguez, & Molina Cobos, 2018).  
Empirical research using the deictic relations protocol with atypically-
developing children. Similar to the mainstream ToM literature, a considerable number 
of studies on deictic relational responding in children have focused on investigating 
possible deficits associated with ASD. The findings that have been observed using the 
deictic relations protocol may be summarised as follows: (1) Overall, children with ASD 
produce weaker performances than their typically-developing peers (Rehfeldt, Dillen, 
Ziomek, & Kowalchuk, 2007); (2) The performances of children with ASD can also be 
differentiated in terms of both relation type and level of complexity, and deficits can be 
remediated with direct training (Jackson, Mendoza, & Adams, 2014); (3) Deictic 
relational responding can be established using naturalistic variations of the original 
protocol, such as children’s stories (Gilroy, Lorah, Dodgea, & Fiorello, 2015); and (4) 
The transformation of stimulus functions through deictic relations has been 
demonstrated in certain training contexts (Barron, Verkuylen, Belisle, Paliliunas, & 
Dixon, 2018; Belisle, Dixon, Stanley, Munoz, & Daar, 2016). 
The use of the deictic protocol with typical adults. Several studies have used the 
original protocol to examine deictic relational responding in typical adults. McHugh et 
al. (2004) reported that adults (18-30 years) produced less errors overall than 
adolescents and children, and that adolescents made less errors than children. 
Interestingly however, even adults produced error rates ranging from 25% on reversed 
I-YOU relations to 50% on reversed NOW-THEN relations. In a replication study in 
the same paper, in which the protocol was presented in an automated rather than table-
top format, very similar performances overall were observed.  
The use of the deictic protocol with atypical adults. A number of studies have 
investigated deictic relational responding in various groups of adults, that may be 
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referred to as atypical, either in terms of intellectual competence or clinical presentation. 
Gore, Barnes-Holmes and Murphy (2010) investigated 24 adults with varying levels of 
intellectual disability and found that performances on the deictic protocol correlated 
with verbal ability, full-scale IQ and performance IQ. Lovett and Rehfeldt (2014) 
successfully used MET with three adults with ASD to establish competent performances 
on the protocol and some level of generalisation to natural social interactions. O’Neill 
and Weil (2014) presented the protocol to three adults with mild-moderate intellectual 
disability and with schizophrenia. Baseline results indicated considerable deficits in 
responding across all three levels of complexity from 17% accuracy on double reversals 
to 50% on simple relations. After explicit training, significant improvements were 
observed on all tasks, with accuracy now ranging from 79% on double reversals to 96% 
on simple relations.  
Villatte, Monestès, McHugh, Freixa, i Baqué and Loas (2008) compared 
performances on the protocol within a non-clinical sample of college students who 
scored high versus low on social anhedonia. Overall, both groups performed very well, 
with minor weaknesses observed on the more complex trials. Where superiority in 
performance was observed in the low social anhedonia group, this occurred on reversed 
I-YOU and reversed HERE-THERE relations, I-YOU/HERE-THERE double reversals 
and HERE-THERE/NOW-THEN double reversals. In a related study, Vilardaga, 
Estévez, Levin and Hayes (2012) reported that performance on a modified version of 
the deictic protocol correlated with social anhedonia, empathy and experiential 
avoidance. 
Villatte, Monestès, McHugh, Freixa, i Baqué and Loas (2010a) investigated 
performances on the protocol with 15 adults with and without schizophrenia. The 
sample with schizophrenia produced significantly more errors on all reversed relations 
and weaker performances on double reversals. Contrary to previous findings, both 
groups performed better on double reversals than reversals.  
Janssen et al. (2014) compared performances on the protocol between 13 adults 
with Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) and 14 control participants. Similar to previous 
evidence, both groups produced their highest levels of accuracy on simple relations, 
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with lowest on double reversals. Interestingly, while highest accuracies were observed 
on I-YOU relations, both groups emitted their next best performances on NOW-THEN 
relations and their lowest accuracies on HERE-THERE relations. The two groups only 
differed significantly on reversals, with the control group showing superiority in this 
regard. In a related study, Hendriks et al. (2016) compared the performances of 27 
individuals with anxiety, eight with psychosis and 23 control participants. The results 
showed that all groups produced their highest levels of accuracy on simple relations and 
the lowest on double reversals, with some evidence that the group with psychosis 
produced lowest accuracies overall, while the control group produced the highest level 
of accuracy. 
Possible limitations to using the deictic protocol in adults and clinical samples. 
Although the deictic protocol has been used less often with adults than children, and has 
not been used extensively with clinical samples, several authors have raised concerns 
about using the tool with these samples (Hussey et al., 2014). These concerns may be 
summarised as follows: (1) The protocol was explicitly designed for developmental 
purposes (i.e. use with young children) to establish deictic relations when they were 
found to be absent or deficient (see Barnes-Holmes, 2001); (2) Even typically-
developing adults show deficits on specific deictic relations when these relations are not 
presented as they typically are in natural language (McHugh et al., 2004; Vitale et al., 
2008); (3) RFT does not necessarily predict that psychological suffering involves 
deficits in relational responding; (4). It is possible that deficits or unexpected patterns 
of deictic relational responding might be observed in psychological suffering, but more 
meaningful effects would likely be obtained if the deictic relations were specific to the 
domain of interest (e.g. an individual’s levels of anxiety relative to others).  
Summary. Behavioural researchers working under the rubric of RFT have 
proposed a distinction between verbal self-discrimination as observed in humans and 
nonverbal self-discrimination as observed with nonhumans. According to RFT, verbal 
self-discrimination and perspective-taking comprise repertoires of AARR. For RFT, 
perspective-taking is AARR that becomes abstracted across multiple exemplars of 
talking about your perspective in relation to others. The core relations involved in 
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perspective-taking are referred to as deictic relations, and include responding from one’s 
own perspective in terms of interpersonal relations, spatial relations and temporal 
relations. Most of the empirical research on deictic relational responding has employed 
various iterations of a developmental protocol. This research supports the distinctions 
among the three types of deictic relations and the finding that these relations vary on a 
continuum of complexity from simple relations to reversed relations, and double 
reversed relations. In general, accuracies in performances on the deictic relational 
protocol increase as a function of age. However, even adults produce error rates and, in 
some cases, adult performances are better on double reversals than reversals. Once 
established via MET, perspective-taking repertoires can generalise to both new stimuli 
and contexts. Studies assessing patterns of deictic relational responding in atypical 
populations have found that children with ASD produce somewhat weaker patterns than 
their peers. Results with atypical adults have found that performances on the deictic 
protocol correlate with verbal ability and IQ. Participants with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia have been shown to produce significantly weaker results on reversed and 
double reversed relations than typically-developing counterparts. Several researchers 
have raised concerns about using the protocol to assess deictic relational repertoires in 
adult samples.   
Exploring the putative relationship between performances on the deictic 
relations protocol and ToM tasks. A considerable number of the studies described 
above attempted to assess the relationship between children’s performances on the 
deictic protocol and traditional ToM tasks, in order to determine the potential functional 
overlap between the skills targeted by each. Specifically, with typically-developing 
children, Weil, Hayes and Capurro (2011) reported that establishing competent 
performances on the protocol generalised to ToM tasks, although Jackson et al. (2014) 
reported that training on the protocol was not sufficient to improve weak performances 
on ToM tasks with atypically-developing children.  
Four of the studies described in the earlier sections with adults from clinical 
samples have also attempted to assess the relationship between performances on the 
protocol and ToM tasks. With adults with mild-moderate intellectual disability and 
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schizophrenia, O’Neill and Weil (2014) reported that training on the protocol 
significantly improved weak baseline performances on the Deceptive Container Task 
(Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989) and the Hinting Task (Corcoran, Mercer, & 
Frith, 1995). Similarly, when Lovett and Rehfeldt (2014) used MET to establish deictic 
relational responding in adults with ASD, they saw improvements on the Theory of 
Mind Inventory (TOMI). Villatte et al. (2010a) found that performances on reversal 
trials by adults with and without schizophrenia significantly predicted accuracy on the 
ToM task. Finally, Hendriks et al. (2016) reported that with individuals with anxiety 
and others with psychosis, performance on the protocol was positively correlated with 
both the Faux-pas (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999) and the 
Strange Stories (Happé, 1995) tests (although these correlations were not retained when 
intelligence was controlled for). Taken together, there is evidence of a functional 
overlap between deictic relational responding as measured by the protocol and ToM 
with numerous samples.  
Several studies have systematically adapted trials from the deictic protocol to 
create tasks that closely resemble the attribution of true and false beliefs as targeted by 
ToM measures, such as the Deceptive Container Task. Specifically, McHugh, Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes and Stewart (2006) constructed trials that required participants 
from five different age groups to respond in accordance with the three deictic relations 
and on some trials to respond in accordance with logical NOT. Consider a true belief 
trial with the following scenario and subsequent questions: “If you put the doll in the 
cookie jar and I am here. What would I think is in the cookie jar? What would you think 
is in the cookie jar?” Now consider a false belief trial containing logical NOT as 
follows: “If you put the doll in the cookie jar and I am not here. What would you think 
is in the cookie jar? What would I think is in the cookie jar?”. For RFT, responding 
correctly to the latter task involves responding in accordance with HERE-THERE, 
NOW-THEN and logical not (i.e. I did NOT see inside THERE and THEN, so this is 
what I think is inside HERE and NOW). The results from McHugh et al. indicated that 
accuracy on both types of trial appeared to increase as a function of age, but there was 
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no significant difference in accuracy rates when responding to true and false belief was 
compared, nor were differences recorded between these trial types for any age group.  
In a related study, McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Whelan and 
Stewart (2007) compared responding to self versus other in adapted false belief trials, 
in terms of both accuracy and response latency. Consider the following self-attribution 
false belief trial: “If you put the pencils in the Smarties box and I am not there, would 
you think the Smarties box contains pencils?”. Now consider an other-attribution false 
belief trial: “If I put the pencils in the Smarties box and you are not there, would I think 
the Smarties box contains pencils?” The results of the study indicated high accuracy 
overall in false belief responding, but significantly longer latencies on trials involving 
the perspective of other versus self. 
Across two experiments, Villatte, Monestès, McHugh, Freixa, i Baqué and Loas 
(2010b) used a similar adaptation of true and false belief trials as above and compared 
15 control participants, 15 high in social anhedonia, 15 low in social anhedonia and 15 
with schizophrenia. The four trial types were as follows: self-attribution true belief (e.g. 
“If I put the pencils in the Smarties box and you are here, you would think the Smarties 
box contains …..?”); self-attribution false belief (e.g. “If I put the pencils in the Smarties 
box and you are not here, you would think the Smarties box contains….?”); attribution-
to-other true belief (e.g. “If you put the pencils in the Smarties box and I am here, I 
would think the Smarties box contains….?”); and attribution-to-other false belief (e.g. 
“If you put the pencils in the Smarties box and I am not here, I would think the Smarties 
box contains ….?”). The results of Experiment 1 indicated that participants with high 
social anhedonia were significantly less accurate than the low social anhedonia group 
on other-attributions. While latencies did not differ across groups, all were significantly 
faster on self- rather than other-attributions. Experiment 2 indicated that both groups 
showed longer latencies on other-attributions than self-attributions and on false beliefs 
versus true. Participants with schizophrenia were significantly less accurate than 
controls on self-attribution of false belief but there was no difference on true belief. 
While the individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia also produced more errors on both 
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types of other-attribution, this was not statistically significant different from the 
performances of controls on other-attribution tasks. 
In a related study, McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, and 
Dymond (2007) constructed deictic trials that resembled ToM tasks for deception and 
presented them to five different age groups. There were four experimental trial types 
which, for example, presented a picture of a teddy on the screen above a picture of a toy 
box and a refrigerator, along with a trial-specific question. Participants provided their 
response by placing the picture at the top of the screen on top of one of the pictures 
below. (1) First-order Positive trials included, for example, the question “If I have a 
teddy and I want you to find it, where should I put the teddy?” A correct response in 
this example would involve the participant placing the picture of the teddy on top of the 
picture of the toy box. (2) First-order Negative trials included, for example, the question 
“If you have a teddy and you don’t want me to find it, where should you hide it?” A 
correct response would involve the participant placing the picture of the teddy on top of 
the picture of the refrigerator. (3) Second-order Positive trials included, for example, 
the question “If I have a teddy and if you know that I know you’re trying to hide it from 
me, where should you hide the teddy?” In this case, a correct response would involve 
the participant placing the picture of the teddy on top of the picture of the toy box. (4) 
Second-order Negative trials included, for example, the question “If I have a teddy and 
if I know that you don’t know I’m trying to hide it from you, where should I hide the 
teddy?” A correct response would involve the participant placing the picture of the teddy 
on top of the picture of the refrigerator. The results showed that in general overall 
accuracy appeared to improve with age. These differences in improvement were 
significant for all age groups, except between late childhood and adolescence, and 
between adolescence and adulthood. 
Summary. A considerable number of studies have assessed the relationship 
between performances on the deictic protocol and traditional ToM tasks, and found 
evidence of a functional overlap between deictic relational responding on the protocol 
and ToM with numerous samples. Several studies have systematically adapted trials 
from the deictic protocol to create tasks that closely resemble the attribution of true and 
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false beliefs as targeted by traditional ToM tasks. The evidence indicates that accuracy 
on both types of trials increases as a function of age, but there are no differences in 
accuracy between true and false belief attribution. Related research has compared 
responding to self versus other in adapted false belief tasks and found no difference in 
overall accuracies but significantly longer latencies on trials involving the perspective 
of other versus self. In studies with atypical samples, those with high social anhedonia 
have been found to perform significantly more poorly than controls on false belief 
attributions to others. Similarly, participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia have 
performed significantly worse than controls on self-attributions of false belief.  
The need for an alternative to the deictic protocol. Much of the work 
conducted in the area of deictic relational responding has focused on assessing the 
presence of these patterns of relational responding in a dichotomous manner. That is, 
participants were typically assessed for the presence of deictic relational responding, 
and if found to be deficient, these relations were trained and tested to determine if they 
produced predicted outcomes. However, little research has focused on the relative 
strength of a pattern once it was observed and there have been recent calls for analyses 
that focus on the relative strength or persistence of derived relational responding, rather 
than simply its presence versus absence (e.g. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Hussey, 
& Luciano, 2016). In an attempt to develop methodologies for assessing the relative 
strength of derived relational responding, researchers have explored alternative 
methodologies, such as the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; e.g. 
Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2008; Hussey, Barnes-
Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015).  
The IRAP requires participants to emit two opposing patterns of relational 
responding and the ease with which one pattern may be emitted relative to the other 
provides a measure of response strength. Specifically, the procedure typically presents 
label and target stimuli (e.g. the label word “puppy” with the target word “pleasant”) 
and requires participants to respond “True” (e.g. puppy-pleasant) or “False” (e.g. puppy-
unpleasant) to the stimulus pairs. An IRAP typically comprises four trial types (e.g. 
Puppy-Positive, Puppy-Negative, Spider-Positive, and Spider-Negative) that are 
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generally analysed independently in terms of the difference in response latencies 
between responding that is deemed consistent versus inconsistent with a participant’s 
verbal history. In general, response latencies are expected to be shorter during blocks of 
trials that require history-consistent versus history-inconsistent responding. 
The body of empirical research employing the IRAP has grown considerably, 
with an increasing focus on clinically relevant phenomena (Vahey, Nicholson, & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2015). Using the IRAP to assess deictic relational responding, 
particularly in the clinical domain, would provide an alternative to the Barnes-Holmes 
(2001) protocol. A recent study in which the IRAP was used to target responding to self 
versus others seems particularly relevant (Barbero-Rubio, Lopez-Lopez, Luciano, & 
Eisenbeck, 2016). 
The study presented participants with their own names and the name of the 
researcher as label stimuli, and statements pertaining to specific characteristics of the 
self versus other as targets (e.g. “is in front of the laptop”). There were two response 
options (“yes” and “no”) on each trial. The four trial types in this study were referred to 
as: I-I (participant name-participant characteristics), Other-Other (researcher name-
researcher characteristics), I-Other (participant name-researcher characteristics) and 
Other-I (researcher name-participant characteristics). In general, the pattern of IRAP 
effects reported by Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016) indicated that participants’ response 
latencies showed significantly more rapid responding on the I-I trial type relative to the 
other three trial types during history-consistent blocks (i.e. responding “True” on I-I and 
Other-Other trial types, and responding “False” on I-Other and Other-I trial types). In 
addition, the difference in response latencies between consistent and inconsistent blocks 
for each trial type was in the predicted direction (i.e. shorter on history-consistent 
relative to history-inconsistent trials), and these differences were significant in terms of 
the normalized DIRAP-scores. 
The Current Thesis 
Following a review of the literature on perspective-taking (as above), the primary 
aim of the current thesis was to determine the potential utility of the IRAP in the domain 
of perspective-taking. To this end, Chapter 2, systematically replicated previous 
 40 
 
research by Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016), in which participants were presented with an 
IRAP that contained each participant’s own name (self) versus the name of the 
researcher (other) as label stimuli, and statements describing specific characteristics of 
the self (e.g. “is in front of the laptop”) versus other (e.g. “is standing up”) as target 
stimuli, along with “Yes” and “No” as response options. In an extension of the research 
by Barbero-Rubio et al., the current research included a control condition in which no 
responding to self was involved, only to others. The results in Experiment 1 yielded 
significant IRAP effects for two of the trial types in both the deictic and control IRAPs, 
whereas four significant effects were observed in the Barbero-Rubio et al. study, in 
which there was no control condition. Given the differences between the results of 
Experiment 1 and those found by Barbero-Rubio et al., Experiment 2 investigated 
whether introduction of a read-aloud procedure would produce a pattern of effects 
similar to the original study? On balance, Experiment 2 replicated the effects on the I-
Other and Other-I trial types reported in the original Barbero-Rubio study (i.e. they 
were both significantly different from zero). The additional analyses conducted here, 
however, indicated that the effects were both significantly weaker than the I-I and 
Other-Other trial types. The control IRAP also yielded significant effects for all four 
trial types, although two of the trial types (Researcher-Researcher and Other-Other) 
continued to be significantly stronger than the two remaining trial types. One possible 
concern that could be raised regarding the two studies involving the self- versus other-
IRAPs conducted in Chapter 2 is that differences that emerged between responding to 
self and other within the IRAP could be attributed to factors other than perspective-
taking per se. For example, a pattern known as the single-trial-type-dominance-effect 
(STTDE) emerged in Experiment 1 (see below). A second potential concern that could 
be raised regarding both experiments pertains to the simple target phrases that specified 
characteristics of self and other (e.g. “is sitting down”, “is the participant”, “is in front 
of the computer”). As such, it could be argued that responding on the IRAP simply 
required deictic relational responding, but not perspective-taking. Indeed, perspective-
taking would appear to require more complex target statements or relational networks 
that involve taking the perspective of self versus other. 
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Chapter 3 sought to develop IRAPs that taregeted perspective-taking with 
regard to the mental states of self and other. This was pursed in a series of experiments 
that employed a novel version of the IRAP, known as the Natural Language-IRAP (NL-
IRAP). Across a sequence of six experiments, a ‘self-focused IRAP’ required 
participants to respond to both positive and negative statements about themselves, 
whilst an ‘other-focused IRAP’ required participants to respond to similar statements 
about others. Experiment 1 and 2 investigated perspective-taking with regard to an 
unspecified other. Experiments 3-6 investigated perspective-taking with regard to a 
specified other, with the specified relationship between self and other manipulated 
across experiments. The results from the first two experiments indicated that there were 
significant differences between the self- versus other-focused IRAPs, when the other 
remained unspecified. The remaining four experiments, however, indicated that when 
the other was specified there was limited evidence that performances on the two IRAPs 
differed significantly. Overall, the IRAP effects for the most part, were in the predicted 
direction. However, on balance, the results could be seen as somewhat disappointing 
because there was little evidence of perspective-taking when other was specified, at least 
in terms of different performances across the two IRAPs, or in correlations among the 
IRAPs and the self-report measures. Perhaps, therefore, there was some sensitivity to 
self versus other, but the use of complex statements in the IRAPs potentially 
undermined or reduced the impact of deictic relational responding per se.  
In reflecting upon the results obtained in Chapters 2 and 3, a key issue emerged 
that seemed important to address. Specifically, the challenge was to develop an IRAP 
that facilitated responding to complex relational networks while maintaining sensitivity 
to self versus other. Chapter 4 addressed this issue in two ways:1. Self- and other-
pictures were employed in an IRAP to ensure that the functions of self and other 
relational networks were controlling participants responding; 2. Perspective-taking 
scenarios were presented before IRAP blocks, rather than presenting complex 
perspective-taking statements within each IRAP trial. Experiment 1 was pilot research 
that assessed the feasibility of using matched pictures of self and others. Participants 
were asked to bring an electronic picture of their face and a picture of another unknown 
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person, which could be inserted into the IRAP at the beginning of the session. Each 
participant was then exposed to two IRAPs, with one IRAP containing the picture of 
themselves and the other containing the matched picture of the other person. Both 
IRAPs presented the same pictures of pens as the contrast category. The results of the 
IRAPs were broadly consistent with common-sense expectations. That is, participants 
confirmed more readily than they denied that a picture of a face was a face and that a 
picture of a pen was a pen. They also denied more readily than confirmed that a picture 
of a pen was a face and that a picture of a face was a pen. No significant differences in 
the sizes of the individual trial type effects, or differences among those effects, emerged 
between the two (self and other) IRAPs.  
Given the relatively positive findings of Experiment 1 in Chapter 4 (i.e. in 
general, responding in a history-consistent manner), Experiment 2 sought to return to 
the main objective of the thesis by examining the impact of a brief vignette on 
performances on a belief-IRAP containing self/other pictures and belief-related 
statements. Specifically, participants were presented with a famliarisation IRAP, one of 
two vignettes which described a false belief scenario or a control scenario, followed by 
a belief-IRAP and eight self-reports. The results indicated vignette-consistent scores for 
three of the four trial types, with vignette-inconsistent effects recorded on the Self-Scarf 
trial type in both conditions. There was little evidence that the two vignettes impacted 
differentially upon the IRAP performances. The correlational analyses failed to indicate 
any clear relationships between the self-report measures and the IRAP. Despite there 
being no significant difference between IRAP performances across the two conditions, 
the pattern of results suggest that both vignettes, to some degree, impacted the IRAP 
effects.  
In reflecting upon the results obtained in Experiment 2 in Chapter 4, a number 
of issues emerged that seemed important to address in a follow-up experiment. First, it 
became apparent that participants in the Control Condition may have found the 
relationship between the vignette and the IRAP trial types somewhat ambiguous. 
Specifically, the control vignette specified that there were two boxes present in the room 
(one in front of the participant and another in front of the other person), whereas the 
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belief-IRAP presented statements that specified only one box. As such, it is difficult to 
interpret the IRAP effects that were observed for the Control group. A related issue 
pertains to the fact that the order in which the IRAP blocks were presented was not 
counterbalanced (i.e. the first block of the belief-IRAP was always vignette-consistent). 
With these issues in mind, we designed a second experiment that once again sought to 
develop an IRAP that would show some sensitivity to a false belief vignette. The main 
aim of Experiment 3 was to determine the extent to which false belief vignettes 
presented before each block of trials in a belief-IRAP would impact the performances 
observed on that IRAP. In doing so, two specific variables were manipulated across four 
conditions; 1. The sequence in which the critical stimuli were specified in false belief 
vignette; and 2. the order in which the IRAP blocks (i.e. vignette-consistent followed 
by vignette inconsistent versus the opposite block sequence) were presented. The main 
rationale for employing these versions of the same vignette was to determine if clear 
differential patterns of responding, consistent with the specified sequence in the 
vignette, would be observed in the belief-IRAP performances. The results of the third 
experiment were more conclusive than those of the second, in indicating that the primary 
controlling variable was the sequence in which the IRAP blocks were presented rather 
than the content of the vignettes. On balance, post-hoc analyses of performance on the 
first practice block pairs indicated that the block sequence and vignettes did interact 
with each other, but only when the vignette and the initial contingencies of the IRAP 
cohered with each other. 
Chapter 5 provides a General Discussion of the findings gathered across the 
eleven experiments reported across the three empirical chapters (2, 3 and 4). The 
empirical research reported in the current thesis was intertwined throughout with the 
on-going development of conceptual analyses within RFT itself, and thus it is important 
to place the current empirical research in that context. In order to achieve this objective, 
Chapter 5 introduces two separate useful conceptual analyses. The first part focuses on 
what has been labelled the differential arbitrarily applicable relational responding 
effects (DAARRE) model and the second part focuses on a recent attempt to provide a 
systematic framework for research within RFT. 
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Chapter 2 
Exploring Differential Trial Type Effects and 
the Impact of  
a Read-aloud Procedure on  
Deictic Relational Responding on the IRAP3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 This chapter is published in Kavanagh, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., 
McEnteggart C., & Finn, M. (2018). Exploring differential trial type effects and the impact of a 
read-aloud procedure on deictic relational responding on the IRAP. The Psychological Record, 
68(2), 163-176. 
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In a systematic replication and extension of previous research by Barbero-
Rubio et al. (2016), participants were presented with an IRAP that contained each 
participant’s own name (self) versus the name of the researcher (other) as label stimuli, 
and statements describing specific characteristics of the self (e.g. “is in front of the 
laptop”) versus other (e.g. “is standing up”) as target stimulu, along with “Yes” and 
“No” as response options. The extension of the original work involved the inclusion of 
a control condition in which no responding to self was involved, only responding to 
others. That is, the control condition involved an IRAP in which none of the trial types 
required responding to self, but only responding to two other separate individuals (i.e. 
the researcher and a picture of another unknown participant). If the comparison between 
self and other in a deictic-IRAP is an important variable, one might expect a different 
pattern of results in a control condition in which there is no contrast between self and 
other. Another way in which the current research extended Barbero-Rubio et al. was the 
inclusion of self-report measures of self-esteem and of the presence of psychotic-like 
experiences. One measure of perspective-taking employed in the original Barbero-
Rubio study was also retained. All measures were included on an exploratory basis; 
hence no specific predictions were made. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants. Forty participants were recruited for Experiment 1, 28 females and 
12 males. They ranged from 18-36 years old (M = 23.34). All participants were recruited 
through random convenience sampling from the Department of Experimental. Clinical 
and Health Psychology, Ghent University participant pool and were paid an hourly rate 
of 10 euro. 
Materials and apparatus. Experiment 1 comprised three computer-based 
tasks: a familiarisation IRAP, a deictic IRAP and a control IRAP. In all three, 
participants were required to respond to two others rather than to the self versus others. 
The study also included three questionnaires: the Community Assessment of Psychic 
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Experiences (CAPE); the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; perspective-taking sub-
scale only) and the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSES). All materials were presented 
in Dutch (but they are translated into English when referred to in the text of the current 
chapter). 
Familiarisation IRAP. The IRAP was presented on standard personal 
computers. The IRAP software was used to present the instructions and stimuli and to 
record responses. The familiarisation IRAP did not contain stimuli relevant to deictic 
relations and was employed simply to familiarise participants with the procedure, 
because no specific pre-block rules for responding were presented in any of the IRAPs. 
The familiarisation IRAP presented two label words at the top of the screen: Fruits and 
Vegetables (see Table 1). Eight target words were individually presented in the centre 
of the screen; four were fruits (e.g. “Pear”) and four were vegetables (e.g. “Broccoli”). 
The response options “Yes” and “No” were presented at the bottom left- and right-hand 
corners. The familiarisation IRAP comprised four trial types: Fruit-Fruit, Vegetable-
Vegetable, Fruit-Vegetable and Vegetable-Fruit (see Figure 1). 
         
 
 
Table 1 
Labels, targets and response options in the familiarisation IRAP 
Labels 
Fruit Vegetables 
Targets 
Apple Carrot 
Banana Potato 
Orange Broccoli 
Pear Sprout 
Reponses 
Yes No 
Note: Stimuli were presented to participants in Dutch. 
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Figure 1. Examples of the four trial types in the familiarisation IRAP: Fruit-Fruit, Vegetable-
Vegetable, Fruit-Vegetable and Vegetable-Fruit. The words Consistent and Inconsistent were 
not shown on-screen. 
 
Deictic IRAP. The deictic IRAP presented two label stimuli (participant 
name/researcher name) on the top of the screen (see Table 2). The target stimuli 
comprised 12 statements; six described characteristics of the participant at the present 
time (e.g. “has a yellow Post-it”) and six described characteristics of the researcher (e.g. 
“has an orange Post-it”). Again, the response options were “Yes” and “No”. The four 
trial types were denoted as: I-I (participant name-participant characteristics), Other-
Other (researcher name-researcher characteristics), I-Other (participant name-
researcher characteristics) and Other-I (researcher name-participant characteristics). 
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Table 2 
Labels, targets and response options in the deictic IRAP 
Labels 
David (Participant’s name) Dee (Researcher’s name) 
Targets 
is seated is standing up 
is the participant is the researcher 
is on the keyboard has a pen 
looking at screen has a notebook 
is here is there 
has a yellow Post-it has an orange Post-it 
Reponses 
Yes No 
Note: Stimuli were presented to participants in Dutch. 
 
Control IRAP. The control IRAP presented the label stimuli “Dee” 
(researcher’s name) and “Ciara” (name of an individual, whose picture was placed on 
the wall in front of participants, see Table 3). To match the deictic IRAP, the target 
stimuli comprised 12 statements; six described features of the researcher (e.g. “has 
brown hair”) and six described features of the person in the picture (e.g. “has blond 
hair”). Again, “Yes” and “No” were the response options. In denoting the four trial 
types, the term Researcher will be used to refer to the actual researcher and the term 
Other will be used to refer to the person shown in the picture. Please note that all four 
trial types involved responding to another and not the self. The four trial types were thus 
denoted as: Other-Other (picture of other and characteristics of other), Researcher-
Researcher (researcher and researcher characteristics), Other-Researcher (picture of 
other and researcher characteristics) and Researcher-Other (researcher and 
characteristics of other).  
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Table 3 
Labels, targets and response options in the control IRAP 
Labels 
Ciara (Picture) Dee (Researcher’s name) 
Targets 
is seated is standing up 
is the participant is the researcher 
is on the keyboard has a pen 
looking at screen has a notebook 
is here is there 
has a yellow Post-it has an orange Post-it 
Reponses 
Yes No 
Note: Stimuli were presented to participants in Dutch. 
 
 
The Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE; Stefanis et al., 
2002). The CAPE measures psychotic-like experiences in the general population and 
was employed because perspective-taking has been implicated in psychotic-like 
experiences (e.g. Savla, Vella, Armstrong, Penn, & Twamley, 2013). The scale consists 
of 42 symptom items rated along three sub-scales: positive symptoms (20 items, e.g., 
“Do you ever feel as if there is a conspiracy against you?”), negative symptoms (14 
items, e.g., “Do you ever feel that you experience few or no emotions at important 
events?”) or depressive symptoms (eight items, e.g., “Do you ever feel sad?”). Each 
item is rated on two 4-point Likert scales from 0 (never) to 3 (nearly always) to indicate 
(1) the frequency of symptoms and (2) the level of distress associated with each 
symptom. The CAPE provides overall frequency and distress scores of psychic 
experiences, and total frequency and distress scores for each of the three sub-scales. In 
order to account for partial non-responses, all scores are weighted for the number of 
valid answers per subscale (i.e. sum score divided by number of items completed). 
Overall frequency and distress scores are also weighted. In all cases, higher scores 
indicate greater frequency or distress regarding symptoms, although there are no clinical 
cut-offs for this measure. The Dutch version was completed by participants. The scale 
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has demonstrated adequate reliability: positive dimension alpha = 0.63, negative 
dimension alpha = 0.64, and depressive dimension alpha = 0.62 (Konings, Hanssen, 
Van Os, & Krabbendam, 2006). 
The Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSES; Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 
2001). The RSES is a 10-item measure of self-esteem. All items (e.g. “I take a positive 
attitude toward myself”) are rated on a four-point scale from 0 (strongly agree) to 3 
(strongly disagree). The RSES yields an overall score, with a maximum of 30 and a 
minimum of 0. The Dutch version has shown high internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .86) and high congruent validity (Franck, De Raedt, Barbez, & Rosseel, 2008). 
Perspective-taking (PT) sub-scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; 
Davis, 1980). The PT sub-scale of the IRI measures perspective-taking. The sub-scale 
consists of seven items (e.g. “I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the other 
guy's point of view”) rated on a five-point scale from 0 (does not describe me) to 4 
(describes me very well). The sub-scale yields an overall score, with a maximum of 28 
and a minimum of 0. High scores indicate strong perspective-taking and low scores 
indicate weak perspective-taking. There are no clinical cut-offs for this measure. The 
Dutch version has demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .73), 
and construct validity (De Corte et al., 2007). 
Procedure. Experiment 1 took place on an individual basis in sound-proof 
cubicles at the Department of Experimental, Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent 
University. Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants. All 
participants were exposed to the same experimental sequence, as follows: 
familiarisation IRAP, deictic IRAP, control IRAP, RSES, PT scale and the CAPE, 
always presented in this order.  
Familiarisation IRAP. The familiarisation IRAP was employed to establish 
competent performances on a simple word-based IRAP (Fruits vs. Vegetables) prior to 
completion of the deictic IRAP. Participants were simply instructed to determine, based 
on individual trial feedback, what the task involved. Consider a trial with the label 
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“Fruits” and the target “Pear”. Participants responded on each trial using either the “d” 
key for the response option on the left or the “k” key for the response option on the 
right. The locations of the response options (the words, “Yes” and “No”) alternated from 
trial to trial in a quasi-random order, such that they did not remain in the same left-right 
locations for more than three successive trials. 
Consistent trial blocks required responding that was in accordance with the pre-
experimental verbal history of the participants: Fruit-Fruit/Yes, Vegetable-
Vegetable/Yes, Fruit-Vegetable/No and Vegetable-Fruit/No. Inconsistent trial blocks 
required responding that was not in accordance with pre-experimental verbal relations: 
Fruit-Fruit/No, Vegetable-Vegetable/No, Fruit-Vegetable/Yes and Vegetable-Fruit/Yes. 
The familiarisation IRAP always commenced with a consistent block of trials. When 
participants selected the response option that was deemed correct within that block, the 
label, target and response option stimuli were immediately removed from the screen, 
and the next trial was presented after an inter-trial interval of 400 ms (the label, target 
and response option stimuli then appeared simultaneously at the beginning of the next 
trial). When participants selected the response option that was deemed incorrect for that 
block, the stimuli remained on the screen and a red “X” appeared beneath the target 
stimulus. The participants were required to select the correct response option, and only 
then did the program proceed directly to the 400 ms inter-trial interval (followed 
immediately by the next trial). Participants were required to achieve both accuracy (≥ 
80% correct responding) and latency criteria (≤ 2,000 milliseconds) in every block. As 
is typical in IRAPs, performance feedback was presented at the end of each block. The 
program automatically recorded response accuracy (based on the first response emitted 
on each trial) and response latency (time in ms between trial onset and the emission of 
a correct response) on each trial. 
The familiarisation IRAP differed from a typical IRAP in that it contained only 
practice blocks (i.e. these were not followed by test blocks). Participants were exposed 
to a maximum of three pairs of blocks, with 24 trials per block (12 for each type of 
target stimulus, fruit or vegetable). If participants achieved both accuracy and latency 
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criteria on the first, second or third pair of blocks, they proceeded to the deictic IRAP. 
All participants completed the familiarisation IRAP within three sets of blocks.  
Deictic IRAP. The format of the deictic IRAP was identical to Barbero-Rubio 
et al. (2016), except that explicit rules were not provided (it was assumed that the 
necessary competence on the task had been established by the familiarisation IRAP). 
The deictic IRAP comprised a maximum of four pairs of practice blocks, followed by 
three pairs of test blocks. On each trial, there was a label at the top of the screen 
(participant’s name or researcher’s name), a target in the centre of the screen (e.g. “is 
the participant” or “is the researcher”) and two response options (“Yes” and “No”) at 
the bottom left and right of the screen. Participants responded on each trial using either 
the “d” key for the response option on the left or the “k” key for the response option on 
the right. The locations of the response options (the words, “Yes” and “No”) alternated 
from trial to trial in a quasi-random order, such that they did not remain in the same left-
right locations for more than three successive trials.  
When participants selected the response option that was deemed correct within 
that block, an inter-trial interval of 400 ms was presented, after which the next trial 
occurred. When participants selected the response option that was deemed incorrect for 
that block, the stimuli remained on the screen and a red “X” appeared beneath the target 
stimulus. Only when the correct response option was selected did the program proceed 
to the 400 ms inter-trial interval (followed by the next trial). This pattern of trial 
presentations, with corrective feedback, continued until the entire block of 24 trials was 
presented. Trials were presented in a quasi-random order within each block with the 
constraint that each label was presented twice with each target stimulus across the 24 
trials. Consistent blocks required responding that was in accordance with pre-
experimental verbal relations: I-I/Yes, Other-Other/Yes, I-Other/No, and Other-I/No. 
Inconsistent blocks required the opposite: I-I/No, Other-Other/No, I-Other/Yes and 
Other-I/Yes. Again, all participants experienced a consistent block first. 
When participants completed a block of trials, the IRAP program delivered 
feedback on their performance during that block. The feedback consisted of a message 
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informing them how accurately and how quickly they had responded. The latter was 
calculated from stimulus onset to the first correct response across all 24 trials within the 
block. Participants were required to achieve a minimum accuracy of 80% correct and a 
maximum median latency of no more than 2000 ms on each block. If participants 
achieved both accuracy and latency criteria on the first, second, third, or fourth pair of 
practice blocks, they proceeded to the first pair of test blocks; if they failed on the fourth 
pair of practice blocks participation in the experiment was terminated. 
A fixed set of six test blocks was presented with no accuracy or latency criteria 
required for participants to progress from one block to the next. However, percentage-
correct and median latency were presented at the end of each block to encourage 
participants to maintain the accuracy and latency levels they had achieved during the 
practice blocks. 
Control IRAP. The format of the control IRAP was similar to the deictic IRAP. 
Consistent blocks required responding that was in accordance with pre-experimental 
verbal relations: Other-Other/Yes, Researcher-Researcher/Yes, Other-Researcher/No 
and Researcher-Other/No. Inconsistent blocks required the reverse: Other-Other/No, 
Researcher-Researcher/No, Other-Researcher/Yes and Researcher-Other/Yes. Again, 
all participants experienced a consistent block first. 
Questionnaires. Participants completed the three questionnaires in the following 
sequence: the PT sub-scale, the RSES and the CAPE. 
Ethical Considerations. All aspects of Experiments 1 and 2 in the current 
chapter were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional research 
committee and with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments or 
comparable ethical standards. All procedures received ethical approval from the Ethical 
Commission, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Ghent Univeristy 
(Approval date: April 27th, 2016, Reference: 2016/38/Deirdre Kavanagh). Informed 
consent was obtained from all individual participants. 
Results 
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Questionnaire data. A summary of the means and standard deviations for the 
CAPE, the RSES and the Perspective-taking (PT) sub-scale is provided in Appendix A. 
The overall CAPE and sub-scale scores were relatively low, indicating low psychotic-
like symptoms. Scores on the RSES were relatively high, indicating overall high self-
esteem. The PT sub-scale scores were relatively high, indicating good perspective-
taking abilities.  
IRAP Data. Mean response latencies for consistent and inconsistent blocks, 
divided according to trial type, were calculated for each participant. Specifically, in 
order to pass the practice blocks and advance to test blocks, participants were required 
to maintain an accuracy level of ≥ 80% correct and a median latency of ≤ 2,000 ms. 
Based on these criteria, three participants failed to complete practice blocks in the 
deictic IRAP and did not proceed to the test blocks. Exclusion criteria also applied to 
the test blocks, such that participants were required to maintain an accuracy level of ≥ 
70% correct and a median latency ≤ 2,200 ms on two of the three successive pairs of 
the six test blocks. No participants failed to maintain these criteria; hence all data were 
included in the analysis of the deictic IRAP (N = 37). Any participant who failed the 
practice blocks of the deictic IRAP did not complete the control IRAP (i.e. three 
participants). The same criteria were applied to the analysis of the control IRAP and one 
participant failed to pass the practice blocks on this basis. Another participant failed to 
maintain criteria across two of the three successive pairs of six text blocks in the control 
IRAP. The final number of participants included in the analysis for the control IRAP 
was 35. 
Deictic DIRAP-scores. DIRAP-scores were calculated for each of the four trial 
types, such that positive DIRAP-scores during consistent blocks indicated responding 
“Yes” more quickly than “No” on I-I and Other-Other trial types and responding “No” 
more quickly than “Yes” on I-Other and Other-I trial types. Negative DIRAP-scores 
indicated the opposite pattern: responding “No” more quickly than “Yes” on I-I and 
Other-Other trial types and responding “Yes” more quickly than “No” on I-Other and 
Other-I trial types.  
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The mean DIRAP-scores and standard errors for each trial type are illustrated in 
Figure 2. The I-I and Other-Other trial types produced relatively strong IRAP effects, 
but the I-Other and Other-I trial types did not. A one-way repeated measures analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) yielded a significant main effect for trial type, F(3,36) = 20.84, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .37. Post-hoc comparisons (Fisher’s PLSD tests, see Table 4), indicated 
that I-I (M = .57, SE = 0.06) differed significantly from the three other trial types: Other-
Other (M = 0.34, SE = 0.05, p < .01), I-Other (M = .02, SE = 0.07, p < .001) and Other-
I (M = 0.08, SE = 0.05, p < .001). Other-Other also differed significantly from I-Other 
(p < .001) and Other-I (p < .01). Four one-sample t-tests indicated that only I-I, t(36) = 
9.34, p < .001, d = 1.6, and Other-Other, t(36) = 6.4, p < .00, d= 1.1, differed 
significantly from zero. In contrast to Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016), only two of the trial 
types were significantly different from zero, whereas all four of their IRAP effects 
were4.  
 
Figure 2. Mean DIRAP-scores on the deictic IRAP trial types in Experiment 1. Positive 
DIRAP-scores indicate history-consistent responding and negative DIRAP-scores indicate 
history inconsistent responding. 
 
 
4 The raw reaction time data from this IRAP were subjected to the same analyses as those 
conducted by Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016) and these produced broadly similar results for the trial 
types that produced significant DIRAP-scores in our study, but not for the trial types that produced 
non-significant effects. 
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Table 4   
Experiment 1, Fisher’s PLSD Comparisons for the deictic IRAP 
Trial type Mean 
Difference 
P 
I-I, Other-Other 0.55 <.001* 
I-I, I-Other 0.48 <.001* 
I-I, Other-I 0.24 <.01* 
Other-Other, I-Other -0.07 .40 
Other-Other, Other-I -0.32 <.001* 
I-Other, Other-I -0.25 <.01* 
* Indicates significant p values. 
 
Control DIRAP-scores. The mean DIRAP-scores per trial type are illustrated in 
Figure 3. Relatively strong IRAP effects were recorded on the Other-Other and 
Researcher-Researcher trial types, with weak effects on the two remaining trial types. 
A repeated measures ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for trial type, F(3,34) = 
12.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .27. Post-hoc comparisons (see Table 5) indicated that Other-
Other (M = .44, SE = 0.06) differed significantly from Researcher-Other (M = .06, SE 
= 0.06, p < .001) and Other-Researcher (M = .04, SE = 0.06, p < .001). Researcher-
Researcher (M = .32, SE = .05) also differed significantly from Other-Researcher (p < 
.001) and Researcher-Other (p < .01). Four one-sample t-tests indicated that only Other-
Other, t(34) = 7.55, p < .001, d = 1.3, and Researcher-Researcher, t(34) = 6.05, p < 
.001, d= 1, differed significantly from zero. 
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Figure 3. Mean DIRAP-scores on the control IRAP trial types in Experiment 1. Positive 
DIRAP-scores indicate history-consistent responding and negative DIRAP-scores scores 
indicate history-inconsistent responding. 
 
Table 5 
 
  
Experiment 1, Fisher’s PLSD Comparisons for the control IRAP 
Trial type Mean 
Difference 
P 
Other-Other, Researcher-Researcher 0.40 <.001* 
Other-Other, Other-Researcher 0.37 <.001* 
Other-Other, Researcher-Other 0.12 .15 
Researcher-Researcher, Other-Researcher -0.02 .76 
Resaercher-Researcher, Researcher-Other -0.29 <.001* 
Other-Researcher, Researcher-Other -0.26 <.01* 
* Indicates significant p values. 
 
Correlations. A correlation matrix was calculated to determine if any of the 
DIRAP-scores from the deictic IRAP predicted self-reported psychotic experiences (on 
the CAPE), self-esteem (on the RSES) or perspective-taking (on the PT sub-scale). The 
only significant correlations involved the Other-Other trial type with the overall CAPE 
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
M
ea
n
 D
IR
A
P
-s
co
re
 
Trial type 
 58 
 
frequency, r (28) = -.384, p = .035, and the CAPE positive sub-scale, r (28) = -.475, p 
< .01, but neither remained significant after Bonferroni corrections.  
Summary. The data from Experiment 1 replicated the findings of Barbero-
Rubio et al. (2016) to some extent. Specifically, the DIRAP-scores for the I-I and Other-
Other trial types were relatively strong and significant. In contrast to their study, 
however, the remaining two trial types were both weak and non-significant. 
Interestingly, a similar pattern was observed with the control IRAP in that two of the 
IRAP effects were strong and significant, and two were not. A detailed discussion of 
why the current pattern of trial type effects obtained for the DIRAP-scores did not closely 
match the original results will be provided in the Chapter 5. Finally, all of the significant 
correlational analyses between the deictic IRAP and the questionnaires were recorded 
for the Other-Other trial type. At this point, a subsequent experiment to try to replicate 
Experiment 1 seemed worthwhile.  
A second experiment was undertaken that involved a novel method for 
collecting IRAP data, which had been shown to yield significant effects for all four trial 
types in a separate line of research being conducted by our group (see Finn, Barnes-
Holmes, & McEnteggart, 2018). Specifically, we had found that relatively extreme 
differential trial type effects were reduced when participants were asked to read aloud 
the stimuli and response options that appeared on each IRAP trial. Given that relatively 
extreme differential trial type effects were observed in Experiment 1 of the current 
chapter, a read aloud procedure was introduced in Experiment 2.  
 
Experiment 2 
 
While the research reported in the current chapter was being conducted, an 
unrelated study in our research group had found that extreme differential trial type 
effects may be moderated by the introduction of what could be called a read-aloud 
procedure. Specifically, participants are required to read aloud the label, target and 
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chosen response option at the time of selection on each IRAP trial throughout the entire 
procedure. Hence, in Experiment 2, all participants completed all IRAPs using a read-
aloud procedure. Given the differences between the results of Experiment 1 and those 
found by Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016), it seemed useful to investigate whether 
introducing the read-aloud procedure would produce a pattern of effects similar to 
Experiment 2. 
Method 
Participants. A total of 66 individuals participated in Experiment 2, 58 
females, seven males and one individual who did not wish to be categorised as either 
male or female. Ages ranged from 18 to 48 years old (M = 22.98). All participants were 
recruited through random convenience sampling from the Department of Experimental, 
Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University participant pool and were paid an 
hourly rate of 10 euro. 
Materials and apparatus. All materials and apparatus for Experiment 2 were 
identical to Experiment 1. 
Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 2 was largely identical to 
Experiment 1, except that a read-aloud procedure was added to both IRAPs. This simply 
required participants to read aloud the label, target and chosen response option at the 
time of selection on each trial throughout the entire procedure. Similar to Experiment 1, 
the researcher remained in the room throughout the procedure. However, rather than 
remaining silent, if the participant failed to read aloud, the researcher reminded them to 
keep reading aloud during all trials. This was only necessary for a small number of 
participants and each of these required only one reminder across both IRAPs. 
Experiment 2 also differed from Experiment 1 in that the order in which the IRAP 
blocks (i.e. consistent followed by inconsistent versus inconsistent followed by 
consistent) was counterbalanced across participants. Preliminary analyses yielded no 
significant effects for this procedural variable and thus it is not included in subsequent 
analyses. 
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Results  
Questionnaire data. A summary of the means and standard deviations for the 
CAPE, the RSES and the PT sub-scale is provided in Appendix B.  The overall pattern 
of results from the questionnaires was broadly similar to Experiment 1. 
IRAP data. All aspects of data processing for the IRAPs were similar to those 
employed in Experiment 1. All participants reached the required performance criteria 
on the practice blocks of the deictic IRAP. All participants also maintained the 
performance criteria during the test blocks, hence all data were included in the analyses 
(N = 66). Four participants failed to reach the required performance criteria on the 
practice blocks of the control IRAP, although all remaining participants maintained the 
performance criteria during the test blocks. The final number of participants included in 
the analysis for the control IRAP was 62. 
Deictic DIRAP-scores. The mean DIRAP-scores for each trial type are illustrated 
in Figure 4. Unlike Experiment 1, all trial types produced relatively strong effects, 
although I-I and Other-Other were again stronger than the remaining two. A repeated 
measures ANOVA indicated a significant main effect for trial type, F(3,65) = 8.98, p < 
.001 , ηp2 = .12. Post-hoc comparisons (see Table 6) indicated that I-I (M = 0.4, SE = 
0.04) differed significantly from I-Other (M = .19, SE = .05, p < .001) and Other-I (M 
= 0.21, SE = 0.05, p < .001). Other-Other also differed significantly from I-Other (p < 
.001) and Other-I (p < .002). Unlike Experiment 1, I-I and Other-Other did not differ 
significantly from each other (p = .5). Four one-sample t-tests indicated that all trial 
types differed significantly from zero: I-I, t(65)= 9.43, p < .001, d=1.17, I-Other, t(65) 
= 4.15, p < .001, d= .51, Other-I, t(65)= 4.5, p < .001, d= .56, and Other-Other, t(65) = 
9.06, p < .001, d= 1.12. 
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Figure 4. Mean DIRAP-scores on the deictic IRAP trial types in Experiment 2. 
Positive DIRAP-scores indicate history-consistent responding and negative DIRAP-scores 
indicate history-inconsistent responding. 
 
 
Table 6 
 
  
Experiment 2, Fisher’s PLSD Comparisons for the deictic IRAP 
Trial type Mean 
Difference 
P 
I-I, Other-Other 0.21 <.001* 
I-I, I-Other 0.19 <.001* 
I-I, Other-I -0.02 .73 
Other-Other, I-Other -0.14 .81 
Other-Other, Other-I -0.23 <.001* 
I-Other, Other-I -0.22 . <.001* 
* Indicates significant p values. 
 
Control DIRAP-scores. The mean trial type DIRAP-scores are illustrated in Figure 
5. All trial types produced relatively strong effects, with the strongest observed on the 
Other-Other and Researcher-Researcher trial types. A repeated measures ANOVA 
indicated that trial type was significant, F(3,60) = 6.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .01. Post-hoc 
comparisons, see Table 7, indicated that Other-Other (M = 0.34, SE = 0.04) differed 
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significantly from Other-Researcher (M = .13, SE = .05, p < .001) and Researcher-
Other (M = 0.13, SE = 0.05, p < .001). Researcher-Researcher (M = 0.28, SE = 0.04) 
differed significantly from Other-Researcher (p < .05) and Researcher-Other (p < .05). 
Four one-sample t-tests indicated that all trial types differed significantly from zero: 
Other-Other, t(60)= 8.44, p < .01, d=1.09, Other-Researcher, t(60) = 2.45, p < .05, d= 
.32, Researcher-Other, t(60)= 2.83, p < .01, d=.37, and Researcher-Researcher, t(60) = 
6.49, p < .01, d=.84. 
Figure 5. Mean DIRAP-scores on the control IRAP trial types in Experiment 2. Positive 
DIRAP-scores indicate history-consistent responding and negative DIRAP-scores indicate 
history-inconsistent responding. 
Table 7 
 
  
Experiment 2, Fisher’s PLSD Comparisons for the control IRAP 
Trial type Mean 
Difference 
P 
Other-Other, Researcher-Researcher 0.21 <.001* 
Other-Other, Other-Researcher 0.21 <.001* 
Other-Other, Researcher-Other 0.06 .311 
Researcher-Researcher, Other-Researcher 0.00 .968 
Resaercher-Researcher, Researcher-Other -0.15 <.02* 
Other-Researcher, Researcher-Other -0.15 <.02* 
* Indicates significant p values. 
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Correlations. A correlation matrix only yielded significant results for the I-I trial 
type. Specifically, increased response biases in responding to I as I predicted: higher 
overall frequency of psychotic experiences, r(63)= .316, p = .01, higher levels of overall 
distress, r(63) = .267, p = .03, greater frequency in positive symptoms, r(63)=.27, p = 
.03 and greater frequency of depressive symptoms, r(63)= .25, p = .04, as measured by 
the CAPE. However, none remained significant after Bonferroni corrections. 
Summary. The data from Experiment 2 once again showed relatively strong 
IRAP effects on the I-I and Other-Other trial types, replicating the findings from 
Experiment 1 and those from Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016), although these two trial types 
no longer differed significantly from each other. On balance, Experiment 2 replicated 
the effects on I-Other and Other-I reported in the Barbero-Rubio et al. study (i.e. they 
were both significantly different from zero). The additional analyses (repeated measures 
ANOVA and post hoc comparisons of DIRAP-scores) conducted in Experiment 2, 
however, indicated that the I-Other and Other-I trial types were both significantly 
weaker than the I-I and Other-Other trial types. The control IRAP also yielded 
significant effects for all four trial types, although two of the trial types (Researcher-
Researcher and Other-Other) continued to be significantly stronger than the two other 
trial types. Similar to previous research by Finn et al., (2018), the read-aloud procedure 
appeared to attenuate the differential trial type effect, such that all four trial types (for 
both IRAPs) were now significantly different from zero.  
Discussion 
The initial purpose of Experiment 1 was to conduct a systematic replication and 
extension of Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016). The results yielded significant effects for two 
of the trial types in both the deictic and control IRAPs, whereas four significant effects 
were observed by Barbero-Rubio et al. In comparing the current findings with those 
reported by Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016), it is interesting to note that a different pattern 
of results was obtained in Experient 1. Specifically, they found significant effects for 
all four trial types, whereas we did not; furthermore, the effect for the I-I trial type in 
our study was significantly different from the effect for the Other-Other trial type (these 
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trial types did not differ significantly in the original study). In attempting to explain this 
difference, it is important to note first that some of the procedures involved in running 
the IRAPs differed substantively between the studies. For example, in Barbero-Rubio 
et al., participants received explicit perspective-taking instructions at the beginning of 
each IRAP block (i.e. "For the next block of trials, you have to respond as if you were 
you and Adrian were Adrian" and "For the next block of trials, you have to respond as 
if you were Adrian and Adrian were you"). In addition, participants in the original study 
were required to complete a deictic relational task (DRT), consisting of 20 scenarios, 
12 of which involved reversed deictic relations (e.g. “Mario is swimming in the pool, 
and Ramon is sailing in a boat. If Ramon were Mario, what would he be doing?”) and 
eight double reversed deictic relations (e.g. “Luis is in Teide analysing sediments, and 
Maria is in Kilimanjaro searching for the source of a river. If Luis were Maria and if the 
Kilimanjaro were the Teide, where would Luis be?”). In stark contrast, participants in 
Experiment 1 of the current chapter were exposed to a basic familiarisation IRAP that 
focused on fruit and vegetables, with no reference to perspective-taking. Furthermore, 
when participants were exposed to the deictic and control IRAPs in the current study, 
no specific instructions concerning perspective-taking were provided either at the 
beginning of the IRAPs or before each block. 
Given the foregoing procedural differences between Barbero-Rubio et al. 
(2016) and the current study, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions concerning the 
variables that were responsible for the different patterns of results across the two studies. 
It is worth noting, however, that the type of instructions that are presented to participants 
before and during IRAP tasks may have quite dramatic effects on performance (see Finn 
et al., 2016). The exact manner in which instructions have these effects remains to be 
elucidated (see Finn et al., 2018); thus, further speculation at this point would be 
premature. 
 In Experiment 2, a read-aloud procedure was implemented and the data showed 
relatively strong IRAP effects on two trial types, replicating the findings from 
Experiment 1 and those from Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016). However, the data from 
Experiment 2 did not indicate significant differences between the I-I and Other-Other 
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trial types. The results of this second experiment appear relevant to future research that 
will attempt to use the IRAP to study deictic relational responding and perspective-
taking more generally; we will return to this issue in Chapter 5. 
It is important to acknowledge a critical limitation in the two experiments 
reported in the current chapter. Specifically, the control IRAPs were always presented 
after the deictic IRAPs. Thus, any difference between the deictic and control IRAPs 
may be due simply to an order effect. On balance, a simple sequence effect does not 
account for the differences observed between Experiments 1 and 2, because both 
involved the same deictic-control IRAP sequence. In any case, the current findings call 
for greater attention to the conditions under which IRAPs are run, including pre-
exposure procedures and the types of instructions that are used, and the impact that these 
and other variables (such as the read-aloud procedure) may have on the functional 
properties of the IRAP in exploring specific domains, such as deictic relational 
responding and perspective-taking more generally.  
A potential concern that could be raised pertains to the simple target phrases 
that specified characteristics of self and other (e.g. “is sitting down”, “is the participant”, 
“is in front of the computer”). As such, it could be argued that responding on the IRAP 
simply required deictic relational responding, but not perspective-taking. Indeed, 
perspective-taking would appear to require more complex target statements or relational 
networks that involve taking the perspective of self versus other. In principle, this sort 
of complex relational network requires that the participant responds to statements that 
coordinate with how the self responds in particular situations, versus how they perceive 
others will respond in the same situations. 
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Chapter 3 
The Search for Perspective-taking IRAPs:  
Exploring the Potential of the Natural 
Language-IRAP5 
 
 
5 This chapter is based on Kavanagh, D., Roelandt, A., Van Raemdonck, L., Barnes-Holmes, Y., 
Barnes, Holmes, D., & McEnteggart C. (2019). The on-going search for perspective-taking 
IRAPs: Exploring the potential of the natural language IRAP. The Psychological Record, 69 (2), 
291-314. 
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Methodologies for studying perspective-taking as deictic relational responding 
may require the presentation of complex target statements or relational networks in 
order to facilitate taking the perspective of self versus other. For example, consider an 
other-based statement such as “It makes other people happy if they win the lottery” 
versus a self-based statement “Winning the lottery makes me happy”. In principle, this 
sort of complex relational network requires a participant to respond to statements that 
co-ordinate their own response and particular events, versus co-ordinating the 
responding of others with the same events. Such an IRAP, at least in terms of face 
validity, appears to target perspective-taking.  
Developing such an IRAP would necessarily involve inserting relatively complex 
statements or networks into the procedure. In doing so, the separation of the stimuli into 
labels and targets may be problematic because participants may simplify the task by 
responding to single words or sub-clauses within the labels and targets in such a way 
that fails to capture perspective-taking. However, one way of potentially avoiding this 
problem would be to employ a natural language format, as previously reported by 
Kavanagh, Hussey, McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, and Barnes-Holmes (2016). In that 
study, the IRAP combined the label and target stimuli to form statements that are more 
similar to natural language.  
All of the experiments reported in the current chapter employed two Natural 
Language-IRAPs (NL-IRAPs) to study perspective-taking, with one IRAP targeting 
self-perspective and the other IRAP targeting other-perspective. The general strategy 
pursued here was to determine the extent to which the two NL-IRAPs employed in each 
experiment would yield any differences in the direction and/or strength of the individual 
trial type effects. In addition, correlational analyses were conducted to determine the 
extent to which the two NL-IRAPs correlated, or failed to correlate, with each other and 
with a range of self-report measures that were deemed to be relevant to perspective-
taking. Given the exploratory nature of the research, the self-report measures selected 
from experiment to experiment were not based on a well-established theoretical 
rationale. Rather, we selected measures that had frequently been used in previous 
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studies of perspective-taking within the field of contextual behavioural science. In the 
later experiments, measures of attachment were included based on comments provided 
by the Doctoral Advisory Committee, who advised that these measures could be 
relevant when attempting to analyse perspective-taking with regard to others with whom 
a participant might have a significant relationship.  
Experiment 1 focused on self versus other when the other was unspecified. In 
developing two IRAPs (i.e. self- versus other-focused), we sought to manipulate only 
the ‘self versus other’ variable. Thus, any difference that emerged between the two 
IRAPs could be readily interpreted as based on the self versus other focus. Because 
Experiment 1 was exploratory, no formal predictions were made.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants. Fifty-four participants were recruited for Experiment 1, 44 females 
and 11 males. Participants ranged from 17-38 years old (M = 20.89) and were recruited 
through random convenience sampling from the Department of Experimental, Clinical 
and Health Psychology, Ghent University participant pool. Each participant was paid 
an hourly rate of 10 euro. The general strategy for recruiting numbers of participants 
was guided by the results of a recent meta-analysis of IRAP effects in the clinical 
domain, indicating that a minimum of 29 is required to achieve a power of 0.8 for first-
order correlations (Vahey, Nicholson, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015). Because participants 
sometimes failed to reach various performance criteria for the IRAP (details provided 
subsequently), it was necessary to recruit more than 29 participants to yield an adequate 
dataset for analyses. 
Materials and apparatus. Experiment 1 comprised two computer-based tasks: 
an other-focused IRAP and a self-focused IRAP. The experiment again included the 
CAPE and also included the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II). As 
before, all materials were presented in Dutch, but are presented in English in the current 
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chapter. The use of the AAQ-II was exploratory, to simply determine if perspective-
taking measured with self and other IRAPs correlated with psychological flexibility.  
Other-focused IRAP. The other-focused IRAP required participants to respond 
to various statements about other people. These statements were presented in a natural 
language format, rather than as label and target stimuli, to form a regular sentence or 
statement. The IRAP presented 16 statements, each of which comprised two parts. The 
statement referred to an event (deemed positive or negative) and a positive or negative 
reaction to that event. The sequence in which the event and reaction were presented in 
each statement could vary, in that the event could be presented before the reaction, or 
the reaction could be presented before the event. Nevertheless, the 16 statements were 
divided into four trial types (see Figure 1), based on whether the event and the reaction 
were both positive, both negative, or a combination of positive and negative (see Table 
1). For illustrative purposes, consider the four following statements “People will be 
proud if they succeed in their exams” (Positive Event-Positive Reaction); “Others are 
frustrated when they pass an exam” (Positive Event-Negative Reaction); “Others feel 
lucky if they fail an exam” (Negative Event-Positive Reaction); and “If others fail an 
exam, then they are disappointed” (Negative Event-Negative Reaction). The response 
options “Yes” and “No” were presented at the bottom left- and right-hand corners on 
each trial. The reader should note that the NL-IRAP presented some statements that 
could be seen as potentially confusing, in terms of how participants should respond, 
particularly the Positive-Negative and Negative-Positive statements. However, the 
general structure of the NL-IRAP remained the same as the standard IRAP in that two 
of the four trial types could be seen as less coherent than the other two. 
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Figure 1. Examples of the four trial types in the other-focused IRAP: Positive Event-Positive 
Reaction, Positive Event-Negative Reaction, Negative Event-Positive Reaction, Negative Event-
Negative Reaction. The arrows and words Consistent and Inconsistent were not shown on-screen. 
Trial type labels denote each of the two parts of the statement, but not necessarily the sequence 
in which they appeared in the statement. 
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 Table 1  
 
 Natural language statements from the other-focused IRAP 
 Trial types Stimuli 
Positive Event  
˗ Positive Reaction 
If others hear that they look good, their self-esteem 
enhances. 
 If the enemy of other people dies, they feel liberated. 
 It makes other people happy if they win the lottery. 
 People will be proud if they succeed in their exams. 
Positive Event  People don’t like it when they are told they look good. 
˗ Negative Reaction If other people’s enemy dies they become angry. 
 Other people are disappointed when they win the lottery 
 Others are frustrated when they pass an exam. 
Negative Event  Other people are happy when a loved one dies. 
˗ Positive Reaction Getting fines makes other people happy. 
 Others feel lucky if they fail an exam. 
 If another person’s enemy wins the lottery, they will be 
happy. 
Negative Event  Other people feel despair when a loved one dies. 
˗ Negative Reaction Getting a fine makes other people angry. 
 If others fail an exam then they are disappointed. 
 Other people become bitter if their enemy wins the 
lottery. 
Note: Statements were presented to participants in Dutch. Trial type labels denote 
each of the two parts of the statement, but not necessarily the sequence in which 
they appeared in the statement. 
 
Self-focused IRAP. The self-focused IRAP was similar to the other-focused 
IRAP, but required participants to respond to various statements about themselves, 
rather than about others (e.g. “I’m proud when I succeed in my exams”). These 16 
statements were also presented in a natural language format and comprised two parts, 
an event and a reaction (see Table 2). Again, “Yes” and “No” were the response options. 
The self-focused IRAP comprised the same four trial types as above. 
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Table 2  
  Natural language statements from the self-focused IRAP 
Trial types Stimuli 
Positive Event 
˗ Positive Reaction 
My self-esteem increases if someone says I look 
good. 
 I feel liberated if my enemy dies. 
 Winning the lottery makes me happy. 
 I’m proud when I success in my exams. 
Positive Event  I feel ugly if someone says I look good. 
˗ Negative Reaction I’m angry if my enemy dies. 
 Winning the lottery disappoints me. 
 It frustrates me if I succeed in my exams. 
Negative Event  I’m happy if a loved one dies. 
˗ Positive Reaction Getting fines make me happy. 
 Failing an exam is fantastic. 
 I rejoice if someone I hate wins the lottery. 
Negative Event If a loved one dies, I’m miserable. 
˗ Negative Reaction Getting a fine makes me angry. 
 Failing an exam is disappointing. 
 It irritates me if someone I hate wins the lottery. 
Note: Statements were presented to participants in Dutch. Trial type labels denote 
each of the two parts of the statement, but not necessarily the sequence in which 
they appeared in the statement. 
 
 
The CAPE was presented as described in Chapter 2. 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II 7-item version; Bond et al., 
2011). The AAQ-II measures acceptance, experiential avoidance and psychological 
inflexibility. The scale consists of seven items rated on a 7-point Likert scale from 0 
(never true) to 7 (always true). The AAQ-II yields an overall score with a maximum 
of 49 indicating low psychological flexibility and a minimum of 7 indicating high 
psychological flexibility. While the measure was not designed as a diagnostic tool, 
Bond et al. (2011) reported that scores ≥24 correlate with psychological distress. The 
English version of this scale has been shown to have good internal consistency (alpha 
= .84, Bond et al.). The Dutch translation, used here, has yielded similar reliability 
values (alpha = .85, Bernaerts et al.). 
Procedure. Experiment 1 took place on an individual basis in sound-proof 
cubicles at the Department of Experimental, Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent 
University. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Each participant was 
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exposed to the other-focused and self-focused IRAPs, with the order of each 
counterbalanced across participants. Participants thereafter completed the CAPE, 
followed by the AAQ-II, always presented in this order. 
Other-focused IRAP. The other-focused IRAP comprised a maximum of eight 
pairs of practice blocks, followed by three pairs of test blocks. On each trial, an other-
related statement was presented in the middle of the screen (e.g. “People will be proud 
if they succeed in their exams”), with two response options (“Yes” and “No”) at the 
bottom left and right of the screen. Participants were simply instructed to determine, 
based on individual trial feedback, what the task involved. Participants responded on 
each trial using either the “d” key for the response option on the left or the “k” key for 
the response option on the right. The locations of the response options “Yes” and “No” 
alternated from trial to trial in a quasi-random order, such that they did not remain in 
the same left-right locations for more than three successive trials. The instruction “The 
previously correct and incorrect answers have been reversed” was presented between 
blocks of trials.  
When participants selected the response option that was deemed correct within 
that block, an inter-trial interval of 400 ms was presented, after which the next trial 
occurred. When participants selected the response option that was deemed incorrect for 
that block, the stimuli remained on the screen and a red “X” appeared beneath the 
statement. Only when the correct response option was selected did the program proceed 
to the 400 ms inter-trial interval (followed by the next trial). This pattern of trial 
presentations, with corrective feedback, continued until the entire block of 32 trials was 
presented. Trials were presented in a quasi-random order within each block, with the 
constraint that each statement was presented twice across the 32 trials. Consistent trial 
blocks required responding that was deemed to be in accordance with positive events 
producing positive reactions and negative events producing negative reactions (i.e. 
Positive Event-Positive Reaction/Yes, Positive Event-Negative Reaction/No, Negative 
Event-Positive Reaction/No, and Negative Event-Negative Event/Yes). Inconsistent trial 
blocks required responding that was in accordance with positive events producing 
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negative reactions and negative events producing positive reactions (i.e. Positive Event-
Positive Reaction/No, Positive Event-Negative Reaction/Yes, Negative Event-Positive 
Reaction/Yes, and Negative Event-Negative Reaction/No). The other-focused IRAP 
always commenced with a consistent block of trials.  
When participants completed each block of trials, the IRAP program provided 
them with feedback on their performance during that block. The feedback consisted of 
a message informing them how accurately and how quickly they had responded overall 
during that block. The average speed of responding was calculated from stimulus onset 
to the first correct response across all 32 trials within the block. Participants were 
required to achieve a maximum median latency of no more than 5000 ms on each trial 
type. Although 5,000 ms is unusually long for the latency criterion in an IRAP (most 
range between 2000 ms and 3000 ms), initial pilot work indicated that most participants 
failed to reach the latency criterion when set at <5000 ms., especially when the criterion 
was set at the trial type level (the IRAP latency criterion is typically set at the block 
level). It is also important to remember that the IRAP effect is calculated from the 
difference in mean latencies between blocks of trials, rather than from the absolute 
length of the latencies. As such, the IRAP effect, even when the latency criterion is set 
relatively high at 5000ms., consists of the difference in average latencies between the 
blocks, which remains relatively short (i.e. no more than a few hundred milliseconds).  
 Participants were also required to achieve a minimum accuracy of no less than 
75%, also set at the trial type level (i.e. no more than 2 errors were permitted per trial 
type). If participants achieved both accuracy and latency criteria on any pair of practice 
blocks, they proceeded to the first pair of test blocks; if they failed on the eighth pair of 
practice blocks, participation in the experiment was terminated. Although setting the 
accuracy criterion at 75% is lower than many other studies that have used 80% or more, 
it is important to note that the accuracy criterion was set at the trial type, rather than the 
block, level. Setting the accuracy criterion at the trial type level requires a high level of 
accuracy across all trial types and thus, in a sense, is more stringent than 80% at the 
block level. 
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A fixed set of six test blocks was presented with no accuracy or latency criteria 
required for participants to progress from one block to the next. However, percentage 
correct and median latency were again presented at the end of each block to encourage 
participants to maintain criterion-level responding from the practice blocks. 
Self-focused IRAP. The format of the self-focused IRAP was identical to the 
other-focused IRAP, but with statements regarding the self, rather than statements 
regarding others (e.g. “It irritates me if someone I hate wins the lottery”). It was 
particularly important in this IRAP to ensure that participants were responding to each 
of the statements from their own perspective. Hence, participants were instructed at the 
beginning of the IRAP, as follows: “The program will present statements on the screen 
which refer to you. Please remember that when you see “I” or “me” on-screen, this 
refers to you (the participant)”. The designation of consistent and inconsistent blocks 
was identical to the previous IRAP. Again, all participants were first presented with a 
consistent block of trials. 
Questionnaires. Participants completed the two questionnaires in the following 
sequence: the CAPE followed by the AAQ-II. 
Ethical Considerations. All aspects of Experiments 1-6 in the current chapter 
were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional research committee 
and with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical 
standards. All procedures received ethical approval from the Ethical Commission, 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Ghent Univeristy (Approval date: 
May 2017, Reference: 2017/24/Deirdre Kavanagh). Informed consent was obtained 
from all individual participants. 
Results and Discussion 
Questionnaire data. A summary of the means and standard deviations for the 
AAQ-II and the CAPE weighted overall and with sub-scale scores is provided in 
Appendix C. The mean AAQ-II score fell below 24, indicating little or no psychological 
distress. All weighted overall and sub-scale scores of the CAPE were relatively low.   
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IRAP data. Consistent with standard IRAP practice, mean response latencies 
for consistent and inconsistent blocks were initially divided according to trial type and 
calculated for each participant (see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 
2010). Based on the latency and accuracy criteria, three participants failed to complete 
the practice blocks (and did not proceed to the test blocks) on the self-focused IRAP, 
and four failed to complete the practice blocks on the other-focused IRAP. Hence, all 
seven datasets were excluded from further analyses. For the remaining participants, the 
same accuracy and latency criteria were applied in the test blocks, except that the criteria 
now applied across all six test blocks. This meant that no more than eight errors were 
permitted per trial type across the six test blocks. Using these criteria, five participants 
failed to complete the self-focused IRAP and five failed the other-focused IRAP. All 10 
datasets were excluded from further analyses, leaving the final number of datasets in 
the analyses at N = 37.  
DIRAP-scores. Consistent with the majority of published IRAP studies, DIRAP-
scores for both IRAPs were calculated for each of the four trial types (see Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2010), such that positive DIRAP-scores during consistent blocks indicated 
responding “Yes” more quickly than “No” on Positive Event-Positive Reaction and 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction trial types, and responding “No” more quickly than 
“Yes” on Positive Event-Negative Reaction and Negative Event-Positive Reaction trial 
types. Negative DIRAP-scores indicated the opposite pattern: “No” more quickly than 
“Yes” on Positive Event-Positive Reaction and Negative Event-Negative Reaction trial 
types, and responding “Yes” more quickly than “No” on Positive Event-Negative 
Reaction and Negative Event-Positive Reaction trial types.  
The mean DIRAP-scores and standard errors for each trial type for both IRAPs 
are presented in Figure 2. Positive scores were recorded for all four trial types, with the 
weakest observed for Negative Event-Positive Reaction. For each of the trial types, the 
mean DIRAP-scores were greater for the other-focused IRAP, with the largest difference 
for the Negative Event-Negative Reaction trial type. A 2x4 repeated measures Analysis 
of Variance (ANOVA) yielded a significant main effect for IRAP type [F(1, 36) = 4.12, 
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p < .05, 𝜂𝜌
2  =.1] and for trial type, F(1, 36) = 10.14, p < .01, 𝜂𝜌
2  =.22, but no significant 
interaction (p > .3). Post-hoc (Fisher’s PLSD) comparisons among the four trial types, 
see Table 3, indicated that Negative Event-Positive Reaction differed significantly from 
the other three trial types and Positive Event-Positive Reaction differed from Negative 
Event-Negative Reaction. In examining Figure 2, it appears that the significant 
difference between the Positive Event-Positive Reaction and Negative Event-Negative 
Reaction trial types was driven largely by the other-focused IRAP. On balance, the 
interaction between IRAP type and trial type was non-significant, and thus it would be 
unwise to draw any strong conclusions at this point. Indeed, the next study was a direct 
replication conducted primarily to determine if the difference between the IRAPs was 
robust and if the relatively strong DIRAP effect for the Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
trial type in the other-focused IRAP would be observed again. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean DIRAP-scores on the self-focused IRAP trial types and other-focused trial types 
in Experiment 1. Positive DIRAP-scores indicate history-consistent responding and negative 
DIRAP-scores indicate history-inconsistent responding.  
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Table 3 
 
Experiment 1 Fisher’s PLSD Comparisons                          
Trial type Mean Difference P 
Positive Event-Positive Reaction/ 
Positive Event–Negative Reaction 
-0.06 .25 
Positive Event- Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction 
0.13 <.01* 
Positive Event- Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
-0.13 <.01* 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction/ 
Negative Event- Positive Reaction 
0.18 <.001* 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction/ 
Negative Event- Negative Reaction 
-0.07 .14 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
-0.25 <.001* 
* Indicates significant p values. 
 
Correlations. Given that there was a significant main effect for IRAP type, but 
no interaction with trial type, a single overall D-score (the mean of the four trial types) 
was calculated for each IRAP, and then subjected to correlational analyses with the 
questionnaires (a total of nine correlations for each IRAP). Neither set of correlations 
proved to be significant (all rs < .32 and all ps > .05). In order to determine if differences 
in responding to self and others across the two IRAPs correlated with psychological 
symptoms, we calculated an IRAP difference score by subtracting the other-focused 
overall D-score from the self-focused overall D-score for each participant, and then 
subjected this to correlational analyses with the questionnaires (a total of nine 
correlations, not shown). The frequency of positive psychotic-like symptoms was the 
only significant correlation, r(37) = 0.34, p = 0.039, but did not remain so after a 
Bonferroni correction. Finally, the overall D-scores from the two IRAPs were correlated 
and this single correlation proved to be non-significant (r = 0.208 and p = 0.219). 
Summary. The results from Experiment 1 indicated that the other-focused 
IRAP produced bias scores that were significantly stronger than the self-focused IRAP. 
There was no significant interaction between IRAP type and trial type, although visual 
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inspection of Figure 2 indicated a large difference between IRAPs for the Negative 
Event-Negative Reaction trial type. Only one of the 27 correlations proved to be 
significant but did not remain so after a Bonferroni correction. Overall therefore, the 
data indicated that there was a significant difference between the self- and other-focused 
IRAPs, that the IRAP difference score correlated with psychotic-like symptoms, and 
that the two IRAPs failed to correlate with each other. This pattern of results suggests 
that the self- and other-focused IRAPs were tapping into different behavioural 
repertoires, and in this sense this first experiment could be seen as a success. On balance, 
given the novelty of the procedure employed in Experiment 1 (i.e. the NL-IRAP), it 
seemed important to conduct a direct replication of the study, with additional 
questionnaires. Because Experiment 2 remained exploratory, no formal predictions 
were made.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was a direct replication of Experiment 1, except that the AAQ-II 
was omitted and replaced with several measures of emotional attachment, relationships 
and self-warmth. A measure that was in development at that time, the Psychological 
Flexibility Index (PFI), was also included in the battery of tests. All questionnaires were 
completed after the participants had finished the IRAPs. 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-one individuals were recruited for Experiment 2, 37 
females, 14 males. Ages ranged from 18-49 years (M = 24.5). All participants were 
recruited through random convenience sampling from the Department of Experimental, 
Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University participant pool and were paid an 
hourly rate of 10 euro. 
Materials and apparatus. Both IRAPs were identical to Experiment 1. The 
CAPE was included again. Five additional questionnaires assessed: psychological 
flexibility (using the Psychological Flexibility Index, PFI); self-warmth (using a Self-
warmth Thermometer); emotional attachments (using the Experiences in Close 
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Relationships-Relationship Structures questionnaire, ECR-RS); and relationships with 
others (The Inclusion of Other in the Self, IOS; and the Experiencing of Self 
Questionnaire, ESQ). The PFI replaced the AAQ-II as a measure of psychological 
flexibility because it was being developed by Bond and colleagues as an alternative to 
the AAQ. The Self-warmth Thermometer was included to determine whether 
performance in the self-IRAP correlated with self-warmth (Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009). The various attachment questionnaires were 
included because pre-existing difficulties in attachment relationships may manifest in 
difficulties in perspective-taking with regard to others (Bernstein, Laurent, Nelson, & 
Laurent, 2015). All materials were presented in Dutch (translated into English when 
referred to in the text). The CAPE was the only questionnaire with a validated Dutch 
version. The instructions and items of the remaining measures were created using a 
backward forward translation procedure (World Health Organization, WHO, 2017). 
There are no clinical cut-offs for any of the measures. 
Psychological Flexibility Index (PFI). The PFI is a measure of psychological 
flexibility currently being developed by Bond and colleagues. In its current format, the 
measure includes 82 items. Each item is rated on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (disagree 
strongly) to 6 (agree strongly), with a minimum of 82 and a maximum of 492, generated 
by reversing relevant items and then summing the scores. Higher scores indicate higher 
levels of psychological flexibility, with lower scores indicating lower flexibility. At 
present, there are no reliability data on this measure. 
Experiences in Close Relationships-Relationship Structures questionnaire 
(ECR-RS; Fraley, Heffernan, Vicary, & Brumbaugh, 2011). The ECR-RS assesses 
attachment patterns in four close relationships (mother, father, romantic partner, and 
best friend). Each of the four relationships is rated as a separate domain along two 
subscales: a) anxious attachment and b) avoidant attachment. The anxious attachment 
subscale comprises 3 items (e.g. “I'm afraid that this person may abandon me”) with a 
maximum possible score of 21 and a minimum of 3. The avoidant attachment subscale 
comprises 6 items (e.g. “I don't feel comfortable opening up to this person”), with a 
maximum possible score of 42 and a minimum of 6. Each item is rated on a 7-point 
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Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate 
higher levels of avoidant attachment and anxious attachment. According to Fraley et al., 
the alpha reliabilities for the four relationship domains in the avoidant subscale are 
between .81 and .92, with the anxiety subscale between .83 and .87. Test-retest 
reliability is available for only two domains on each subscale, but is adequate (alpha 
=.65 for romantic relationships and .80 for parental relationships).  
Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). The IOS 
is a measure of closeness in relationships, comprising two sets of seven Venn diagrams. 
All Venn diagrams contain one circle that represents the self, while the other circle 
represents a “best friend” or “other people generally”. As such, each set of Venn 
diagrams represents the relationship between self and a significant other (best friend) or 
between self and a non-significant other (other people generally). Seven Venn diagrams 
were presented in each set, with each Venn diagram differing systematically in terms of 
the extent of the overlap between the two circles. Specifically, in the first Venn diagram, 
the two circles are completely separate, whereas in the seventh Venn diagram, the two 
circles are almost fully overlapping, with each Venn diagram in-between showing some 
variation from one extreme to the other. In order to yield one overall score for the 
relationship between self and best friend, and one overall score for the relationship 
between self and other people generally, each Venn diagram is allocated a number 
between 1 and 7, where 1 represented the least overlap, and 7 represented the most. 
Hence, the maximum score for best friend/other people generally was 7, with the 
minimum score 1. The IOS has demonstrated adequate reliability (alpha = .93, see Aron 
et al.).  
Experiencing of Self Scale (EOSS; Kanter, Parker, & Kohlenberg, 2001). The 
EOSS measures the control of others over the experience of the self. It consists of 20 
items rated along four subscales (each with 5 items): casual acquaintances-absent (e.g. 
“My feelings are influenced by casual acquaintances when I am alone”); casual 
acquaintances-present (e.g. “My wants are influenced by casual acquaintances when I 
am with them”); close relationships-absent (e.g. “My attitudes are influenced by close 
relationships when I am alone”); and close relationships-present (e.g. “My actions are 
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influenced by close relationships when I am with them”). Each item is rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale from 1 (never true) to 7 (always true). The maximum overall score is 140 
and the minimum is 20, with high scores indicating greater control of others over the 
experience of self. According to Kanter et al., the scale overall has high internal 
consistency (alpha = 0.91), with internal consistency in the subscales ranging from 
alpha .83-.93.  
Self-warmth Thermometer. A feeling-thermometer adapted from Vahey et al. 
(2009) was used as a measure of subjective self-warmth. The current measure composed 
an illustrated thermometer with a continuous horizontal scale from 0 (cold), rising in 
intervals of 10, to 100 (warm). Participants were required to indicate their self-warmth 
from 0-100. Given that this is not a standardised measure, there are no reliability data. 
Procedure. The two IRAPs were identical to Experiment 1. Participants 
thereafter completed the CAPE, PFI, IOS, ECR-RS, EOSS and the Self-warmth 
Thermometer, always presented in this order. All questionnaires were presented to 
participants via computer using the program Psychopy (Pierce, 2007). 
Results and Discussion 
Questionnaire data. A summary of the means and standard deviations of each 
questionnaire and relevant sub-scales is provided in Appendix D. The mean score on 
the Self-warmth Thermometer was around the mid-way point at 56.65 (/100) and as 
such was consistent with previous samples (see Vahey et al., 2009). The overall PFI 
scores were relatively high, indicating high psychological flexibility. The overall CAPE 
and sub-scale scores were relatively low, indicating low psychotic-like symptoms. The 
ECR-RS scores were also relatively low in terms of both attachment-anxiety and 
attachment-avoidance. The overall EOSS and subscale scores were low, indicating low 
control by others over the experience of self. The IOS scores for best friend were higher 
than for other people, suggesting a closer relationship in this regard. Nothing unusual 
or unexpected, therefore, emerged from the questionnaires, given the use of a non-
clinical sample.  
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IRAP data. One participant failed the practice blocks on the self-focused IRAP 
and another participant failed to complete self-reports, and thus their IRAP data was 
excluded from further analysis. The final number of participants included in the analyses 
was N = 49. 
DIRAP-scores. The mean DIRAP-scores and standard errors for each trial type for 
both IRAPs are presented in Figure 3. Positive scores were recorded for all four trial 
types, with the weakest observed for Negative Event-Positive Reaction. For three of the 
four trial types, the mean DIRAP-scores were greater on the other-focused IRAP, with the 
largest difference between IRAPs for Positive Event-Negative Reaction. A 2x4 mixed 
repeated measures ANOVA produced a main effect for IRAP type , F(1, 48) = 4.61, p 
= .04, 𝜂𝜌
2  =.09, and for trial type, F(1, 48) = 4.42, p < .01, 𝜂𝜌
2  =.09, but no significant 
interaction (p > .1). Post-hoc (Fisher’s PLSD) comparisons among the four trial types, 
see Table 4, indicated that Negative Event-Positive Reaction differed significantly, or 
marginally so, from the other three trial types.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean DIRAP-scores on the self-focused and others-focused IRAP trial types in 
Experiment 2. Positive DIRAP-scores indicate history-consistent responding and negative DIRAP-
scores indicate history-inconsistent responding.  
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Table 4 
 
Experiment 2 Fisher’s PLSD Comparisons 
Trial type Mean Difference P 
Positive Event-Positive Reaction/ 
Positive Event–Negative Reaction 
-0.03 .51 
Positive Event- Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction 
0.09 .05 
Positive Event- Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
-0.07 .13 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction/ 
Negative Event- Positive Reaction 
0.12 <.01* 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction/ 
Negative Event- Negative Reaction 
-0.04 .39 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
-0.16 <.001* 
* Indicates significant p values 
            
Correlations. The overall D-score from each IRAP, as well as the difference 
scores between the two IRAPs, were subjected to correlational analyses with the 
questionnaires (i.e. 25 correlations for each IRAP and 25 for the IRAP difference score, 
not shown). The correlation matrix showed three significant correlations. The other-
focused IRAP significantly correlated with the frequency of positive psychotic-like 
symptoms, r(49) = -0.3, p < 0.04, but did not do so after a Bonferroni correction. The 
other-focused IRAP also significantly correlated with the ECR-RS attachment-
avoidance subscale for romantic partner, r(49) = 0.34, p < 0.02, and for mother, r(49) = 
0.31, p < 0.03, but neither remained significant after Bonferroni corrections. There were 
no significant correlations with the IRAP difference score (all rs <.28 and all ps > .05). 
Finally, the overall D-scores from the two IRAPs were correlated and this single 
correlation proved to be significant (r = 0.315 and p = 0.027). 
Summary. The results from Experiment 2 again indicated that the other-
focused IRAP produced bias scores that were significantly stronger than the self-
focused IRAP. Again, there was no significant interaction between IRAP type and trial 
type. Interestingly, the relatively large difference between the IRAPs for the Negative 
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Event-Negative Reaction trial type that was observed in Experiment 1, was completely 
absent in Experiment 2, despite the fact that Experiment 2 was a direct replication. The 
reason for the failure to replicate the effect for this trial type remains unclear at this time. 
It is noteworthy that we also failed to replicate this effect across the remaining four 
studies, and thus it is reasonable to conclude that the effect observed in Experiment 1 
was likely due to genuine error variance in the sample. Only three of the 75 correlations 
proved to be significant, but did not remain so after Bonferroni corrections, and thus 
should be interpreted with extreme caution. At this point, therefore, the main effect for 
IRAP type had been replicated, in that the other-focused IRAP produced larger positive 
DIRAP effects relative to the self-focused IRAP. Differences between the two IRAPs for 
individual trial types did not appear to be particularly important, in that both 
experiments failed to yield even a trend towards a significant interaction, and the 
relatively large difference in the IRAPs observed in Experiment 1 for the Negative 
Event-Negative Reaction trial type was completely absent in Experiment 2. The lack of 
significant correlations between the IRAPs and the questionnaires in both studies 
suggests that the measures were not targeting behaviours that overlapped to any great 
degree. On balance however, the overall D-scores from the two IRAPs did correlate in 
Experiment 2 (but not in Experiment 1), suggesting some overlap in the two measures.  
At this point in the research programme, it seemed wise to begin to address the 
fact that the other-focused IRAP produced stronger DIRAP-scores than the self-focused 
IRAP. One simple explanation for this difference might be that questions about how 
other people in general react may tend to produce more stereotypical responding. That 
is, when the other is unspecified, participants tend to produce responses that reflect some 
general view of other people, rather than of a particular individual. In contrast, when 
responding to self, a range of potentially important contextual variables may be 
involved. Thus, for example, when asked how you as an individual react to positive 
events, there may be a tendency to confirm that in general you react positively but that 
you are not the type of person to get overexcited, relative to unspecified others. 
Similarly, an individual may confirm that they react negatively to negative events, but 
not to the same degree, in general, as other people do. Insofar as this may be the case, it 
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is possible that an other-focused IRAP that specified a particular other would produce a 
different result. The next experiment, therefore, was a systematic replication of 
Experiments 1 and 2, but other was now specified and identified as someone who the 
participant believed was “the person they are closest to”. Identifying this person 
involved the participant completing a bespoke specified other-focusing task, which is 
described subsequently. Conducting a third experiment also allowed us to determine if 
we would replicate the correlation between the two IRAPs found in Experiment 2, but 
not in Experiment 1. Finding such a correlation would undermine, to some extent, the 
argument that the two IRAPs were targeting fundamentally different behavioural 
repertoires. The research remained relatively exploratory and thus no formal predictions 
were made. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. Forty participants were recruited for Experiment 3, 29 females, 
10 males and one participant who identified as neither male nor female. Ages ranged 
from 18-45 years (M = 22.67). All participants were recruited through random 
convenience sampling from the Department of Experimental, Clinical and Health 
Psychology, Ghent University participant pool and were paid an hourly rate of 10 euro.  
Materials and apparatus. The self-focused IRAP was identical to that used in 
Experiments 1 and 2. The other-focused IRAP was similar to the previous experiments, 
except that the phrase “other people” was replaced with the name of a significant other 
identified by each participant (e.g. “Sarah”). All questionnaires were identical to those 
used in Experiment 2. 
Specified other-focusing task. This task was designed to help ensure that all 
participants, in a broadly similar way, identified a significant other to whom they felt 
closest. The name of the person identified was then presented in the other-focused 
IRAP. Specifically, participants were asked to write down the name of the individual to 
whom they felt closest, followed by answers to six further questions about their 
relationship: 1. length of relationship, rated on Likert scale from 1 (0-1 year) to 4 (10+ 
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years); 2. closeness of relationship (using one set of the IOS Venn diagrams and 
referring specifically to the name of the significant other); 3. frequency of contact, rated 
from 1 (several times a day) to 6 (less than once a month); 4. level of sharing personal 
information, rated from 1 ( “I share everything I possibly could”) to 5 ( “I share nothing 
about myself with this person”); 5. warmth toward the significant other, on a 
thermometer from 0 (“very cold toward the person”) to 100 (“very warm toward the 
person”); and 6. An open-ended description of the most pleasant event shared with this 
person. The scores on Questions 1-5 were combined and divided by 5 to provide an 
overall score for the specified other-focusing task, with higher scores indicating greater 
closeness in the relationship.  
Self-focusing task. This task was also developed for the purpose of the current 
experiment, primarily to control for the extra 5 minutes it took to complete the specified 
other-focusing task. In this case, participants were simply asked to write down their own 
first name, followed by answers to five further questions: 1. List your top three hobbies; 
2. How frequently do you engage in these hobbies, rated from 1 (several times a day) 
to 6 (less than once a month); 3. What is your favourite food; 4. Where is your favourite 
place; and 5. How warm do you feel toward yourself, from 0 (very cold toward myself) 
to 100 (very warm toward myself). Outcomes on this control task were not quantified.  
Specified other-focused IRAP. The specified other-focused IRAP was identical 
to the other-focused IRAP used previously, except that each statement included the 
name of the individual from the specified other-focusing task (e.g. “Getting a fine makes 
David angry”). 
Self-focused IRAP. The self-focused IRAP was identical to the previous 
experiments.  
Questionnaires. All questionnaires included in Experiment 3 were identical to 
Experiment 2. 
Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 3 was similar to the procedure from 
the previous studies, except for the inclusion of the two focusing tasks before each 
IRAP. Experiment 3 comprised three phases: 1. specified other-focusing task and 
specified other-focused IRAP; 2. self-focusing task and self-focused IRAP; and 3. 
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Questionnaires (CAPE, PFI, ECR-RS, EOS, IOS and the Self-warmth Thermometer). 
The order of the presentation of Phases 1 and 2 was counterbalanced across participants. 
Phase 1: Specified other-focusing task and specified other-focused IRAP. The 
researcher guided participants through the seven items of the specified other-focusing 
task in a semi-structured manner. Upon completion of the specified other-focusing task, 
participants were instructed as follows: “Before we begin the next task, I just want you 
to take a moment to think about [name of significant other]. The next phase of the 
experiment will be focused, in part, on this person.” The specified other-focused IRAP 
was very similar to the other-focused IRAP from Experiment 2, except that each 
statement used the name of the significant other and participants were instructed as 
follows: “The program will present statements on the screen which refer to [name of 
significant other]. Please remember that when you see [name of significant other], this 
refers to [nature of the relationship, e.g., your best friend]”. 
Phase 2: Self-focusing task and self-focused IRAP. The researcher guided 
participants through the items of the self-focusing task also in a semi-structured manner. 
Participants were then instructed as follows: “The next task will contain statements 
about you. Consider the statement, “If I win the lottery I feel happy”. It is important to 
remember that the “I” we are referring to in this statement is you the participant. The 
procedure for the self-focused IRAP was identical to Experiment 2.  
Questionnaires. Participants completed the questionnaires in the following 
sequence: the CAPE, PFI, ECR-RS, EOSS, IOS and the Self-warmth Thermometer. 
Results and Discussion 
Questionnaire data. A summary of the means and standard deviations of each 
questionnaire and relevant subscales is provided in Appendix E. The overall pattern of 
results from the questionnaires was broadly similar to Experiment 2. 
IRAP data. One participant failed the practice blocks on the specified other-
focused IRAP; one failed to complete the self-focused IRAP because of limited time; 
three failed to maintain criteria on the self-focused IRAP; and two failed to do so on the 
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specified other-focused IRAP. Thus, the final number of participants included in the 
analyses was N = 33. 
DIRAP-scores. The mean DIRAP-scores for each trial type are presented in Figure 
4.  Positive scores were recorded for all four trial types, with the weakest on Negative 
Event-Positive Reaction. For each of the four trial types, the difference between the two 
IRAPs appeared relatively modest. A 2x4 mixed repeated measures ANOVA produced 
a main effect for trial type, F(1, 32) = 9.98, p < .001, 𝜂𝜌
2  =.24, but not for IRAP type (p 
> .8), nor for the interaction (p > 0.7). Post-hoc (Fisher’s PLSD) comparisons indicated 
that Positive Event-Positive Reaction differed significantly from the other three trial 
types, and Negative Event-Positive Reaction differed from Positive Event-Negative 
Reaction and from Negative Event-Negative Reaction (see Table 5). 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean DIRAP-scores on the self-focused IRAP trial types and specified other-focused 
trial types in Experiment 3. Positive DIRAP-scores indicate history-consistent responding and 
negative DIRAP-scores indicate history-inconsistent responding.  
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Table 5 
 
Experiment 3 Fisher’s PLSD Comparisons 
Trial type Mean Difference p 
Positive Event-Positive Reaction/ 
Positive Event–Negative Reaction 
0.15 <.01* 
Positive Event- Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction 
0.25 <.0001* 
Positive Event- Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
0.1 <.04* 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction/ 
Negative Event- Positive Reaction 
0.1 <.03* 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction/ 
Negative Event- Negative Reaction 
-0.05 .31 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
-0.15 <.001* 
* Indicates significant p values. 
 
Correlations. The overall D-score from each IRAP, as well as the difference 
scores between the two IRAPs, were subjected to correlational analyses (not shown) 
with the questionnaires (i.e. 25 correlations for each IRAP and 25 for the IRAP 
difference score). A correlation matrix showed four significant correlations. The self-
focused IRAP correlated positively with frequency of negative psychotic-like 
symptoms, r(33) = .38, p < 0.03, and with warmth towards oneself, r(33) = .49, p < 0.01. 
The specified other-focused IRAP correlated negatively with avoidant-attachment with 
one’s mother, r(33) = -.43, p < 0.01. The IRAP difference score correlated positively 
with avoidant-attachment with one’s mother, r(33) = 0.41, p < 0.02. None of these 
correlations remained significant after Bonferroni corrections. Finally, the overall D-
scores from the two IRAPs were correlated and this single correlation proved to be 
significant (r = 0.414 and p = 0.016). 
Summary. In contrast to the two previous experiments, the difference for IRAP 
type was non-significant in this third experiment. This suggests that when the other is 
specified, participants respond in a broadly similar fashion to both self- and other-
focused IRAPs. The overall D-scores from the two IRAPs also correlated, suggesting 
some overlap in the two measures. Only four of the 75 correlations proved to be 
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significant but did not remain so after Bonferroni corrections, and thus again should be 
interpreted with extreme caution. On balance, Experiment 3 differed from the previous 
two experiments in two ways. That is, Experiment 3 introduced a specified other, but 
also involved a focusing task designed to help ensure that all participants identified, in 
a similar manner, with the significant other to whom they felt closest. It is possible that 
completing this task before the IRAPs, in some undefined way, undermined the 
differences in IRAP performances previously recorded in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Experiment 4, therefore, replicated Experiment 3, which again involved a specified 
other, but without exposure to the focusing tasks.  
Experiment 4 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-four participants were recruited for Experiment 4, 21 
females and 13 males. Ages ranged from 18-39 years old (M = 22.64). All participants 
were recruited through random convenience sampling from the Experimental, Clinical 
and Health Psychology Department, Ghent University participant pool and were paid 
an hourly rate of 10 euro. 
Materials and apparatus. Both IRAPs were identical to Experiment 3. 
Procedure. The procedure was very similar to Experiment 3, except that the 
self-focusing and specified other-focusing tasks were no longer included. That is, 
participants were again asked to write down the name of the individual to whom they 
felt closest, but this was not followed by any questions about the nature of their 
relationship. Note also that no additional questions preceded the self-focused IRAP. 
Results and Discussion 
Questionnaire data. A summary of the means and standard deviations of each 
questionnaire and relevant sub-scales is provided in Appendix F. The overall pattern of 
results from the questionnaires was broadly similar to Experiment 3. 
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IRAP data. Three participants failed to maintain criteria on the self-focused 
IRAP and one failed to complete the self-focused IRAP because of time constraints. 
Thus, the final number of participants included in the analyses was N = 30. 
DIRAP-scores. The mean DIRAP-scores and standard errors for each trial type 
for both IRAPs are presented in Figure 5. Positive scores were recorded for all four trial 
types, with the weakest observed for Negative Event-Positive Reaction. For each of the 
four trial types, the difference between the two IRAPs appeared relatively modest, 
except for Positive Event-Negative Reaction. A 2x4 repeated measures ANOVA yielded 
a significant main effect for trial type, F(1, 29) = 10.99, p < .001, 𝜂𝜌
2  =.27, but no main 
effect for IRAP type (p > .8) or the interaction (p > .4). Post-hoc (Fisher’s PLSD) 
comparisons among the four trial types (see Table 6) indicated that Negative Event-
Positive Reaction differed significantly from the other three trial types. 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean DIRAP-scores on the self-focused IRAP trial types and specified other-focused 
trial types in Experiment 4. Positive DIRAP-scores indicate history-consistent responding 
negative DIRAP-scores indicate history-inconsistent responding. 
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Table 6 
 
Experiment 4 Fisher’s PLSD Comparisons  
Trial type Mean Difference P 
Positive Event-Positive Reaction/ 
Positive Event–Negative Reaction 
0.04 .49 
Positive Event- Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction 
0.27 <.0001* 
Positive Event- Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
- 0.01 .96 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction/ 
Negative Event- Positive Reaction 
0.23 <.0001* 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction/ 
Negative Event- Negative Reaction 
-0.04 .45 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
-0.28 <.0001* 
* Indicates significant p values. 
 
Correlations. The overall D-score from each IRAP, as well as the difference 
scores between the two IRAPs, were subjected to correlational analyses with the 
questionnaires (i.e. 25 correlations for each IRAP and 25 for the IRAP difference score, 
not shown). A correlation matrix showed six significant correlations. The self-focused 
IRAP correlated positively with the EOSS close relationships-absent subscale, r(30) = 
0.47, p < 0.01. The specified other-focused IRAP correlated negatively with the ECR-
RS attachment-avoidance subscale for one’s mother, r(30) = -0.42, p < 0.05, one’s 
father, r(30) = -.391, p < 0.04, and with attachment-anxiety of best friend, r(30) = -0.38, 
p < 0.04, and again with the overall PFI score, r(30) = -0.42, p < 0.03. The difference 
score between the IRAPs correlated negatively with attachment-avoidance with 
romantic partner, r(30) = -0.38, p < 0.04. None of these correlations remained 
significant after Bonferroni corrections. Finally, the overall D-scores from the two 
IRAPs were correlated and this single correlation proved to be non-significant (r = 0.284 
and p = 0.129). 
Summary. Similar to Experiment 3, the difference for IRAP type was again 
non-significant, suggesting that when the other is specified, participants respond in a 
broadly similar fashion to both self- and other-focused IRAPs. As a result, the lack of 
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difference between the IRAPs observed in Experiment 3 was unlikely due to the 
focusing tasks (because in Experiment 4, these tasks were not included). However, the 
overall D-scores from the two IRAPs did not correlate significantly (in Experiment 3 
the correlation was significant), suggesting no overlap in the two measures. Only six of 
the 75 correlations proved to be significant but again these did not remain so after 
Bonferroni corrections.  
At this point in the research, the first two experiments had yielded significant 
differences between the IRAPs when other was unspecified, but non-significant 
differences were recorded across the third and fourth experiments when other was 
specified. In these latter experiments, the specified other was identified as the person to 
whom each participant was closest, and thus the variable of closeness, but not similarity, 
was manipulated. It is possible, therefore, that the lack of significant differences 
between the self- and other-IRAPs was not due to closeness but to similarity, if one 
assumes that in general people are close to others who are similar to them. Experiment 
5, therefore, replicated Experiment 4, but asked participants to identify an individual to 
whom they were close but who they perceived to be very different: would targeting 
difference in this way produce a significant difference between the two IRAPs?  
 
Experiment 5 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two participants were recruited for Experiment 5, 24 
females, eight males. Ages ranged from 18-32 years (M = 20.82). All participants were 
recruited through random convenience sampling from the Department of Experimental, 
Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University participant pool and were paid an 
hourly rate of 10 euro.  
Materials and apparatus. The self-focused IRAP was identical to that used in 
Experiments 1-4. The other-focused IRAP was similar to Experiments 3 and 4, except 
that the name presented in each of the statements was now of a specified other (e.g. 
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“Sarah”) who the participant considered to be very different from them. All 
questionnaires were identical to those used in Experiments 2-4. 
Specified other-focused IRAP. The specified other-focused IRAP was similar 
to Experiments 3 and 4, except that each statement now included the name of an 
individual to whom the participant was close, but who was nonetheless perceived to be 
very different. Participants were instructed as follows “I want you to think of a person 
in your life that you are close to, but who you also consider to be very different from 
you. For example, this could be a friend who has very different interests from you.” 
Self-focused IRAP. The self-focused IRAP was identical to all previous 
experiments.  
Questionnaires. All questionnaires were identical to Experiments 2-4. 
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Experiment 4, except that the 
specified-other IRAP involved the name of an individual to whom the participant was 
close, but who was perceived to be very different.  
Results and Discussion 
Questionnaire data. A summary of the means and standard deviations of each 
questionnaire and relevant sub-scales is provided in Appendix G. The overall pattern of 
results from the questionnaires was broadly similar to previous experiments. 
IRAP data. One participant failed to complete the specified other-focused 
IRAP because of limited time and one failed to maintain criteria on the self-focused 
IRAP. Thus, the final number of participants included in the analyses was N = 30. 
DIRAP-scores. The mean DIRAP-scores for each trial type are presented in Figure 
6.  Positive scores were recorded for all four trial types, with the weakest on Negative 
Event-Positive Reaction. For each of the four trial types, the difference between the two 
IRAPs appeared relatively modest. A 2x4 mixed repeated measures ANOVA produced 
a main effect for trial type, F(1, 29) = 5.33, p < .001, 𝜂𝜌
2  =.16, but not for IRAP type (p 
> .5), or for the interaction p > 0.2). Post-hoc (Fisher’s PLSD) comparisons indicated 
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that Negative Event-Positive Reaction differed significantly from Positive Event-
Positive Reaction and Negative Event-Negative Reaction (see Table 7). 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean DIRAP-scores on the self-focused IRAP trial types and specified 
other-focused trial types in Experiment 5. Positive DIRAP-scores indicate 
history-consistent responding and negative DIRAP-scores indicate history-
inconsistent responding. 
Table 7 
 
Experiment 5 Fisher’s PLSD Comparisons 
Trial type Mean Difference P 
Positive Event-Positive Reaction/ 
Positive Event–Negative Reaction 
.03 .51 
Positive Event- Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction 
.12 .01* 
Positive Event- Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
- .06 .2 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction/ 
Negative Event- Positive Reaction 
.09 .05 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction/ 
Negative Event- Negative Reaction 
-.09 .05 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
-.18 <.0001* 
* Indicates significant p values.   
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Correlations. The overall D-score from each IRAP, as well as the difference 
scores between the two IRAPs, were subjected to correlational analyses with the 
questionnaires (i.e. 25 correlations for each IRAP and 25 for the IRAP difference score, 
not shown). A correlation matrix showed only one significant correlation. The self-
focused IRAP correlated negatively with avoidant-attachment with one’s mother, r(30) 
= -.38, p < 0.04, but again this was non-significant after Bonferroni correction. In 
addition, the overall D-scores from the two IRAPs were correlated and this single 
correlation proved to be significant (r = 0.410 and p = 0.023). 
Summary. Similar to Experiments 3 and 4, the difference for IRAP type was 
again non-significant, suggesting that when the other is known by the participant, but 
perceived as different from them, participants respond in a broadly similar fashion to 
both self- and other-focused IRAPs. The overall D-scores from the two IRAPs also 
correlated, suggesting some overlap in the two measures. Only one of the 75 correlations 
proved to be significant but did not remain so after a Bonferroni correction, and thus 
once again this result should be interpreted very cautiously. In Experiments 3 and 4, the 
specified other was identified as the person to whom each participant felt closest, but in 
Experiment 5 specified other was identified as the person to whom each participant felt 
closest but perceived them as different. It was assumed that people would feel positive 
toward others to whom they are close, and thus the variable of valence (i.e. positivity) 
was kept constant across these three experiments. It is possible, therefore, that the lack 
of difference in overall IRAP effects was not due to closeness and similarity, but to 
positive valence, if we assume that in general people feel positive toward those to whom 
they are close. Experiment 6, therefore, replicated Experiment 5, but asked participants 
to identify an individual who they knew but disliked: would targeting valence in this 
way produce a significant difference between the two IRAPs?  
Experiment 6 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-four participants were recruited for Experiment 6, 30 
females, four males. Ages ranged from 18-50 years (M = 21.29). All participants were 
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recruited through random convenience sampling from the Department of Experimental, 
Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University participant pool and were paid an 
hourly rate of 10 euro.  
Materials and apparatus. The self-focused IRAP was identical to that used in 
Experiments 1-5. The other-focused IRAP was similar to Experiments 3-5, except that 
the name presented in each of the statements was now of a specified other (e.g. “Sam”) 
who the participant disliked. All questionnaires were identical to those used in 
Experiments 2-5. 
Specified other-focused IRAP. The specified other-focused IRAP was similar 
to Experiments 3-5, except that each statement now included the name of an individual 
who was known to the participant, but who they disliked. Participants were instructed 
as follows “I want you think of a person in your life who you often interact with, but 
who you don’t like. For example, this could be a classmate, work colleague or family 
member who you do not get along with.” 
Self-focused IRAP. The self-focused IRAP was identical to all previous 
experiments.  
Questionnaires. All questionnaires were identical to Experiments 2-5. 
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Experiment 5, except that the 
specified-other IRAP involved the name of an individual to whom the participant was 
close, but who they disliked.  
Results and Discussion 
Questionnaire data. A summary of the means and standard deviations of each 
questionnaire and relevant subscales is provided in Appendix H. The overall pattern of 
results from the questionnaires was broadly similar to previous experiments. 
IRAP data. One participant failed to complete the specified other-focused 
IRAP because of limited time and two failed to maintain criteria on the specified other-
focused IRAP. One participant failed to maintain criteria on the self-focused IRAP. 
Thus, the final number of participants included in the analyses was N = 30. 
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DIRAP-scores. The mean DIRAP-scores for each trial type are presented in Figure 
7.  Positive scores were recorded for seven of the eight trial types, with the only negative 
score recorded on Negative Event-Positive Reaction of the specified other-focused 
IRAP. For each of the four trial types, the difference between the two IRAPs appeared 
relatively modest. A 2x4 mixed repeated measures ANOVA produced a main effect for 
trial type, F(1, 29) = 7.28, p < .001, 𝜂𝜌
2  =.2, but not for IRAP type (p > .09), or for the 
interaction (p > 0.46). Post-hoc comparisons (Fisher’s PLSD) indicated that Negative 
Event-Positive Reaction differed significantly from Positive Event-Positive Reaction, 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction, and Negative Event-Negative Reaction (see Table 8). 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean DIRAP-scores on the self-focused IRAP trial types and specified other-
focused trial types in Experiment 6. Positive DIRAP-scores indicate history-consistent 
responding and negative DIRAP-scores indicate history-inconsistent responding. 
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Table 8 
 
Experiment 6 Fisher’s PLSD Comparisons 
Trial type Mean Difference P 
Positive Event-Positive Reaction/ 
Positive Event–Negative Reaction 
.07 .18 
Positive Event- Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction 
.21 <.01* 
Positive Event- Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
- .0006 .90 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction/ 
Negative Event- Positive Reaction 
.14 <.02* 
Positive Event-Negative Reaction/ 
Negative Event- Negative Reaction 
-.08 .14 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction/ 
Negative Event-Negative Reaction 
-.21 <.01* 
* Indicates significant p values. 
 
Correlations. The overall D-score from each IRAP, as well as the difference 
scores between the two IRAPs, were subjected to correlational analyses with the 
questionnaires (i.e. 25 correlations for each IRAP and 25 for the IRAP difference score, 
not shown). The correlation matrix yielded five significant correlations. The self-
focused IRAP correlated negatively with avoidant-attachment to one’s romantic partner, 
r(30) = -.41, p < 0.03, and the control of a person close to them over the experience of 
self, r(30) = - .43, p < 0.02. The specified-other IRAP correlated negatively with the 
control of a person close to them over the experience of self, r(30) = - .39, p = 0.03, 
closeness to other people, r(30) = - .41, p = 0.03, and with warmth toward oneself , r(30) 
= -.46, p < 0.01. Once again, none of these correlations remained significant after 
Bonferroni corrections. Finally, the overall D-scores from the two IRAPs were 
correlated and this single correlation proved to be non-significant (r = 0.103, p = 0.59). 
Summary. Similar to Experiments 3-5, the difference for IRAP type was again 
non-significant, suggesting that when the other is negatively valenced, participants 
again respond in a broadly similar fashion to both self- and other-focused IRAPs. On 
balance, the overall D-scores from the two IRAPs did not correlate significantly, 
suggesting limited overlap in the two measures. Once again, only a small number of the 
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75 correlations proved to be significant, but again these did not remain so after 
Bonferroni corrections.  
Discussion 
The overarching purpose of the current series of experiments was to develop 
IRAPs that would clearly differentiate responding from the perspective of self versus 
other. Previous research appeared to demonstrate deictic relational responding using the 
IRAP (i.e. responding to the characteristics of self versus other within an IRAP), but to 
date clear evidence of responding from the perspective of self versus from the 
perspective of another has not been shown. To demonstrate such an effect would seem 
to require inserting statements into an IRAP that ask participants to confirm and deny 
how the self versus others would react to similar events. Achieving this objective 
required that relatively complex statements be employed, and for this reason a natural 
language version of the IRAP was used. The results from the first two experiments 
reported here indicated that there were significant differences between the self- versus 
other-focused IRAPs, when the other remained unspecified. The remaining four 
experiments, however, indicated that when the other was specified there was limited 
evidence that performances on the two IRAPs differed significantly. The correlational 
analyses between the IRAPs and the self-report measures yielded very few significant 
effects (and none at all after Bonferroni corrections). Finally, the correlational analyses 
between the two IRAPs in each experiment were significant in some cases (Experiments 
2, 3 and 5), but not others (Experiments 1, 4 and 6). Overall, the relatively small number 
of uncorrected correlations between the IRAPs and the explicit measures, and the 
complete absence of any corrected significant correlations, suggest that such effects 
should be taken with extreme caution. 
Overall, the current findings could be seen as encouraging because each 
expeirment produced perfromances that would be deemed consistent with the pre-
experiemental histories of the participants. That is, the IRAP effects for most part, were 
in the predicted direction (e.g. participants confirmed more rapidly than they denied that 
when positive events occur, they react positively, but when negative events occur, they 
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react negatively. On balance however, the results could be seen as somewhat 
disappointing because we failed to find strong evidence of perspective-taking when 
other was specified, ay least in terms of different perfromances across the two IRAPs, 
or in correlations among the IRAPs and self-report measures. The IRAPs produced 
predictable outcomes and thus it seems important, going forward, to ask why the IRAPs 
did not distinguish in a clear and consistent way between the perspective of self versus 
other. One possibility is that the IRAPs simply tapped into ‘sense-making’. For 
example, confirming, rather than denying that positive events evoke positive reactions 
in the self and others makes sense in natural language. The only caveat to this 
interpretation is that significant differences between the IRAPs were observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2 when the other was unspecified, but not in Experiments 3-6 when 
other was specified. Perhaps, therefore, there was some sensitivity to self versus other, 
but the use of complex statements in the IRAPs potentially undermined or reduced the 
impact of deictic relational responding per se. That is, in presenting such complex 
stimuli or networks in the IRAP, participants more or less interpreted the task as a sense-
making or problem-solving task, in which the self versus other had little or no impact, 
particularly when the other was specified. The challenge going forward, therefore, is to 
develop IRAPs that maintain the deictic functions of self and other, in the context of 
perspective-taking rather than simple sense-making.  
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Chapter 4 
Exploring Perspective-taking in a False Belief 
IRAP using  
Pictures of Self and Other6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6  Experiment 1 of this chapter is based on Kavanagh, D., Matthyssen, Barnes-Holmes, Y., 
Barnes, Holmes, D., McEnteggart C. & Vastano, R. (2019). Exploring the use of pictures of self 
and other in the IRAP: Reflecting upon the emergence of differential trial type effects. 
International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 19(3), 323-336 
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In pursuing IRAP research that has focused on assessing responses to self 
versus other, an issue arose concerning the nature of the stimuli we were using, which 
we hoped to begin to address in the empirical work outlined in the current chapter. 
Experiment 1 was deemed to be exploratory in seeking to determine if it was feasible to 
use matched pictures of self versus another across two IRAPs. Specifically, we sought 
to determine if the IRAPs would produce intuitively predictable effects when pictures 
of self and matched pictures of another were inserted into the procedure (see below). 
The broader motivation for the first experiment naturally stemmed from the programme 
of research presented in the two previous chapters that sought to develop the IRAP as a 
measure of perspective-taking (see also Barbero-Rubio et al., 2016). In each of the 
studies we conducted thus far, and in the original work by Barbero-Rubio et al., the 
stimuli that were presented in the IRAP itself all consisted of words or statements that 
pertained to the characteristics of the participant or another individual. Typically, these 
self-related terms involved using the participant’s name or words such as “I”, “my” or 
“me”, whilst other-related terms involved using another’s name or words such as “they”, 
“others” or “them”. Although this research yielded interesting findings, we had concerns 
that the use of such stimuli might allow for some ambiguity in how they were interpreted 
by participants. For example, when the on-screen stimulus was “I” the assumption was 
that the participant would interpret this as referring to self, rather than to the computer 
or another person. In general, it appeared that this assumption was upheld, but of course 
room for ambiguity remained. One way in which we thought we could remove this 
potential ambiguity was to insert a picture of the participant into the IRAP itself, so that 
on those trials when the picture appeared, it would be clearly interpreted as a self-related 
stimulus.  
In the first experiment presented in the current chapter, participants were asked 
to bring an electronic picture of their face which could be inserted into the IRAP at the 
beginning of the session. They were also asked to bring a picture of another person, who 
they considered to be relatively similar to themselves in terms of age, gender and general 
facial features. Each participant was then exposed to two IRAPs, with one IRAP 
containing the picture of themselves and the other containing the matched picture of the 
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matched other. Both IRAPs presented the same pictures of pens as the contrast category. 
The two IRAPs were thus very similar in that they both involved confirming and 
disconfirming if the on-screen pictures contained faces versus pens. We expected to find 
IRAP effects that were consistent with previously-established verbal relations. That is, 
participants would confirm more readily than deny that a picture of a face was a face, 
and that a picture of a pen was a pen, as well as denying more readily than confirming 
that a picture of a pen was a face and that a picture of a face was a pen. Participants 
were also asked to complete the six questionnaires that were employed in Experiments 
2-6 of the previous chapter. Given the exploratory nature of the study, we made no 
formal predictions concerning the extent to which the two IRAPs (self-picture versus 
other-picture) would produce different outcomes or how performance on those IRAP 
might correlate with responses to the questionnaires.  
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-four participants were recruited for Experiment 1, 29 
females and five males. Participants ranged from 17-45 years (M = 21.4) and were 
recruited through random convenience sampling from the Ghent University participant 
pool. Each participant was paid an hourly rate of 10 euro. Given that this was the first 
study in which pictures of the self versus others had been inserted into an IRAP, it was 
not possible to conduct a meaningful power analysis. Nevertheless, the general strategy 
for recruiting numbers of participants was similar to that previously described in 
Chapter 2. 
Materials and apparatus. Experiment 1 comprised of two IRAPs, a self-
picture IRAP and an other-picture IRAP, and included the same six questionnaires 
previously employed in Experiments 2-6 of Chapter 2.   
Picture stimuli used in the IRAPs. The face picture stimuli were collected for 
both IRAPs prior to the experiment. Participants were asked to bring to the experiment 
two pictures; a picture of themselves that they liked and a picture of an unknown other 
who they considered to be similar in looks to themselves (i.e. same gender, age, hair 
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colour, skin colour and eye colour). These pictures were included in the self-picture and 
other-picture IRAPs, respectively.  
Self-picture IRAP. The self-picture IRAP presented a total of six label stimuli 
on the top of the screen; three of the labels were words pertaining to faces (i.e. “face”, 
“head” and “person”), with the remaining three words pertaining to pens (i.e. “bic”, 
“pen” and “stylo”, see Table 1). The target stimuli consisted of four images presented 
in the centre of the screen, one picture depicted the individual participant’s face and the 
other three pictures depicted three different pens. The response options “Yes” and “No” 
were presented at the bottom left- and right-hand corners. The four trial types were 
denoted as: Face words-Self picture, Face words-Pen pictures, Pen words-Self picture 
and Pen words-Pen pictures (see Figure 1).  
 
Table 1 
Experiment 1, label stimuli for the self-picture and other-
picture IRAPs 
Face words Pen words 
Person Pen 
Face Stylo 
Head Bic 
Note: Stimuli were presented to participants in Dutch. 
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Figure 1. Examples of the four trial types in the self-picture IRAP: Face words-Face 
picture, Face words-Pen pictures, Pen words-Face picture and Pen words-Pen 
pictures. The words Consistent and Inconsistent were not shown on-screen. 
 
Other-picture IRAP. The other-picture IRAP was similar to the self-picture 
IRAP, except that the four target pictures now depicted the face of another person (rather 
than the face of each participant), as well as the three different pens. The four trial types 
were denoted as: Face words-Other picture, Face words-Pen pictures, Pen words-Other 
picture and Pen words-Pen pictures (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Examples of the four trial types in the other-picture IRAP: Face words-Face picture, 
Face words-Pen pictures, Pen words-Face picture and Pen words-Pen pictures. The words 
Consistent and Inconsistent were not shown on-screen. 
 
Questionnaires. All questionnaires included in Experiment 1 were identical to 
those presented in Experiments 2-6 of Chapter 2. 
Procedure. Experiment 1 took place on an individual basis in sound-proof 
cubicles at the Department of Experimental, Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent 
University. Each participant was exposed to the self-picture and other-picture IRAPs, 
with the order of each counterbalanced across participants. Participants thereafter 
completed the six questionnaires, always presented in the same order as Experiments 2-
6 of Chapter 2.   
Self-picture IRAP. The self-picture IRAP comprised of a maximum of four 
pairs of practice blocks, followed by three pairs of test blocks. On each trial, the label 
(face-related word or pen-related word) appeared at the top of the screen, with a target 
(picture of participant’s face or picture of a pen) in the centre. The response options and 
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between block instructions were presented in a similar manner to those described in 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
Trials were presented in a quasi-random order within each block, such that each 
of the four trial types appeared eight times within each block (32 trials were presented 
in a block). Consistent blocks required responding that was in accordance with pre-
experimental verbal relations: Face words-Face picture/Yes, Face words-Pen 
pictures/No, Pen words-Face picture/No and Pen words-Pen pictures/Yes. Inconsistent 
blocks required the opposite: Face words-Face picture/No, Face words-Pen 
pictures/Yes, Pen words-Face picture/Yes and Pen words-Pen pictures/No. The 
presentation of consistent and inconsistent blocks was counterbalanced across 
participants.  
Other-picture IRAP. The other-picture IRAP was similar to the self-picture 
IRAP, except that it contained the picture of the other face rather than the face of the 
participant. 
Questionnaires. Participants completed the six questionnaires immediately 
after completing the two IRAPs. 
Ethical Considerations. All aspects of Experiments 1-3 in the current chapter 
were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional research committee 
and with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical 
standards. All procedures received ethical approval from the Ethical Commission, 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Ghent University (Approval date: 
January 4th 2018, Reference: 2017/109/Deirdre Kavanagh). Informed consent was 
obtained from all individual participants. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Questionnaire data. A summary of the means and standard deviations for the 
six questionnaires is provided in Appendix I. The mean score on the Self-warmth 
Thermometer was around the mid-way point at 56.72 (/100) indicating relatively 
average warmth toward self. The overall PFI scores were relatively high, indicating high 
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psychological flexibility. The overall CAPE and sub-scale scores were relatively low, 
indicating low psychotic-like symptoms. The ECR-RS scores were also relatively low 
in terms of both attachment-anxiety and attachment-avoidance. The overall EOSS and 
sub-scale scores were low, indicating low control by others over the experience of self. 
The IOS scores for best friend were higher than for other people, suggesting a closer 
relationship in this regard. Nothing unusual or unexpected, therefore, emerged from the 
questionnaires, given the use of a non-clinical sample.  
IRAP data. In order to pass the practice blocks and advance to test blocks, 
participants were required to maintain an accuracy level of ≥ 80% correct and a median 
latency of ≤ 2,000 ms. Based on the latency and accuracy criteria, one participant failed 
the practice blocks on the self-picture IRAP and was excluded from further analysis. 
Exclusion criteria were also applied to the test blocks, such that participants were 
required to maintain an accuracy level of ≥ 80% correct and a median latency ≤ 2,000 
ms on two of the three successive pairs of the twelve test blocks. Of the remaining 
participants, one failed to maintain criteria across the test block pairs in the self-picture 
IRAP, again these data were excluded from further analysis (final N = 32). Consistent 
with Nicholson and Barnes-Holmes (2012), if participants failed to maintain criteria for 
one or both test blocks from a given pair, the data from those two blocks were excluded 
and the data from the remaining two test-block pairs were analysed. These exclusions 
were applied to four of the final data sets. 
Consistent with the previous chapters, DIRAP-scores for both IRAPs were 
calculated for each of the four trial types, such that positive DIRAP-scores during 
consistent blocks indicated responding “Yes” more quickly than “No” on Face words-
Face picture and Pen words-Pen pictures trial types, and responding “No” more quickly 
than “Yes” on Face words-Pen pictures and Pen words-Face picture trial types. 
Negative DIRAP-scores indicated the opposite pattern: responding “No” more quickly 
than “Yes” on Face words-Face picture and Pen words-Pen pictures trial types, and 
responding “Yes” more quickly than “No” on Face words-Pen pictures and Pen words-
Face picture trial types. 
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The mean DIRAP-scores and standard errors for each trial type are presented in 
Figure 3. Positive scores were recorded for all four trial types, with the weakest on Pen 
words-Face picture in both of the IRAPs. For each of the four trial types, the difference 
between the two IRAPs appeared relatively modest. A 2x4 mixed repeated measures 
ANOVA produced a main effect for trial type, F(1, 31) = 17.14, p < .0001, 𝜂𝜌
2  =.36, but 
not for IRAP type (p > .5), or for the interaction (p > 0.1). Post-hoc comparisons, with 
the trial type effects collapsed across the self- and other-picture IRAPs (see Table 2), 
indicated that each trial type differed from every other trial type, except for the 
comparison between Faces words-Pen pictures and Pen words-Pen pictures. Four one-
sample t-tests indicated that the effects were significantly different from zero (ps < .05) 
for all four trial types.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean DIRAP-scores on the self-picture and the other-picture IRAP trial types. Positive 
DIRAP-scores indicate history-consistent responding.  
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Table 2 
Experiment 1, Fisher’s PLSD Comparisons 
Trial type 
Mean 
Difference 
P 
Face words-Face picture/ 
Face words-Pen pictures 
.28 
 
<.001* 
 
Face words-Face picture/ 
Pen words-Face picture 
.418 
 
<.001* 
 
Face words-Face picture/ 
Pen words-Pen pictures 
.236 
 
<.001* 
 
Face words-Pen pictures/ 
Pen words-Face picture 
.136 
 
.024* 
 
Face words-Pen pictures/ 
Pen words-Pen pictures 
-.045 
 
.454 
 
Pen words-Face picture/ 
Pen words-Pen pictures 
-.181 
 
.003* 
 
* Indicates significant p values. 
 
Correlations. Given that there was no significant main effect for IRAP type or 
interaction with trial type, a single overall D-score (the mean of the four trial types) was 
calculated for each IRAP, and then subjected to correlational analyses with the 
questionnaires (a total of 25 correlations for each IRAP). Neither set of correlations 
proved to be significant (all ps > .05).  
Summary. The primary objective of Experiment 1 was to determine if it was 
feasible to use matched pictures of self versus another across two IRAPs. In both IRAPs, 
the contrast categories were pen-related stimuli. In general, the pattern of effects 
indicated that pictures of faces could be incorporated into the IRAP. Specifically, with 
the exception of one trial type, the effects recorded were consistent with what might be 
expected based on previously-established verbal relations. That is, participants tended 
to confirm more readily than to deny that a picture of a face was a face and that a picture 
of a pen was a pen. They also tended to deny more readily than confirm that a picture 
of a pen was a face and that a pen-related word was a picture of a face. There was no 
significant difference between the self- and other-IRAPs, at least in terms of the D-
scores.  
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In previous chapters, and in research by others (see Barbero-Rubio et al., 2016), 
differences have been found in reactions to self versus others, using IRAPs. No clear 
differences emerged in the current experiment between self versus others. On balance, 
differences between self and other IRAPs were not observed in the experiments reported 
in the previous chapter when the ‘other’ was specified rather than unspecified. Insofar 
as the ‘other’ was specified in the current experiment, because a specific picture of 
another individual was employed in the other-picture IRAP, the current findings could 
be seen as generally consistent with the findings reported thus far. On balance, it could 
be argued that it was highly unlikely that in the current experiment any differences 
between the self- versus other-picture IRAPs would emerge because responding in the 
IRAPs was controlled more by the presence of a face versus a pen, rather than by the 
presence of one’s own face versus the face of another. In any case, the results from 
Experiment 1 are promising in indicating that pictures of self and other can be 
successfully employed in an IRAP, and this finding was used as a basis for selecting 
self- versus other-related stimuli in the following two experiments reported in the 
current chapter. 
 As noted earlier, the general rationale for the six experiments reported in Chapter 
3 was to develop an IRAP that was sensitive to perspective-taking rather than simply 
tracking deictic relations. In an effort to achieve this goal NL-IRAPs were employed, 
which allow relatively complex statements to be presented that appeared to require 
responding from a self-perspective in one IRAP and another’s perspective on a second 
IRAP. Unfortunately, however, the complexity of the statements employed in those 
IRAPs may have undermined the extent to which ‘genuine’ perspective-taking was 
being assessed by the IRAPs. Specifically, it was possible that the IRAPs were treated 
largely as problem-solving tasks rather than contexts for taking the perspective of self 
versus other. On this basis, we aimed to identify relatively simple stimuli that could be 
inserted into an IRAP that would clearly distinguish between self versus other. This was 
the purpose of the next experiment. 
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Experiment 2 
 At this point, we faced the challenge of deciding how to assess perspective-
taking using IRAPs that presented pictures of self and other without adding complex 
statements that may again undermine perspective-taking (as in the NL-IRAPs). The 
strategy we adopted thus involved avoiding the use of complex statements within the 
IRAP, but instead presenting vignettes that required perspective-taking just prior to the 
completion of an IRAP. In other words, the vignettes were designed to produce different 
patterns for self versus other trial types within a single IRAP. The vignette was based 
on one of the most widely used formats for exploring perspective-taking in the ToM 
literature, namely the Change in Location task. This task was designed to assess the 
attribution of false beliefs (see Perne et al., 1989). Specifically, the false belief vignette 
comprised of a written paragraph that described a scenario involving the participant and 
the other person depicted in the other-face picture. In this scenario, the participant 
observed that items in a box switched locations when the other person left the room. A 
belief IRAP was then presented that required the participant to respond to what they 
thought was in the box and what they thought that the other person thought was in the 
box. Given that the items had been switched when the other person had the left the room, 
the self and other should differ in terms of what they believed to be in the box. The key 
question was, would the observed IRAP effects be consistent with the false belief 
vignette? A control vignette was presented to half of the participants, in which there was 
no exchange of the items in the box and therefore no false belief attribution was 
required. At this stage, we were interested in determining if differential patterns of 
responding would be observed in the IRAP performances across the two conditions 
(false belief versus control). Participants were also asked to complete the six 
questionnaires that were employed in Experiments 2-6 of the previous chapter. Given 
the exploratory nature of the study, we made no formal predictions concerning the extent 
to which the IRAP in the two conditions would produce different outcomes or how 
performance on those IRAPs might correlate with responses to the questionnaires. 
 
Method 
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Design. There were three stages in Experiment 2: 1. Familiarisation IRAP; 2. 
Condition vignette and belief IRAP; 3. Questionnaires. Experiment 2 also comprised of 
two vignette conditions: (i) False Belief and (ii) Control. 
Participants. Seventy-five participants were recruited, 63 females and 12 males, 
all aged between 17 and 34 years (M = 21.27). The recruitment process was similar to 
that described in the previous experiment. 
Materials and apparatus. Experiment 2 involved two computer-based tasks 
presented on standard computers, the familiarisation IRAP and the belief IRAP. The 
belief IRAP involved two pictures of faces selected by each participant, one picture 
presented the participant’s face, while the other picture was the face of a stranger 
considered by the participant to be similar in looks to themselves (i.e. same gender, age, 
hair colour, skin colour and eye colour). Two short vignettes were also constructed for 
current purposes, with each pertaining to one of the two conditions (False Belief or 
Control). Two bespoke questionnaires assessed performance strategies and perceived 
physical similarities between the picture of self and the picture of other. The same six 
questionnaires previously employed in Experiments 2-6 of Chapter 2 were also 
included.   
Picture stimuli used in the IRAP. The face picture stimuli were collected in a 
manner identical to the previous experiment.  
Familiarisation IRAP. The familiarisation IRAP did not contain stimuli 
relevant to perspective-taking and was employed simply to familiarise participants with 
the procedure, because no practice blocks were presented in the subsequent belief IRAP. 
The stimuli presented in the familiarisation IRAP were similar to those described in 
Experiment 1 of Chapter 2. 
Belief IRAP. Each trial in the belief IRAP presented the picture of the 
participant or the picture of the other person as a label stimulus at the top of the screen. 
The target stimuli comprised 12 statements, with one presented on each trial. Six of the 
statements referred to beliefs about a scarf (e.g. “thinks there is a scarf”) and six referred 
to beliefs about gloves (e.g. “thinks there is a glove”), see Table 3. The response options 
“Yes” and “No” were presented at the bottom left- and right-hand corners. The four trial 
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types were denoted as: Self-Glove (participant’s picture-statement about a glove); Self-
Scarf (participant’s picture-statement about a scarf); Other-Glove (picture of other-
statement about a glove); and Other-Scarf (picture of other-statement about a scarf); see 
Figure 4. 
Table 3 
Experiment 2, target stimuli for the belief IRAP 
                    Glove Scarf 
Thinks there is a glove Thinks there is a scarf 
Believes there is a glove Believes there is a scarf 
Says there is a glove Says there is a scarf 
Note: Stimuli were presented to participants in Dutch. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Examples of the four trial types in the belief IRAP: Self-Glove, Self-Scarf, Other-Glove 
and Other-Scarf. The words Consistent and Inconsistent were not shown on-screen. 
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 Condition Vignettes. The two vignettes were presented on-screen in a word 
document. Each comprised of a written paragraph that described one of two scenarios 
involving the participant and the other person depicted in the other-face picture, 
followed by questions that served to check that participants had read and understood the 
vignette. 
False Belief Vignette. The false belief vignette was based on a ToM Change in 
Location task designed to assess the attribution of false beliefs (see Perner, et al., 1989). 
The English translation of the vignette presented in Dutch is as follows:  
The following sentences describe a scenario that involves you 
and the person in the second picture that you brought with you 
today. I want you to imagine that you and this person are in a 
room. In front of you both is a box. When you both open the lid 
of the box, you both see together that there is a scarf in the box 
and then you place the lid back on the box again. At this point, 
the other person leaves the room. When they are no longer in 
the room (but you still are) the scarf is removed from the box 
and is replaced with a glove. The lid is then put back on the 
box. At this point, the other person now returns to the room. 
 
After reading he vignette, participants were required to indicate which of the 
following statements best described what happened in the scenario presented: 1. “I 
stayed in the room and the other person left the room”; 2. “Both of us stayed in the 
room”; or 3. “The other person stayed in the room and I left the room”7. Participants 
were then instructed as follows: “Please remember the details of the scenario you read 
 
7 The researchers checked responses to these questions after the experiment to ensure that they 
were consistent with the vignette; the data were lost for five participants due to a software 
overwriting error, but consistency was obtained for all other participants. 
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above as you will require information from this scenario to successfully complete the 
next part of the experiment.” 
Control Vignette. The control vignette described a similar scenario to the false 
belief vignette, but critically there was no change in the location of items. The English 
translation is as follows: 
 
The following sentences describe a scenario that involves you 
and the person in the second picture that you brought with you 
today. I want you to imagine that you and this person are in a 
room. You have a box in front of you and the other person has 
a different box in front of them. When you both open the lid of 
the boxes, you both see together that you have a glove in your 
box and the other person has a scarf in their box. Then the lids 
are placed back on the boxes. 
The same three statements, and the instruction presented above, were used to 
ensure that participants understood the vignette.  
Strategy Questionnaire. This questionnaire was designed to identify any 
strategies that participants may have engaged in to successfully complete the belief 
IRAP (see Appendix J for questionnaire translated to English). Specifically, participants 
were asked three questions concerning the potential influence of the preceding vignette 
on their responding during the belief IRAP, rated from 1 (“not much”) to 5 (“a lot”). 
Specifically, one question asked “How much of your responding on the computer task 
was influenced by the scenario that you read before and throughout the task?” The 
questionnaire also contained a single open-ended question regarding any strategy they 
may have used to complete the task. Participants, in the False Belief Condition only, 
were also asked about the degree of success they believed they had in taking the 
perspective of the other person, rated from 1 (“not successful”) to 5 (“very successful”). 
Similarity Questionnaire. This questionnaire was designed to identify 
perceived similarities between the self- and other-picture (see Appendix J). Specifically, 
participants were asked a single question concerning overall perceived similarity 
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between self and other, rated from 1 (“not similar at all”) to 5 (“very similar”). Another 
five questions pertained to perceived similarity in terms of 1. hair colour, 2. age, 3. eye 
colour, 4. skin colour and 5. facial expression, rated from 1 (“not similar at all”) to 5 
(“very similar”). Two final questions focused on the attractiveness of the self-picture 
and the other-picture, both rated from 1 (“not attractive”) to 5 (“very attractive”). 
Questionnaires. All other questionnaires included in Experiment 2 were 
identical to those presented in the previous experiment. 
Procedure. Experiment 2 comprised of three stages, with all participants 
completing those stages as follows: 1. Familiarisation IRAP; 2. Condition vignette and 
belief IRAP; and 3. Questionnaires (Strategy Questionnaire, Similarity Questionnaire, 
CAPE, PFI, IOS, ECR-RS, EOSS and the Self-warmth Thermometer, always presented 
in this order). 
Stage 1: Familiarisation IRAP. The familiarisation IRAP was employed to 
establish competent performances on a simple word-based IRAP (Fruits vs. Vegetables) 
prior to completion of the belief IRAP. Participants were simply instructed to determine, 
based on individual trial feedback, what the task involved. The procedure for the 
familiarisation IRAP was largely identical to Experiments 1 and 2 of Chapter 2, in that 
it only presented practice blocks. However, in the current experiment participants could 
complete up to five sets of practice blocks within the familiarisation IRAP (rather than 
just three sets of blocks as in Experiments 1 and 2 of Chapter 2). 
Stage 2: Condition Vignette and Belief IRAP. Following the familiarisation 
IRAP, participants completed the condition vignettes and belief IRAP. These were 
presented in a sequence, such that a condition vignette was presented before each of the 
three test block pairs of the belief IRAP (i.e. condition vignette-first test block pair- 
condition vignette-second test block pair-condition vignette-third test block pair). After 
reading the condition vignette, participants were required to indicate which statement 
out of three possible statements best described what happened in the scenario that they 
just read. Participants were then instructed as follows: “Please remember the details of 
the scenario you read above as you will require information from this scenario to 
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successfully complete the next part of the experiment.” Participants were then presented 
with a test block pair from the Belief IRAP. The first block always required a response 
pattern that was deemed consistent with the vignette (e.g. participant’s picture/“Thinks 
there is a glove”/“Yes”). 
On each trial of the belief IRAP, the label (participant’s picture or other’s 
picture) appeared at the top of the screen, with a target statement (belief about a scarf 
or belief about a glove) in the centre, and the two response options (“Yes” and “No”) at 
the bottom. Participants responded on each trial using either the “d” key for the response 
option on the left or the “k” key for the response option on the right. The locations of 
the response options alternated from trial to trial in a quasi-random order, such that they 
did not remain in the same left-right locations for more than three successive trials. The 
instruction “The previously correct and incorrect answers have been reversed” was 
presented between the first block and second block of each test block pair. Consistent 
blocks required responding that was in accordance with pre-experimental verbal 
relations: Self-Glove/Yes, Self-Scarf/No, Other-Glove/No, and Other-Scarf/Yes. 
Inconsistent blocks required the opposite: Self-Glove/No, Self-Scarf/Yes, Other-
Glove/Yes, and Other-Scarf/No. 
When participants completed a block of trials, the IRAP program delivered 
feedback on their performance during that block. The feedback consisted of a message 
informing them how accurately and how quickly they had responded. The latter was 
calculated from stimulus onset to the first correct response across all 24 trials within the 
block. Participants were required to achieve a minimum accuracy of ≥80% correct and 
a maximum median latency of ≤ 2000 milliseconds on each block. A fixed set of three 
test block pairs was presented with no accuracy or latency criteria required for 
participants to progress from one block to the next. However, percentage correct and 
median latency were presented at the end of each block to encourage participants to 
maintain the accuracy and latency levels. 
Stage 3: Questionnaires. Participants completed the eight questionnaires in 
the following sequence: Strategy Questionnaire, Similarity Questionnaire, CAPE, PFI, 
 121 
 
IOS, ECR-RS, EOSS and the Self-warmth Thermometer. The Strategy and Similarity 
Questionnaires were presented in paper format and all other questionnaires were 
presented to participants via computer using the program Psychopy (Peirce, 2007). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Questionnaire data. A summary of the means and standard deviations for 
questionnaires, divided according to the two conditions (False Belief and Control), are 
presented in Appendix K. The scores divided across the conditions did not appear to 
differ substantively. Independent t-tests indicated that there were no significant 
differences between conditions, except for one comparison; casual acquaintances-
present sub-scale of the EOSS, t(56) = 2.33, p = .02 (all other ps > .3). Given the large 
number of comparisons (25), this single significant effect was considered to be a false 
positive. 
The open-ended strategy question was also assessed (N = 49). The open-ended 
answers were read by one researcher who developed an initial coding frame to organise 
the data. These codes were then grouped into categories, according to how they were 
related. Following this, a second researcher independently reviewed the coding and 
categories developed by the first researcher. Any inconsistencies or issues raised by the 
second researcher were discussed and the categories were adjusted accordingly. A list 
of the final 11 categories is presented in Appendix L. The most common strategy 
recorded by participants was linking the object words and picture words together (N = 
25). Ten participants reported that they focused only on the object word and did not read 
the full sentences. Five participants reported that they rehearsed the link between the 
object and person before starting an IRAP block.  
IRAP data. Consistent with standard practice in IRAP research, mean response 
latencies for consistent and inconsistent blocks were initially divided according to trial-
type and calculated for each participant. Based on the latency and accuracy criteria, 
eight participants failed to complete the familiarisation IRAP (and did not proceed to 
the belief IRAP). Exclusion criteria were also applied to the belief IRAP, such that 
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participants were required to maintain an accuracy level of ≥ 79% correct and a median 
latency ≤ 2,000ms on the third block pair.8 Eleven participants failed to maintain these 
criteria, five from the False Belief Condition and six from the Control Condition. Their 
data were excluded from further analysis (False Belief, final N = 30; Control, final N = 
30). 
DIRAP-scores. DIRAP-scores for the belief IRAP were calculated for each of the 
four trial types, such that positive DIRAP-scores during vignette-consistent blocks 
indicated responding “Yes” more quickly than “No” on Self-Glove and Other-Scarf trial 
types and responding “No” more quickly than “Yes” on Self-Scarf and Other-Glove 
trial types. Negative DIRAP-scores indicated the opposite pattern: responding “No” more 
quickly than “Yes” on Self-Glove and Other-Scarf trial types and responding “Yes” 
more quickly than “No” on Self-Scarf and Other-Glove trial types.  
The mean DIRAP-scores and standard errors for each trial type, from the third test 
block pair, are presented in Figure 5. Positive scores were recorded for three of the four 
trial types, with negative scores recorded on Self-Scarf in both of the conditions. For 
each of the four trial types, the difference between the two IRAPs appeared relatively 
modest. A 2x4 mixed repeated measures ANOVA produced a main effect for trial type 
[F(1, 58) = 8.65, p < .0001, 𝜂𝜌
2  =.29], but not for condition (p > .8), or for the interaction 
(p > 0.3). Post-hoc comparisons, with the trial type effects collapsed across the two 
conditions (see Table 4), indicated that Self-Scarf differed from every other trial type. 
Eight one-sample t-tests indicated that the effects were significantly different from zero 
 
8 Initially, we planned to include analysed data from all three block pairs, or at least two block 
pairs, but 47 of the 75 participants failed to meet the performance criteria on the first and/or 
second test block pair. Thus, only data for the third block pair were analysed and, even then, 17 
participants failed to meet the performance criteria. Nevertheless, focusing on the third block 
pair yielded data that could be analysed for 60 participants. Note, the high attrition rate was likely 
due to the use of a familiarisation IRAP in the place of the usual practice blocks; this issue is 
addressed, however, in the next study.  
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(ps < .05) for both the Self-Glove and Other-Scarf trial type in both conditions and for 
the Self-Scarf trial type in the Control Condition. 
 
Table 4 
Experiment 2, Fisher’s PLSD Comparisons  
Trial type 
Mean 
Difference 
P 
 
Self-Glove, Self-Scarf 
 
0.513 
  
<.001* 
 
Self-Glove, Other-Glove 
 
0.160 
 
.158 
 
Self-Glove, Other-Scarf 
 
0.033 
 
.769 
 
Self-Scarf, Other-Glove 
 
-0.353 
 
.002* 
 
Self-Scarf, Other-Scarf 
 
-0.480 
 
<.001* 
 
Other-Glove, Other-Scarf 
 
-0.127 
 
.263 
 
* Indicates significant p values. 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean DIRAP-scores for the third test block pair of the belief IRAPs in the False Belief 
and Control Condition. Positive DIRAP-scores indicate history-consistent responding.  
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Correlations. Given that no main effect emerged in comparing the False Belief 
and Control Conditions, the DIRAP-scores for both conditions were collapsed before 
being subjected to correlational analyses with the questionnaires (i.e. a total of 100 
correlations; 25 for each trial type). Only five significant correlations (at p < 0.05) 
emerged, with no obvious pattern or clustering around a particular trial type or self-
report measure. Specifically, Self-Glove correlated positively with the frequency of 
negative psychotic-like symptoms [r(58) = .32, p < 0.02] and with distress associated 
with these symptoms [r(58) = .27, p < 0.04]. Self-Scarf correlated with the casual 
acquaintances-present sub-scale of the EOSS [r(58) = .29, p < 0.03]. Finally, Other-
Scarf correlated with closeness to best friend [r(58) = .27, p < 0.05] and with greater 
control of others over the experience of self [r(58) = .26, p < 0.05].  None of these 
remained significant after Bonferroni corrections.  
Summary and Conclusion. The primary objective of Experiment 2 was to 
explore the potential impact of a false belief and control vignette on performances in a 
related belief IRAP. The results indicated vignette-consistent scores for three of the four 
trial types, with vignette-inconsistent effects recorded on Self-Scarf in both conditions. 
There was little evidence that the two vignettes impacted differentially upon the IRAP 
performances. The correlational analyses failed to indicate any clear relationships 
between the self-report measures and the IRAP. Despite there being no significant 
difference between IRAP performances across the two conditions, the pattern of results 
suggest that both vignettes, to some degree, impacted the IRAP effects, given that 6 of 
the 8 trial types were in a vignette-consistent direction. Of course, the vignette-
inconsistent effect for the Self-Scarf trial type seems somewhat anomalous. On balance, 
this result could be interpreted as a type of self-positive bias effect, in which participants 
tended to choose a positively valenced response option (i.e. Yes) on a trial type that 
presented a self-related label (i.e. a picture of the self). The bias towards responding 
“Yes” on the Other-Scarf trial type would thus be seen as driven largely by the vignette 
rather than a self-positivity bias effect (see Finn et al., 2018, for empirical evidence for, 
and a detailed discussion of, the complex manner in which individual trial types may 
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differentially influence responding on the IRAP). As an aside, it is interesting to note 
that the anomalous effect for the Self-Scarf trial type was substantively larger for the 
Control Condition, where “Yes” could be interpreted as a vignette-consistent response 
because the self knows that there are two items (one in each box). On balance, the 
inferential statistics did not yield a significant difference for condition and thus further 
speculation seems unwarranted. 
 In reflecting upon the results obtained in Experiment 2, a number of issues 
emerged that seemed important to address in a follow-up experiment. First, it became 
apparent that participants in the Control Condition may have found the relationship 
between the vignette and the IRAP trial types somewhat ambiguous. Specifically, the 
control vignette specified that there were two boxes present in the room (one in front of 
the participant and another in front of the other person), whereas the belief IRAP 
presented statements that specified only one box. As such, it is difficult to interpret the 
IRAP effects that were observed for the Control group. A related issue pertains to the 
fact that the order in which the IRAP blocks were presented was not counterbalanced 
(i.e. the first block of the belief IRAP was always vignette-consistent). It is possible, 
therefore, that the IRAP performances for the False Belief group were determined 
largely by the vignette, whereas the performance of the Control group was simply 
determined by the pattern that they were required to produce on the first block. Indeed, 
it could be the case that the IRAP effects for the False Belief group may also have been 
determined, at least to some degree, by the pattern required by the first block. If this was 
the case, it could explain why there was limited evidence for a significant difference 
between the two conditions. With these issues in mind, we designed a subsequent 
experiment that once again sought to develop an IRAP that would show some sensitivity 
to a false belief vignette.  
Experiment 3 
The main aim of Experiment 3 was to determine the extent to which false belief 
vignettes presented before each block of trials in a belief IRAP would impact the 
performances observed on that IRAP. In doing so, two specific variables were 
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manipulated across four conditions; 1. The sequence in which the critical stimuli were 
specified in the false belief vignette; and 2. the order in which the IRAP blocks were 
presented (i.e. vignette-consistent followed by vignette-inconsistent versus the opposite 
block sequence). Specifically, participants were presented with one of two false belief 
vignettes, both similar to that presented in Experiment 2. Half of the participants were 
presented a vignette in which a scarf was initially found in the box and this was later 
replaced with a glove; the other half were presented with a vignette in which a glove 
was initially found in the box and this was later replaced with a scarf. The only 
difference between both vignettes, therefore, was the sequence in which the stimuli were 
specified (i.e. scarf then glove versus glove then scarf). The main rationale for 
employing these versions of the same vignette was to determine if clear differential 
patterns of responding, consistent with the specified sequence in the vignette, would be 
observed in the belief IRAP performances. As noted above, the sequence in which the 
IRAP blocks were presented in Experiment 2 was not manipulated and thus the extent 
to which the vignette per se determined performance remained unclear. In Experiment 
3, therefore, IRAP block sequence was also manipulated, thus creating a mixed 2x2 
factorial design: (i) scarf-glove sequence/vignette-consistent first, (ii) glove-scarf 
sequence/vignette-consistent first, (iii) scarf-glove sequence/vignette-inconsistent first 
and (iv) glove-scarf sequence/vignette-inconsistent first.  
Before continuing, it is important to note that pilot research for Experiment 3 
suggested that specific parameters of the belief IRAP could be altered to both reduce 
attrition rates and increase the impact of the vignettes. First, the familiarisation IRAP 
employed in Experiment 2 was now replaced by exposure to practice blocks in the belief 
IRAP. Second, the vignettes were presented before exposure to each block of the IRAP 
(rather than before each pair of blocks). To avoid any perceived conflict between the 
vignette and the between-block instructions that were presented in Experiment 2, the 
latter were removed and replaced with general task instructions presented once at the 
beginning of the experiment. Given the large number of changes in Experiment 3, 
relative to 2, the former was deemed to be largely exploratory and thus we did not make 
any formal predictions. 
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Method 
Design. Experiment 3 comprised of four conditions: (i) scarf-glove 
sequence/vignette-consistent first, (ii) glove-scarf sequence/vignette-consistent first, 
(iii) scarf-glove sequence/vignette-inconsistent first, and (iv) glove-scarf 
sequence/vignette-inconsistent first. Participants were given general task instructions 
before exposure to the vignette and the IRAP. The Similarity and Strategy 
Questionnaires that were employed in the previous experiment were presented after 
completing the IRAP; given the focus of the current experiment, the six questionnaires 
employed in the previous experiment were not presented here. 
Participants. Seventy-four participants were recruited for the current 
experiment, 58 females and 16 males. Participants ranged from 18-25 years (M = 20.97). 
The general strategy for recruiting numbers of participants was similar to that previously 
described in Experiment 1. 
 
Materials and Apparatus  
General Task Instructions. Participants were presented with a sheet that 
provided general instructions for completing the IRAP. The English translation of the 
instructions presented in Dutch is as follows: 
You will soon be performing different tasks on the computer. 
Before each part of the task, you will be presented with a story 
about you and the person whose picture you brought here 
today. This story will sometimes be consistent with that 
computer task you need to perform and other times it will be 
inconsistent with the computer task you need to perform. 
Condition vignettes.  Each of the two vignettes was presented on-screen in a 
word document. Each comprised of a written paragraph that described one of two 
scenarios involving the participant and the other person depicted in the other-face 
picture. Both vignettes were similar to the false belief vignette employed in the previous 
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experiment. Based on pilot research the vignettes were modified to reduce potential 
ambiguity in the event described (see below). 
Scarf-Glove Sequence Vignette. The scarf-glove sequence vignette specified 
that there was a scarf in the box first and this was replaced with a glove. The English 
translation of the vignette presented in Dutch is as follows: 
The following sentences describe a scenario that involves you 
and the person in the second picture that you brought with you 
today. I want you to imagine that you and this person are in a 
room. In front of you both is a box. When you both open the lid 
of the box, you both see together that there is a scarf in the box 
and then you place the lid back on the box again. At this point, 
the other person leaves the room. Therefore, they cannot see 
what happens in the room but you still are in the room and you 
can still see what happens. When they are no longer in the room 
(but you still are) the scarf is removed from the box and is 
replaced with a glove. The lid is then put back on the box. At 
this point, the other person now returns to the room and they 
are not allowed to take the lid off the box. 
After reading through the vignette, participants were required to indicate which 
of the following statements best described what happened in the scenario: 1. “I stayed 
in the room and the other person left the room when the items in the box were changed”; 
2. “We both stayed in the room when the items in the box were changed”; or 3. “The 
other person stayed in the room and I left the room when the items in the box were 
changed”9. Participants were then instructed as follows: “Please remember the details 
 
9 The researchers checked responses to these questions after the experiment to ensure that they 
were consistent with the vignette; only one participant in the scarf-glove sequence/vignette-
inconsistent-first condition identified the incorrect scenario for one block out of the 16 presented. 
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of the scenario you read above. as you will require information from this scenario to 
successfully complete the next part of the experiment.”  
Glove-Scarf Sequence Vignette. The glove-scarf sequence vignette described a 
similar scenario to the scarf-glove sequence vignette. The only difference between 
both vignettes, therefore, was the sequence in which the stimuli were specified (i.e. 
scarf then glove versus glove then scarf). The same three statements, and the 
instruction presented above, were used to ensure that participants understood the 
vignette.  
Belief IRAP. The format for the belief IRAP was similar to that presented in 
the previous experiment, except for the three following modifications; 1. A maximum 
of five practice blocks pairs were now presented before a fixed number of six test block 
pairs; 2. The order in which the IRAP blocks (i.e. consistent followed by inconsistent 
versus inconsistent followed by consistent) was manipulated across the four conditions; 
3. Only the vignettes and the three statements, which ascertained participant 
understanding, were presented before each block (i.e. no additional rules or instructions 
were used).  
The Strategy and Similarity Questionnaires described in the previous experiment 
were again used to assess performance strategies and perceived physical similarities 
between the self and other. 
Procedure. Experiment 3 took place on an individual basis in sound-proof 
cubicles at the Department of Experimental, Clinical, and Health Psychology at Ghent 
University.  
General task instructions. The researcher gave participants a copy of the general 
task instructions. If participants asked for any clarification, the researcher provided this 
verbally in a brief and concise manner.   
Condition vignette and belief IRAP. Participants were exposed to the belief 
IRAP, with the same vignette presented before each practice and test block throughout 
the IRAP.  
Consistent blocks required responding that was in accordance with the vignette, 
which was labelled as follows: Self-Correct/Yes, Self-Incorrect/No, Other-Incorrect/No 
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and Other-Correct/Yes. Inconsistent blocks required the opposite, labelled as follows: 
Self-Correct/No, Self-Incorrect/Yes, Other-Incorrect/Yes and Other-Correct/No.  
Questionnaires. Participants completed the two questionnaires immediately 
after completing the belief IRAP. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Questionnaire data. A summary of the means and standard deviations for 
questionnaires, divided according to the four IRAP conditions, are presented in 
Appendix M. The similarity scores were relatively high, indicating that participants 
confirmed that they looked similar to the person depicted in the other picture. In general, 
the scores divided across the four IRAP conditions did not appear to differ substantively. 
For the purposes of statistical analysis only the scores from the general similarity 
question were entered into a one-way between-participants ANOVA and this proved to 
be non-significant (p = .23). 
 The means and standard deviations for the strategy scores indicate that 
participants perceived that they were relatively successful at taking the other person’s 
perspective and that they felt that the vignette controlled their responding on the IRAP. 
The scores divided across the four IRAP conditions did not appear to differ 
substantively and two one-way between-participant ANOVAs, one for each question, 
both proved to be non-significant; given the separate analyses for each question a 
Bonferroni correction was applied (p < .025). 
In addition, the open-ended strategy question was assessed (N = 51). The open-
ended answers were read by one researcher who developed an initial coding frame to 
organise the data. These codes were then grouped into categories, according to how they 
were related. Following this, a second researcher independently reviewed the coding 
and categories developed by the first researcher. Any inconsistencies or issues raised by 
the second researcher were discussed and the categories were adjusted accordingly. A 
list of the final 11 categories is presented in Appendix N. The most common strategies 
recorded by participants was linking the object words and picture words together (N = 
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16) and focusing on the scenario to help complete the IRAP (N = 16). Forteen 
participants reported that they relied on the IRAP feedback and 11 reported that they 
focused only on the object word and did not read the full sentences. Nine participants 
reported that they rehearsed the link between the object and person before starting an 
IRAP block.  
IRAP data. Due to a technical issue, the IRAP data for two participants were 
lost and thus were not included in the analyses. The data for a third participant were also 
excluded after the participant reported prior familiarity with similar IRAPs, which 
recent research indicates may influence IRAP performance (see Finn et al., 2018). 
As noted previously, practice blocks required an accuracy level of ≥ 80% and a 
median latency of ≤ 2,000ms; three participants failed to achieve these criteria across 
five exposures and thus they did not proceed to the test blocks. Test blocks required an 
accuracy level of ≥ 79% and a median latency of ≤ 2,000ms (on two of the three 
successive pairs), which four participants failed to achieve, and thus the data for these 
participants were not included in subsequent analyses. Seven participants failed to 
maintain the accuracy and latency criteria for one of the pairs of test blocks, and thus 
their scores were calculated from the remaining two pairs (see Nicholson & Barnes-
Holmes, 2012). The final analyses contained N = 64 (scarf-glove sequence/vignette-
consistent-first, N = 17; scarf-glove sequence/vignette-inconsistent-first, N = 15; glove-
scarf sequence/vignette-consistent-first, N = 16; and glove-scarf sequence/vignette-
inconsistent-first, N = 16).   
DIRAP-scores. As noted previously, participants were divided into four 
conditions based on the vignette sequence (i.e. scarf-glove versus glove-scarf) and the 
IRAP block sequence (i.e. vignette-consistent-first versus vignette-inconsistent-first). 
DIRAP-scores were calculated for each trial type, such that positive scores indicated a 
response bias that was consistent with the scarf-glove vignette and negative scores 
indicated a response bias that was consistent with the glove-scarf sequence. The data 
were entered into a preliminary 2x2x4 mixed repeated-measures ANOVA and this 
yielded a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 60) = 18.85, p < .0001, 𝜂𝜌
2   = .24. A 
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main effect for vignette, F(1, 60) = 4.41, p = .04, 𝜂𝜌
2   = .06, and a two-way interaction 
for vignette and IRAP block sequence, F(1, 60) = 23.54, p < .0001, 𝜂𝜌
2   = .28 were also 
recorded. Given the highly significant three-way interaction with IRAP trial type it was 
decided at this point to conduct four separate 2x2 independent ANOVAs, one for each 
trial type; a Bonferroni correction (p < .0125) was applied to the multiple follow-up 
ANOVAs.  
A graphical representation of the four ANOVAs is presented in Figure 6. The 
following explanation may assist in the interpretation of the figure. If the vignette 
controlled the IRAP performances, then the two bars for the scarf-glove sequence 
should be in a positive direction, whereas the two bars for the glove-scarf sequence 
should be in a negative direction. The top left panel shows that the DIRAP-scores for the 
Self-Correct trial type were vignette-consistent for both vignette sequences (scarf-glove 
and glove-scarf), but only when the IRAP commenced with a vignette-consistent block. 
The opposite appeared to be the case when the IRAP commenced with a vignette-
inconsistent block. The descriptive analysis was supported by the 2x2 ANOVA, which 
yielded a significant interaction, F(1, 60) = 83.83, p < .0001, 𝜂𝜌
2   = .58, but no significant 
main effects (ps > .4). The top right panel shows that the DIRAP-scores for the Self-
Incorrect trial type were vignette-consistent, and only marginally so, for the scarf-glove 
sequence when the IRAP commenced with a vignette-consistent block. The 2x2 
ANOVA yielded no significant main or interaction effects (all ps > .04). The bottom 
left panel shows that the DIRAP-scores for the Other-Incorrect trial type were relatively 
small and all vignette-inconsistent. The 2x2 ANOVA yielded no significant main or 
interaction effects (all ps > .09). The bottom right panel shows that the pattern of DIRAP-
scores for the Other-Correct trial type were similar (albeit weaker) to the pattern 
observed for the Self-Correct trial type. The 2x2 ANOVA, yielded a significant 
interaction, F(1, 60) = 15.23, p = .0002, 𝜂𝜌
2   = .20, but no significant main effects (ps > 
.4). Overall, therefore, there was little evidence that the vignette controlled the IRAP 
performances for any of the four trial types. Indeed, for the Self-Correct and Other-
Correct trial types the pattern of IRAP effects suggests that the primary controlling 
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variable was the order in which the IRAP blocks were presented (vignette-consistent-
first versus vignette-inconsistent-first).    
 
 
                                 Vignette-Consistent First                     Vignette-Inconsistent First 
Figure 6. Mean DIRAP-scores for the four trial types of the belief IRAP across the four conditions 
(scarf-glove sequence/vignette-consistentfirst; glove-scarf sequence/vignette-consistent-first; 
scarf-glove sequence/vignette-inconsistent-first; glove-scarf sequence/vignette-inconsistent-
first). Positive DIRAP-scores indicate a response bias that is consistent with the scarf-glove 
sequence vignette; negative scores indicate a response bias that is consistent with the glove-scarf 
sequence vignette. 
 
At this point in the analyses of the data from the IRAP it appeared that the false 
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blocks. Instead, the response pattern required during exposure to the first block of trials 
seemed to drive the IRAP response biases. In drawing this conclusion, however, it may 
be premature to assume that the vignette had no impact whatsoever on the IRAP 
performances. For example, perhaps the vignette was a controlling variable, but only 
when it cohered with the initial exposure to the IRAP. Or to put it another way, if 
participants perceived the vignette to be an accurate guide on how to respond on the 
IRAP they simply continued to be guided by both sources. If, however, participants 
perceived the vignette to be an inaccurate guide, then they simply ignored the vignette 
and treated the first block of IRAP trials as the ‘correct’ pattern. If this post-hoc 
interpretation of the findings is correct, then perhaps performances on the IRAP may 
differ during the practice blocks (i.e. when participants first encounter either coherence 
or incoherence between the vignette and the feedback contingencies of the IRAP). To 
test this suggestion, we simply compared the number of practice blocks that participants 
required in the vignette-consistent-first versus the vignette-inconsistent-first conditions. 
The difference proved to be significant with the consistent-first group requiring a mean 
of 2.03 (SD = 1.12) practice blocks to reach the accuracy and latency criteria versus a 
mean of 2.93 (0.96) for the inconsistent-first group. 
To further explore the potential impact of coherence between the vignette and 
initial exposure to the IRAP, we analysed the individual DIRAP-scores from the first pair 
of practice blocks. Although this analytic strategy is rarely if ever adopted in IRAP 
research (because the IRAP performances could not be considered relatively stable in 
terms of the desired stimulus control) it seemed reasonable to adopt it here to address 
the post-hoc question we were asking. We restricted our analysis to the first pair of 
practice blocks because a large number of the participants (N = 18), particularly in the 
consistent-first condition (N = 16), only required one pair of practice blocks before 
proceeding to the test blocks. 
The data from the first pair of practice blocks were entered into a preliminary 
2x2x4 mixed repeated measures ANOVA, and this yielded a two-way interaction for 
vignette and IRAP block sequence, F(1, 60) = 62.71, p < .0001, 𝜂𝜌
2   = .51 and a main 
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effect for vignette, F(1, 60) = 52.36, p < .0001, 𝜂𝜌
2   = .62. A graphical representation of 
the interaction for vignette and IRAP block sequence is presented in Figure 7. The graph 
shows that the DIRAP-scores for the vignette-consistent-first conditions was marginally 
vignette-inconsistent for both vignette sequences (scarf-glove sequence and glove-scarf 
sequence). Similar, but far stronger effects, were observed for the vignette-inconsistent-
first conditions. Given the highly significant two-way interaction, it was decided to 
conduct four follow-up unpaired t-tests; a Bonferroni correction (p < .0125) was 
applied. Only one of the four t-tests proved to be non-significant; the comparison 
between the two vignette-consistent-first conditions (p > .23; remaining ps < .0001). 
The pattern of effects for the first pair of practice-blocks suggests that when the vignette 
and the initial IRAP contingencies cohered, block sequence had a limited impact on 
IRAP performance. However, when the vignette and the IRAP contingencies did not 
cohere (during initial contact with the IRAP), block sequence was a dominant 
controlling variable. 
 
Figure 7. Mean overall D-scores for the first pair of practice blocks for the four conditions (scarf-
glove sequence/vignette-consistent-first; glove-scarf sequence/vignette-consistent-first; scarf-
glove sequence/vignette-inconsistent-first; glove-scarf sequence/vignette-inconsistent-first). 
Positive D-scores indicate a response bias that is consistent with the scarf-glove sequence 
vignette; negative scores indicate a response bias that is consistent with the glove-scarf sequence 
vignette. 
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Overall, the results of this third experiment appear to confirm that the false 
belief vignettes had a limited impact on the IRAP performances during the test blocks. 
Indeed, the primary controlling variable, at least with respect to the Self-Correct and 
Other-Correct trial types, was the order in which the two types of IRAP blocks were 
presented. In other words, the observed IRAP effects were in a direction that was 
consistent with the contingencies that were contacted during the first block of trials on 
the IRAP, rather than the content of the vignettes. On balance, the vignettes did not 
appear to be completely inert, as controlling variables, because the participants in the 
vignette-consistent-first conditions required fewer practice blocks to reach criteria than 
participants in the vignette-inconsistent-first conditions. Furthermore, there were large 
and significant differences in the actual overall IRAP effects during the initial pair of 
practice blocks across the two sequences (i.e. vignette-consistent-first versus vignette-
inconsistent-first).  
 
General Discussion 
The primary objective of Experiment 1 was to determine if it was feasible to 
use matched pictures of self versus other across two IRAPs. In both IRAPs, the contrast 
categories were pen-related stimuli. In general, the pattern of effects indicated that 
pictures of faces could be incorporated into the IRAP, thus supporting the feasibility of 
using photographs of self versus other in IRAP perspective-taking studies. However, 
two effects did emerge that are worthy of further consideration, but these will be 
addressed in the final chapter of the thesis because the effects were also observed in 
studies presented in other chapters.  
The primary objective of Experiment 2 was to determine if the presentation of 
a false belief vignette before exposure to a single IRAP would influence performance 
in a vignette-consistent direction. The results of this study were inconclusive for a 
number of reasons. First, no clear differences emerged between the active vignette and 
control condition (and the latter could have been interpreted as being ambiguous for the 
participants). Second, the use of a familiarisation IRAP, instead of requiring participants 
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to complete practice blocks in the belief IRAP, likely contributed to high rates of 
attrition thus restricting data analyses to the final pair of test blocks. Third, the order in 
which IRAP blocks were presented (i.e. vignette-consistent-first versus vignette-
inconsistent-first) was not counterbalanced and thus it was difficult to determine if the 
vignette and/or the block sequence was the primary controlling variable in determining 
the observed IRAP effects.  
The primary aim of Experiment 3 was to rectify the three main problems 
described above. The experiment thus involved an active control design in which the 
two vignettes specified the opposite states of affairs; the familiarisation IRAP was 
removed from the experiment, but the belief IRAP included practice blocks; and the 
block sequence of the IRAP was counterbalanced. The results of the third experiment 
were more conclusive than those of the second, in indicating that the primary controlling 
variable was the sequence in which the IRAP blocks were presented rather than the 
content of the vignettes. On balance, post-hoc analyses of performance of the first 
practice block pairs indicated that the block sequence and vignettes did interact with 
each other, but only when the vignette and the initial contingencies of the IRAP cohered 
with each other.  
At this stage in the doctoral research programme 11 individual experiments had 
been completed and there was limited evidence that an IRAP had been developed that 
showed clear and unambiguous sensitivity to perspective-taking. On balance, the 
research reported in the current thesis also contributed to the on-going development of 
a conceptual analysis of perspective-taking and the dynamics of arbitrarily applicable 
relational responding, more generally. And thus, the current findings are highly valuable 
in that regard. A discussion of these conceptual developments, and their relationship to 
the current empirical work, will be presented in the final chapter of the current thesis, 
to which we now turn. 
 
 
 
 138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
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The primary aim of the current thesis was to determine the potential utility of the IRAP 
in the domain of persepctive-taking. The format of the current chapter is as follows. The 
chapter begins with a summary of the main findings per thesis chapter. This is followed 
by a discussion of the link between the current empirical work and the conceptual 
analyses of perspective-taking. Specifically, the relationship between IRAP results in 
Chapters 2 and 4 and the the Differential Arbitrarily Applicable Relational Responding 
Effects (DAARRE) model of the IRAP is explored. In addition, we grapple with a 
DAARRE model interpretation of the findings from Chapter 3. Finally, we suggest an 
alternative strategy for conceptualising perspective-taking based on a Multi-
Dimensional Multi-Level (MDML) framework for RFT, and in doing so, we present a 
conceptual functional analysis of a classic false belief task based on the MDML 
framework.  
 
Summary of the Main Thesis Findings 
Chapter 2. The aim of the two experiments in Chapter 2 was to replicate previous 
IRAP research that successfully produced differential responding to self versus other. 
The initial purpose of Experiment 1 was to conduct a systematic replication and 
extension of the first IRAP study of perspective-taking reported by Barbero-Rubio et al. 
(2016) in terms of exploring potential differences in responding to self and other. 
Similar to the original findings, the results of our first study yielded significant effects 
for the two trial types I-I and Other-Other (in both the deictic and control IRAPs), 
although all four trial types yielded significant effects in the Barbero-Rubio et al. study. 
In addition, these two trial types differed significantly from each other in our study, 
which had not been the case in the original. The purpose of the second experiment was 
to investigate whether the introduction of a read-aloud procedure would produce a 
similar pattern of effects and whether these would more closely resemble Experiment 1 
or the original study (i.e. four signficant effects versus two). The data again showed 
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relatively strong IRAP effects on the same two trial types, but we no longer found a 
significant difference between them. 
In attempting to explain the different pattern of results we obtained in Experiment 
1 from the original study, in terms of our significant effects in only two trial types and 
the fact that these differed significantly from each other, it is important to note first that 
some of the procedures involved in running the IRAPs differed substantively between 
these two studies. For example, in the study by Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016), participants 
received explicit perspective-taking instructions at the beginning of each IRAP block 
(i.e. "For the next block of trials, you have to respond as if you were you and Adrian 
were Adrian/as if you were Adrian and Adrian were you"). In addition, participants 
completed a DRT, with 12 scenarios involving reversed deictic relations (e.g. “Mario is 
swimming in the pool, and Ramon is sailing in a boat. If Ramon were Mario, what would 
he be doing?”) and eight involving double reversed deictic relations (e.g. “Luis is in 
Teide analysing sediments, and Maria is in Kilimanjaro searching for the source of a 
river. If Luis were Maria and if the Kilimanjaro were the Teide, where would Luis be?”). 
In stark contrast, participants in Experiment 1 of Chapter 2 were exposed to a basic 
familiarisation IRAP that focused on fruit and vegetables, with no reference to 
perspective-taking. And, even when participants were exposed to the deictic and control 
IRAPs, they received no specific instructions regarding perspective-taking, either at the 
beginning of the IRAPs or before each block. 
As a result of these considerable procedural differeces, it is difficult to draw 
firm conclusions about the variables that may have been responsible for the different 
findings between the original study and our Experiment 1. However, there is some 
evidence elsewhere that the type of instructions presented before and during IRAP tasks 
may have quite dramatic effects on performance, in and of themselves (see Finn et al., 
2016). In other words, the explicit instructions regarding, and references to, perspective-
taking, provided during the original study by Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016) may have 
influenced their outcomes, at least to some extent, in a manner that was not operating in 
our Experiment 1.  
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The second pattern of differences from Chapter 2 that warrants exploration is 
the different findings recorded between our own Experiments 1 and 2, particularly in 
terms of the instability of the significant difference between the I-I and Other-Other 
trial types (this difference also differentiated our Experiment 1 from the original work). 
We will return to this issue later because it requires to a broader discussion of on-going 
conceptual developments in RFT and its approach to perspective-taking (see the section 
below entitled The Differential Arbitrarily Applicable Relational Responding Effects 
(DAARRE) model of the IRAP and its relationship to the current empirical research. 
Chapter 3. The broad aim of the empirical work in Chapter 3 was to develop an 
IRAP that required participants to respond to relatively complex statements regarding 
their own mental states and the mental states of others. Specifically, across six 
experiments, we employed the NL-IRAP to investigate perspective-taking with regard 
to the mental states of self and other. That is, the self-focused IRAP required participants 
to respond to positive and negative statements about themselves, while the other-
focused IRAP required responding to similar statements about an other. In Experiments 
1 and 2, we compared self with an unspecified other and explored the extent to which 
the two (self and other) NL-IRAPs potentially correlated with each other and with a 
range of relevant self-report measures. In Experiments 3-6, we compared self with a 
specified other and we manipulated the nature of this specified relationship across 
experiments.  
In short, the data from Experiments 1 and 2 showed significant differences 
between the self- and other-focused IRAPs, when other was unspecified. In contrast, the 
data from Experiments 3-6 showed no significant differences between the self- and 
other-focused IRAPs, when other was specified in various ways. In order to facilitate 
comparisons of the findings from the six studies in Chapter 3, Table 1 provides an 
overview of the results from each experiment under a series of common headings. 
Experiment 1 compared self with an unspecified other and found a significant difference 
between them, with no correlations of any kind. Experiment 2 also compared self with 
an unspecified other, again found a significant difference between them, and only a 
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correlation between the IRAPs. Experiment 3 compared self with a specified other 
(person closest to) and included a focusing task. No significant difference between the 
IRAPs was found, nor were there any correlations. Experiment 4 compared self with a 
specified other (person closest to) but with no focusing task, and again found no 
significant difference between them, and no correlations. Experiment 5 compared self 
with a disliked specified other, found no significant difference between them, but now 
found a correlation between the IRAPs. Finally, Experiment 6 compared self with a 
specified other (different from), found no significant difference between them, and 
found a correlation between the IRAPs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Chapter 2, summary of the main findings from Experiments 1-6 
Experiment Difference 
in overall D-IRAP score 
between Self and Other 
IRAPs 
IRAPs  
Correlated 
 
Correlations between IRAPs 
and self-reports 
(uncorrected) 
Corrected 
Correlations 
 
 
Experiment 1 
Self and Unspecified Other 
Yes No 
 
 
IRAP difference score with CAPE (positive 
symptoms/frequency) [r(37) = 0.34, p = 0.039] 
 
None 
 
Experiment 2 
Self and Unspecified Other 
 
Yes 
 
r (49) = 0.315, 
p = 0.027 
 
Other-focused IRAP with CAPE (positive 
symptoms/frequency) 
[r(49) = -0.3, p < 0.04] 
 
Other-focused IRAP with ECR-RS attachment-related 
avoidance subscale for romantic partner 
[r(49) = 0.34, p < 0.02] 
 
and for mother 
[r(49) = 0.31, p < 0.03] 
 
 
None 
 
Experiment 3 
Self and Specified Other 
(closest to), 
with focusing task 
 
No 
 
r (33) = 0.414, 
p = 0.016 
 
Self-focused IRAP with CAPE (negative 
symptoms/frequency) 
[r(33) = 0.38, p < 0.03] 
 
and with Self-warmth Thermometer 
[r(33) = 0 .49, p < 0.01] 
 
 
None 
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Specified other-focused IRAP with ECR-RS attachment-
related avoidance subscale for one’s mother 
[r(33) = -0.43, p < 0.01] 
 
IRAP difference score with ECR-RS attachment-related 
avoidance for one’s mother 
[r(33) = 0.41, p < 0.02] 
 
 
Experiment 4 
Self and Specified Other 
(closest to), 
without focusing task 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Self-focused IRAP with EOSS close relationships-absent 
subscale 
[r(30) = 0.47, p < 0.01] 
 
Specified other-focused IRAP with ECR-RS attachment-
related avoidance subscale for one’s mother 
[r(30) = -0.42, p < 0.05] 
 
one’s father 
[r(30) = -0.391, p < 0.04] 
 
with ECR-RS attachment-related anxiety subscale for best 
friend 
[r(30) = -0.38, p < 0.04] 
 
and with the overall PFI score 
[r(30) = -0.42, p < 0.03] 
 
None 
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IRAP difference score with ECR-RS attachment-related 
avoidance subscale for romantic partner 
[r(30) = -0.38, p < 0.04] 
 
 
Experiment 5 
Self and Specified Other 
(dislike) 
 
 
No 
 
r(30) = 0.410, 
p = 0.023 
 
 
Self-focused IRAP with ECR-RS attachment-related 
avoidance subscale for one’s mother 
[r(30) = -0.38, p < 0.04] 
 
 
None 
 
Experiment 6 
Self and Specified Other 
(different from) 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Self-focused IRAP with ECR-RS attachment-related 
avoidance subscale for romantic partner 
[r(30) = -0.41, p < 0.03] 
 
and with the EOSS close relationships-present subscale 
[r(30) = -0.43, p < 0.02] 
 
Specified-other IRAP with the EOSS close relationships-
present subscale 
[r(30) = - 0.39, p = 0.03] 
 
IOS for best friend 
[r(30) = - 0.41, p = 0.03] 
 
and with the Self Warmth Thermometer 
 
None 
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[r(30) = -0.46, p < 0.01] 
Overall, each experiment in Chapter 3 produced performances that would be 
deemed consistent with the pre-experimental histories of the participants, in that the 
IRAP effects were generally in the predicted direction. Furthermore, the rather robust 
outcomes with regard to specified versus unspecified other seem potentiually important 
(see also DeBernardis et al., 2014). Indeed, we failed to find strong evidence of 
perspective-taking when other was specified (Experiments 3-6), at least in terms of 
different performances across the two IRAPs, or in correlations among the IRAPs and 
the self-report measures. We discuss below our attempts to grapple with the observed 
difference between self and specified/unspecified other (see section on Grappling with 
the Findings from Chapter 3). 
Taken together, these findings suggest some level of sensitivity in the NL-IRAPs 
to self and other, although the use of complex statements in this type of IRAP may have 
also served to undermine or reduce the impact of deictic relational responding per se. 
That is, in presenting such complex stimuli or relational networks in the IRAP, 
participants may have more or less interpreted the procedure as a sense-making or 
problem-solving task, in which the self versus other had little or no impact on 
responding, particularly when the other was specified.  
The correlational analyses between the IRAPs and the self-report measures 
yielded very few significant effects (and none at all after Bonferroni corrections). 
Furthermore, the correlational analyses between the two IRAPs in each experiment were 
significant in some cases (Experiments 2, 3 and 5), but not others (Experiments 1, 4 and 
6). Taken together, little more can be said with any conviction regarding these very 
limited statistical outcomes. 
Chapter 4. Because of the possibility, as suggested above, that participants 
interpreted the NL-IRAPs as a sense-making rather than self versus other task 
(particularly when other was specified), we returned to using the standard IRAP in the 
three experiments that comprised Chapter 4, but we now tried to capture self and other 
using actual photographs (Experiment 1), as well as vignettes that required perspective-
taking before exposure to the IRAP (Experiments 2 and 3).  
The primary objective of Experiment 1 in Chapter 4 was to determine if it was 
feasible to use matched pictures of self versus other across two IRAPs. The results 
indicated that with the exception of one trial type, the effects recorded were consistent 
with what might be expected based on previously-established verbal relations. That is, 
participants tended to confirm more readily than to deny that a picture of a face was a 
face and that a picture of a pen was a pen. They also tended to deny more readily than 
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confirm that a picture of a pen was a face and that a pen-related word was a picture of a 
face. This pattern of effects indicated that indeed pictures of self and other can be 
successfully employed in an IRAP. However, the question remained regarding whether 
they facilitated perspective-taking per se.  
At this point, we faced the challenge of deciding how to assess perspective-
taking using IRAPs that presented pictures of self and other without adding complex 
statements that may again undermine perspective-taking (as in the NL-IRAPs). The 
strategy we adopted thus involved avoiding the use of complex statements within the 
IRAP, but instead presenting vignettes that required perspective-taking just prior to the 
completion of an IRAP. Specifically, the vignettes were designed to assess the 
attribution of false belief. The ratiobale for assessing false belief was that it is a widely 
used format for exploring perspective-taking in the ToM literature and its inclusion in 
the vignettes allowed us to more systemativally depict perspective-taking than would 
more general self and other statemenst (as in the NL-IRAP). 
 
The specific objective of Experiment 2 was to determine if the presentation of 
a false belief vignette before exposure to a single IRAP would influence performance 
in a vignette-consistent direction, thus showing that the IRAP could capture complex 
perspective-taking. Specifically, the false belief vignette comprised of a written 
paragraph that described a scenario involving the participant and the other person 
depicted in the other-face picture. In this scenario, the participant observed that items in 
a box switched locations when the other person left the room. A belief IRAP was then 
presented that required the participant to respond to what they thought was in the box 
and what they thought that the other person thought was in the box. Given that the items 
had been switched when the other person had the left the room, the self and other should 
differ in terms of what they believed to be in the box. The key question was, would the 
observed IRAP effects be consistent with the false belief vignette? A control vignette 
was presented to half of the participants, in which there was no exchange of the items 
in the box and therefore no false belief attribution was required. However, the results 
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were inconclusive and there is a number of possible reasons for this outcome. (1) The 
vignette presented in the Control Condition could have been interpreted as ambiguous 
for participants. (2) High rates of attrition restricted data analyses to the final pair of test 
blocks. (3) The order in which the IRAP blocks were presented (i.e. vignette-consistent-
first versus vignette-inconsistent-first) was not counterbalanced. Naturally, the primary 
aim of Experiment 3 was to rectify these three issues by: (i) including an active control 
design in which the two vignettes specified the opposite states of affairs; (ii) included 
practice blocks in the IRAP; and (iii) counterbalancing the block sequence of the IRAP. 
The results Experiment 3 were more conclusive, but still suggested that the primary 
controlling variable was the sequence in which IRAP blocks were presented, rather than 
the actual content of the vignettes. Indeed, the primary controlling variable, at least with 
respect to the Self-Correct and Other-Correct trial types, was the order in which the two 
types of IRAP blocks were presented. Thus, the extent to which particiapntes were 
respoding to self versus other appears to be limited. Nevertheless, post-hoc analyses did 
indicate that the vignettes did impact on performance, but only when the vignette and 
the initial contingencies of the IRAP cohered with each other.  
 
The Current Empirical Research and its Relationship to Conceptual Analyses of 
Perspective-Taking 
 As noted previously, the empirical research reported in the current thesis was 
intertwined throughout with the on-going development of conceptual analyses within 
RFT itself, and thus it is important to place the empirical research here in that context. 
In order to achieve this objective, it will be useful to separate these conceptual analyses 
into two parts. The first part will focus on what has been labelled the Differential 
Arbitrarily Applicable Relational Responding Effects (DAARRE) model and the second 
part will focus on a recent attempt to provide a systematic framework for research within 
RFT. 
The Differential Arbitrarily Applicable Relational Responding Effects 
(DAARRE) model of the IRAP and its relationship to the current empirical 
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research. Recently, some RFT-based research has focused on variables that appear to 
impact IRAP performances. In a series of studies, a persistent pattern of IRAP effects 
referred to as the Single-Trial-Type-Dominance-Effect (STTDE) has been recorded (see 
Finn, Barnes-Holnes, & McEnteggart, 2018). This pattern involves significant 
differences in magnitude between trial types that share the response option “True” 
during history-consistent blocks. These results were not previously accounted for by 
any existing model of IRAP performances. Thus, the authors proposed a new model, 
known as the Differential Arbitrarily Applicable Relational Responding Effects 
(DAARRE) model. This model incorporates variables beyond the particular stimulus-
stimulus relations (between label and target) presented within each trial type of the 
IRAP. In the paragraphs below, we use the DAARRE model to potentially explain the 
STTDE effect observed in the data from Experiment 1 and the Double-Trial-Type-
Dominance-Effect (DTTDE) observed in the data from Experiment 2 of Chapter 2. We 
also use the model to explain the unexpected effect observed in Experiment 1 of Chapter 
4.  
Chapter 2. The findings from Experiment 1 in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2) showed 
a clear STTDE for the I-I trial type, whereas the data from Experiment 2 showed a 
DTTDE for the I-I and Other-Other trial types. Although the empirical work conducted 
in the current thesis was not designed to test the DAARRE model or to manipulate either 
of these effects, placing the current data in the context of the model and the effects 
observed in parallel research could be particularly instructive, especially in terms of 
future research.  
In attempting to explain the STTDE for the I-I trial type in Experiment 1, we 
assume that self-related terms possess relatively strong orienting or recognition 
responses relative to other-related words (Alexopoulos, Muller, Ric, & Marendaz, 
2012). We make this assumption based on the fact that, in general, most individuals 
engage more frequently in self-related verbal behaviour than in verbal buhaviour related 
to others. It is worth noting that the STTDDE was not observed in the Control Condition 
in Experiment 1, which supports the assumption that the self-related stimuli possess 
some functions that other-related stimuli do not. The DAARRE model as it applies to 
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the self and other stimuli employed in Experiments 1 and 2 of Chapter 2 is presented in 
Figure 1. The reader is encouraged to consult Figure 1 while reading the following text.  
 
Figure 1. The DAARRE model as it applies to the deictic IRAP in Chapter 2. The 
positive and negative labels refer to the relative positivity of the Cfuncs, for each label 
and target, the relative positivity of the Crels, and the relative positivity of the RCIs in 
the context of the other Cfuncs, Crels, and RCIs in that stimulus set. 
 
 The model identifies three key sources of behavioural influence: (1) the 
relationship between the label and target stimuli (labeled as Crels), (2) the orienting 
functions of the label and target stimuli (labelled as Cfuncs), and (3) the coherence 
functions of the two response options (e.g. “Yes” and “No”). Consistent with the earlier 
suggestion that self-related terms likely possess stronger orienting functions relative to 
other-related terms, the Cfunc property for self is labelled as positive and the Cfunc 
property for Other is labelled as negative. The negative labelling for Other should not 
be taken to indicate a negative orienting function, but simply an orienting function that 
is weaker than that of self. The labelling of the relations between the label and target 
stimuli indicates the extent to which they cohere or do not cohere based on the 
participants’ relevant verbal history. Thus, an I-I relation is labelled with a plus sign 
(i.e. coherence), whereas an I-Other relation is labelled with a minus sign (i.e. 
incoherence). Finally, the two response options are each labelled with a plus or minus 
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sign to indicate their functions as either coherence or incoherence indicators (see 
Maloney & Barnes-Holmes, 2016). In the current example, “Yes” (+) would typically 
be used in natural language to indicate coherence and “No” (-) would be used to indicate 
incoherence. Note, however, that these and all of the other functions labelled in Figure 
6 are behaviourally determined, by the past and current verbal history of the participant, 
and should not be seen as absolute or inherent in the stimuli themselves.  
As can be seen from Figure 1, each trial type differs in its pattern of Cfuncs and 
Crels, in terms of plus and minus properties, that define the trial type for the deictic 
IRAP. The STTDE for the I-I trial type in Experiment 1 may be explained, as noted 
above, by the DAARRE model based on the extent to which the Cfunc and Crel 
properties cohere with the relational coherence indicator (RCI) properties of the 
response options across blocks of trials. To appreciate this explanation, note that the 
Cfunc and Crel properties for the I-I trial type are all labelled with plus signs; in 
addition, the RCI that is deemed correct for history-consistent trials is also labelled with 
a plus sign (the only instance of four plus signs in the figure). In this case, therefore, 
according to the model this trial type may be considered maximally coherent during 
history-consistent trials. In contrast, during history-inconsistent trials, there is no 
coherence between the required RCI (minus sign) and the properties of the Cfuncs and 
Crel (all plus signs). According to the DAARRE model, this stark contrast in levels of 
coherence across blocks of trials serves to produce a relatively large IRAP effect. Now 
consider the Other-Other trial type, which requires that participants choose the same 
RCI as the I-I trial type during history-consistent trials, but here the property of the RCI 
(plus sign) does not cohere with the Cfunc properties of the label and target stimuli (both 
minus signs). During history-inconsistent trials, the RCI (minus sign) does cohere with 
the Cfunc properties but not with the Crel property (plus sign). Thus, the differences in 
coherence between history-consistent and history-inconsistent trials across these two 
trial types is not equal (i.e. the difference is greater for the I-I trial type) and thus favours 
the STTDE for I-I. Finally, as becomes apparent from inspecting the figure for the 
remaining two trial types (I-Other and Other-I), the differences in coherence across 
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history-consistent and history-inconsistent blocks is reduced relative to the I-I trial type 
(two plus signs relative to four), thus again supporting the STTDE. 
At this point, the DAARRE model appears to explain the STTDDE for the 
deictic IRAP in Experiment 1. But how might it explain the apparent moderating 
influence of the read-aloud procedure which appeared to undermine the STTDE, as 
observed in Experiment 2? Although entirely speculative, it is possible that requiring 
participants to read aloud each label and target stimulus as they appeared on-screen 
reduced or eradicated the influence of the orienting functions of those stimuli. In other 
words, because every label and target was given a similar function by the read-aloud 
requirement, this overshadowed the differential orienting functions that were present 
when reading aloud was not required. Thus, the remaining controlling variable was the 
Crel property, which was the same across the I-I and Other-Other trial types (both plus 
signs). As an aside, perhaps the perspective-taking instructions and DRT training 
provided in the Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016) study had a functionally similar impact to 
the read-aloud requirement (i.e. it attenuated the Cfunc properties of the IRAP and thus 
a DTTDE was observed). 
 In presenting the foregoing model, we recognise that it is specific to the IRAP, 
but if the IRAP is to be developed as a method for analysing deictic relational 
responding, and perspective-taking more generally, it is essential that we understand as 
fully as possible the functional processes involved in the behavioural patterns we 
observe with this methodology. Imagine, for example, that a deictic IRAP was used to 
explore potential differences in deictic relational responding between groups with 
different clinical profiles. It may be important to determine if those groups differ in 
terms of the orienting functions for self and other, rather than any difference in their 
ability to relate self-to-self and other-to-other.   
 In considering the potential relevance of the DAARRE model to understanding 
IRAP performances in the clinical domain, it seems important to reflect upon the pattern 
of correlations we obtained between the IRAP performances and the self-report 
measures of psychological presented in Experiments 1 and 2 of Chapter 2. Specifically, 
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in Experiment 1, only the Other-Other trial type correlated with the CAPE. That is, 
increased response bias in responding to others as others predicted lower levels of 
psychotic-like experiences. In Experiment 2, however, only the I-I trial type correlated 
with the CAPE. That is, increases in response bias in responding to self as self predicted 
higher levels of psychotic-like experiences. Although these correlations did not remain 
significant following Bonferroni correction, the fact that the pattern of correlations 
differed in the presence versus the absence of the read-aloud procedure may indicate 
that manipulating the dominance of the orienting versus relational functions of the IRAP 
impacts upon specific features of its predictive validity. In Experiment 2, for example, 
the relatively strong pattern of self-self relational responding, in the absence of orienting 
functions (i.e. in the presence of the read-aloud procedure), predicted higher levels of 
psychological suffering. When relative differences in orienting functions were present 
in the IRAP (i.e. in the absence of the read-aloud procedure), the Other-Other trial type 
predicted lower levels of psychological suffering. In any case, the extent to which 
different functional properties of the IRAP predict psychological suffering will be an 
important avenue for future research. 
Chapter 4. The STTDE was again observed in the data from Experiment 1 of 
Chapter 4. In the context of both the self-focused and other-focused IRAPs it is assumed 
that in general participants oriented toward face-related stimuli more strongly than 
toward pen-related stimuli (see Borji, Sihite, & Itti, 2013; Hershler, & Hochstein, 2005; 
Santos, Mier, Kirsh, & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2011)1. Specifically, the D-score for the 
Face words-Face picture trial type was significantly larger than for the other three trial 
types. The fact that the Face words-Face picture effect was larger than both Face 
words-Pen picture and Pen words-Face picture may be deemed relatively predictable 
because the latter two trial types do not share the same response option with the former 
 
1 We use the term ‘face-related’ stimuli based on the assumption that words co-ordinated with 
pictures of faces in the context of the IRAP would possess some of the functions (e.g. orienting) 
of those pictures, via a transfer of functions. 
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trial type within blocks of trials. During consistent bocks, for example, the Face words-
Face picture trial type requires the participant to respond Yes, whereas the Face words-
Pen picture and Pen words-Face picture trial types require the response No. What is 
more difficult to explain, however, is the difference between the Face words-Face 
picture and the Pen words-Pen picture, because they both share the same response 
option within IRAP blocks (i.e. Yes during consistent blocks and No during inconsistent 
blocks).  
 At this point, we have used the DAARRE model to explain the STTDE that 
emerged once again in Experiment 1 of Chpater 4 (as had been the case in Experiment 
1, Chapter 2), but another differential trial type effect also emerged here in Experiment 
1. which would be difficult to explain in terms of the response options alone. 
Specifically, participants tended to deny more readily than confirm that a picture of a 
pen was a face, but this was not the case (at a statistically significant level) when 
denying that a picture of a face was a pen. Indeed, post-hoc analyses indicated that these 
two trial types differed significantly from each other. How might we explain this 
difference, given that both trial types required the same RCI within blocks of trials? 
Once again, the DAARRE model may be of use here. Specifically, the Face words-Pen 
pictures trial type presents a target stimulus that coheres with the RCI in terms of its 
Cfunc properties, whereas the Pen words-Face picture trial type does not. If we assume 
that the spatial contiguity between the target stimulus and the response option plays a 
role in determining the IRAP effect, the difference in trial type effects observed here 
makes sense. More informally, participants may experience a ‘Yes-No-No’ reaction to 
the Face words-Pen pictures trial type, but a ‘No-Yes-No’ reaction to the Pen words-
Face picture trial type, assuming that in general they read each IRAP trial from top-
down. If participants find it easier to select an RCI that is functionally similar to the 
target stimulus they have just observed, than an RCI that is functionally dissimilar, the 
larger effect for the Face words-Pen pictures trial type is readily predicted.  
 Of course, the DAARRE model explanation presented above is post-hoc and 
speculative, but it seems important to present it here because it is a pattern we have 
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observed in other studies, in which the DAARRE model can be applied in a relatively 
straightforward way. Perhaps other researchers, therefore, who are using the IRAP, may 
find the interpretation offered here of some use in attempting to explain and explore 
similar effects. In any case, it seems important to continue to develop increasingly 
sophisticated functional analyses of the IRAP in terms of the cluster of variables that 
produce the patterns we observe with the measure. Indeed, this seems particularly 
important because the IRAP has been used widely as a measure in clinical, health, 
forensic and social psychological research (e.g. see Vahey et al. 2015 for a recent meta-
analysis).  
Grappling with the findings from Chapter 3. It is considerably more difficult 
to attempt to use the DAARRE model to explain the effects observed in Experiments 2-
6 of Chapter 3, primarily because of the use of the NL-IRAPs. Nonethless, the 
unexpected pattern that was generally consistent across all six experiments, in terms of 
the Negative Event-Positive Reaction trial type yielding the weakest effect, still needs 
to be grappled with. The STTDE cannot readily be applied here because that effect is 
specific to the two trial types that require a “Yes” response during history-consistent 
blocks. The critical issue here is that across all six experiments the effect for the 
Negative Event-Positive Reaction trial type was weaker than for the Positive Event-
Negative Reaction trial type, and both of these trial types require a “No” response during 
history-consistent blocks. Why would they differ, given that they both require the same 
response within blocks? This question seems particularly interesting because the NL-
IRAP was employed here, and thus an explanation that appeals to the functions of 
separate label and target stimuli within a traditional IRAP cannot be applied. 
Nevertheless, given the consistency in this weak effect for the Negative Event-Positive 
trial type, across the six studies, it remains a pattern that should be targeted for 
systematic analyses in future research. 
It is also important to note that overall the two IRAPs employed throughout the 
empirical work in Chapter 3 did produce performances that would be deemed consistent 
with the pre-experimental histories of the participants. That is, partiicpants tended to 
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confirm more readily than to deny that positive event was posistive and a negative event 
was negative. They also tended to deny more readily than confirm that a positive event 
was negative and a negative event was posistive. But, why did the IRAPs not distinguish 
in a clear and consistent way between the perspective of self versus other. One 
possibility is that the IRAPs simply tapped into ‘sense-making.’ For example, 
confirming, rather than denying that positive events evoke positive reactions in the self 
and others makes sense in natural language. The only caveat to this interpretation is that 
significant differences between the IRAPs were observed in Experiments 1 and 2 when 
other was unspecified, but not in Experiments 3-6 when other was specified. Perhaps, 
therefore, there was some sensitivity to self versus other, but the use of complex 
statements in the IRAPs potentially undermined or reduced the impact of deictic 
relational responding per se. That is, in presenting such complex stimuli or networks in 
the IRAP, participants more or less interpreted the task as a sense-making or problem-
solving task, in which the self versus other had little or no impact, particularly when the 
other was specified. The challenge going forward, therefore, is to develop IRAPs that 
maintain the deictic functions of self and other, in the context of perspective-taking 
rather than simple sense-making.  
It is important at this point to draw attention to a pattern in the data that only came 
to light during the publication review process, and which might indicate that the two 
NL-IRAPs may have been sensitive, to some degree, to self versus others, when other 
was clearly distinct from self. Specifically, the trial type effect for Positive Event-
Negative Reaction was significantly different from zero for the self-focused IRAPs, but 
not for the other-focused IRAPs, across Experiments 5 and 6. This was not the case in 
the four remaining experiments, in which other was unspecified or specified as similar 
to self. In a purely post-hoc analysis, we compared the difference between the self- and 
other-focused IRAPs for the Positive Event-Negative Reaction trial type, (Self; M = .164 
SD = .324, Other; M = .032 SD = .333, t(59) = 2.195 p =.032. 95% CI [ .024, .54], BF1 
= 2.560). We raise this issue here because this pattern emerged across the two 
experiments in which other was clearly distinct from self. If this finding is indeed robust, 
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it could indicate that participants found it easier to respond ‘False’ when self, rather than 
a very distinct other, was co-ordinated in some way with a negative reaction. In simple 
terms, participants showed a bias toward denying that they are negative that was 
stronger than that bias for very different others. Although subtle, pursuing this 
potentially interesting effect could be useful in future research. 
 
An Alternative Strategy for Conceptualising and Analysing Perspective-taking 
Based on a Multi-Dimensional Multi-Level (MDML) Framework for RFT 
As noted in the introductory chapter to the current thesis, the approach taken to 
studying perspective-taking within RFT has focused heavily on the three deictic 
relations (I-YOU, HERE-THERE and NOW-THEN). Indeed, the development of the 
original perspective-taking protocol involved targeting exactly these relations. 
Specifically, the protocol asked participants to respond in accordance with these 
relations in simple and/or reversed form. As discussed in Chapter 2, more recent work 
on perspective-taking within RFT has employed the IRAP (see Barbero-Rubio et al., 
2016) or has involved deriving spatial perspective-taking relations by exposing adult 
participants to a complex series of graduated ‘mental rotation’ tasks (see Guinther, 
2017, 2018). In all of this work, however, there has been little if any effort to develop a 
technical, conceptual RFT-based analysis of tasks typically used by mainstream 
psychology to assess perspective-taking. For example, it remains unclear exactly what 
relational repertoires seem to be required to complete the types of task that aim to assess 
what is described as false belief, such as the Deceptive Container Task or the Sally-
Anne Test, which was employed in the research reported in Chapter 4 of the current 
thesis. Throughout the empirical research reported herein, there was an on-going effort 
to systematise the increasing complexity in patterns of relational responding that have 
been identified within RFT and critically, in the current context, to begin to specify 
exactly what relational abilities are required for a child or individual to successfully 
complete false belief tasks. To appreciate how the systematic analysis of relational 
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responding leads to a potentially more precise analysis of perspective-taking it will first 
be necessary to outline the general framework, to which we now turn. 
The Multi-Dimensional Multi-Level (MDML) Framework. In an effort to 
systematise the RFT account and to emphasise the relevant behavioural dynamics 
involved in AARR (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Luciano, & McEnteggart, 2017), 
a multi-dimensional multi-level (MDML) framework has been proposed (see Table 2). 
According to this framework, AARR may be conceptualised as developing in a broad 
sense from; (i) mutual entailment, to (ii) simple networks involved in frames, to (iii) 
more complex networks involved in rules and instructions, to (iv) the relating of 
relations involved in analogical reasoning, and finally to (v) relating relational networks, 
which is typically involved in understanding and producing extended narratives, and 
advanced problem-solving. In identifying these as different levels, the MDML 
framework is not indicating that they are rigid or invariant ‘stages.’ Rather, lower levels 
are seen as containing patterns of AARR that may provide an important historical 
context for the patterns of AARR that occur in the levels above. In general, the different 
levels are based on a combination of well-established assumptions within RFT and, 
where possible, empirical evidence. The framework also conceptualises each of these 
levels as having multiple dimensions: coherence, complexity, derivation and flexibility. 
Each of the levels is seen as intersecting with each of the dimensions yielding a 
framework that consists of 20 units of analysis for conceptualising and studying the 
dynamics of AARR in the laboratory and in natural settings. 
 
Table 2 
                  Overview of the Multi-Dimensional Multi-Level (MDML) Framework 
LEVELS DIMENSIONS 
Coherence Complexity Derivation Flexibility 
Mutually 
Entailing 
Coherence/Mutual 
Entailment 
Complexity/Mutual 
Entailment 
Derivation/Mutual 
Entailment 
Flexibility/Mutual 
Entailment 
Relational 
Framing 
 Coherence/Frame Complexity/Frame Derivation/Frame Flexibility/Frame 
Relational 
Networking 
Coherence/Network Complexity/Network Derivation/Network Flexibility/Network 
Relating 
Relations 
Coherence/Relating 
Relations 
Complexity/Relating 
Relations 
Derivation/Relating 
Relations 
Flexibility/Relating 
Relations 
Relating 
Relational 
Networks 
Coherence/Relating 
Relational Networks 
Complexity/Relating 
Relational Networks 
Derivation/Relating 
Relational Networks 
Flexibility/Relating 
Relational Networks 
  
 
 
 
A brief description of each of the four dimensions is as follows. Coherence 
refers to the extent to which specific patterns of AARR are generally consistent with 
other patterns of AARR. For example, the statement “A car is larger than a truck” would 
typically be seen as lacking coherence with the relational networks that operate in the 
wider verbal community. Note, however, that such a statement may be seen as coherent 
in certain contexts (e.g. when playing a game of ‘everything is opposite’). Complexity 
refers to the level of detail or density of a particular pattern of AARR. As a simple 
example, the mutually entailed relation of co-ordination may be seen as less complex 
than the mutually entailed relation of comparison because the former involves only one 
type of relation (e.g. if A is the same as B then B is the same as A), but the latter involves 
two types of relations (if A is bigger than B, then B is smaller than A). Derivation refers 
to how well practiced a particular instance of AARR has become. Specifically, when a 
pattern of AARR is derived for the first time it is, by definition, highly derived (i.e. 
novel or emergent) and thus derivation reduces as that pattern becomes more practiced. 
Flexibility refers to the extent to which a given instance of AARR may be modified by 
current contextual variables. Imagine a young child who is asked to respond with the 
wrong answer to the question “Which is bigger, a car or a truck?” The easier this is 
achieved, the more flexible the AARR. 
A detailed treatment of the MDML framework has been provided elsewhere 
(e.g. Barnes-Holmes et al., 2017) and thus there is no need to work through all the details 
and subtleties here. The key purpose in presenting the MDML framework in the current 
chapter is to show how it has been used to develop the beginnings of an RFT-based 
conceptual analysis of the basic false belief task (e.g. the Deceptive Container Task and 
Sally-Anne Test), which we will now consider. 
A conceptual functional analysis of the False Belief Task based on the 
MDML framework. The following is ‘educated guess work’ at providing a functional 
analysis, based on the MDML framework, of the AARR that is required to ‘solve’ a 
classic false belief task. Where appropriate, the minimal levels of relational 
development specified within the MDML framework are indicated below. Specifically, 
we will argue that solving a false belief task involves the highest level of relational 
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development (Level 5). We recognise that one could directly train correct responding 
on a false belief task through explicit reinforcement, direct instruction and prompting, 
etc. However, obtaining correct responses that involve ‘genuinely’ understanding that 
others may believe something that is false if they have not seen what the self has seen 
would seem to require the relating of relational networks. 
The critical relational pre-cursors. Before presenting the full MDML-based 
model of false belief, it seems important to identify what we see as the key relational 
pre-cursors and the levels of relational development at which they need to be observed. 
First, the three basic relational frames of co-ordination, distinction and temporality 
would be required, thus involving Levels 1 and 2 of the MDML framework. It would 
be important that relational responding involved in these frames is relatively high in 
coherence and complexity, but relatively low in derivation and flexibility. More 
informally, (1) when events are related as co-ordinate, distinct or occurring in some 
temporal order, these patterns of relational responding should be consistent with many 
other instances of previous and current relevant patterns of such responding (high 
coherence); (2) the three classes of relational responding should be relatively sensitive 
to various forms of contextual control (high complexity); (3) each of the three classes 
should have relatively extended or protracted behavioural histories (low derivation); and 
(4) the three patterns should persist in the absence of direct reinforcement, prompting, 
instruction and even modest levels of punishment (low flexibility).  
In addition to the three basic relational frames discussed above, the core deictic 
relational frame of I-YOU, HERE-THERE and NOW-THEN would need to be firmly 
established in the behavioural repertoire. Strictly speaking, as a frame this would be 
located at Level 2 of the MDML framework, but in ensuring that the frame was firmly 
established would likely have required that the basic framing participated in larger 
relational networks, thereby locating it at Level 3 at least. More informally, the ‘I’ would 
have been related to many other individuals (rather than only one other) in many 
different times and places. Technically speaking, this would involve ensuring again 
relatively high levels of coherence and complexity, with low levels of derivation and 
flexibility. For example, if I told someone that I was on a train at noon going from 
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Dublin to Cork, this statement would cohere with the conclusion that I will arrive in 
Cork at approx. 3pm. If, however, I qualified that I would have to change at Mallow to 
complete the trip, the conclusion about the arrival time would be adjusted to approx. 
3.30pm, which would require of course an increased level of complexity in the 
contextual control over the networking involved. Appropriate responding in this 
example would almost certainly involve low levels of derivation and flexibility. That is, 
there would be many broadly similar instances of informing listeners of where you are, 
where you are going, what time you expect to arrive, and any other qualifying conditions 
that would then allow both you and the listener to co-ordinate your activities.   
The final critical relational pre-cursor would require causal or if-then frames 
and appropriate transformations of function, involving the deictic relations specified 
above, thus again involving relational development at Levels 1, 2 and 3, at minimum, 
of the MDML framework. The specific causal relation and transformations of function 
could be described as ‘seeing leads to knowing’ or in other words ‘if I see an event 
occur, then I know that it occurred.’ Ideally, this particular if-then frame would network 
with the deictic frame in a complex network, so that I could derive ‘if you and I see an 
event occur, then both you and I know that it occurred.’ Again, it would be necessary 
for this type of complex networking to be relatively high in coherence and by definition 
complexity, and low in derivation and flexibility. Indeed, these dimensional 
requirements could be seen as essential if a full-blown understanding of false belief is 
to be observed on relevant tasks. 
Even with all of the foregoing pre-cursors in place, false belief understanding 
appears to require relational responding that is clearly located at both Levels 4 and 5 of 
the MDML framework. To appreciate why this is the case, the reader should examine 
Figure 2, which provides a graphical representation of the suggested functional-analytic 
processes involved in responding correctly to the classic Unexpected Location (false 
belief) Task. The bullet points below provide an additional description of the graphhical 
representation. 
The MDML-based Analysis of a False Belief Task 
Temporal Relation 
            
Relating-Relations (Level 4) Time 1                                                         Relating-Relations (Level 4) Time 2 
(Self and Other both see a glove in the box)                                         (Self sees a scarf in the box, but other does not) 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
Distinction Relation Between the Two Relational Networks (Level 5) 
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the suggested functional-analytic processes involved in responding correctly to a classical false belief task. 
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• The left-hand side of the figure indicates that initially (at Time 1) both the self 
and other observe a glove being placed into a box; based on this and the 
relational pre-cursors described above, the self can conclude that both self and 
other know that there is a glove in the box.  
• The right-hand side of the figure indicates that subsequently (at Time 2) the self 
observes the glove in the box being replaced with a scarf when the other is not 
in the room; based on this and the relational pre-cursors noted above, the self 
can conclude that only the self will know that there is a scarf (rather than a 
glove) in the box. 
• The double-headed arrow linking the left and right sides of the figure indicates 
that responding correctly to the false belief task requires that the self relates the 
two relational networks as distinct in terms of what the self and other know after 
Time 2. The critical point here is that if the self simply reported that the other 
does not know what is in the box after Time 2, that would indicate relating 
relations which is best located at Level 4 of the MDML framework. If, however, 
the self reports that the other thinks that the box contains a glove, that requires 
the relating of relations at Time 2 to the relating of relations at Time 1. More 
informally, the self has to understand that what the other knew at Time 1 is what 
they still think at Time 2. 
Deconstructing a classic false belief task using the MDML framework, as we have 
done here, clearly reveals the layers of complexity involved in this widely used task and 
may explain to some extent why many young children struggle to solve it correctly. The 
potential individual differences in levels of coherence, complexity, derivation and 
flexibility among the relational pre-cursors discussed above may also help explain why 
the literature on perspective-taking contains such wide variation in the ages at which 
false belief tasks can be solved correctly, and why performances vary widely depending 
on the precise variation of the task that is presented. At this point, we should be clear 
that the current MDML-based interpretation of the false belief task remains highly 
speculative. Nevertheless, we present it here because it seems to suggest numerous ways 
in which applied researchers and practitioners could approach the training and 
establishment of relatively robust false belief responding in individuals who find the 
task challenging.  
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If the foregoing MDML-based analysis of perspective-taking is at least partially 
correct, it may also help to explain why it has proven so difficult, even in our own 
research here, to capture perspective-taking using the IRAP. Consider two key issues in 
this regard. 1. Responding to the IRAP requires participants to respond under time 
pressure (typically < 2000ms). When considering the above MDML-based analysis it 
would appear unlikely that participants could engage in such complex relational 
responding within such a short time period. 2. The repeated presentation of similar trial 
types may also impact upon the likelihood of particiapnts responding with ‘genuine 
perspective-taking’. For example, it may be the case that participants initially engage in 
‘genuine perspective-taking’ during the first trials of the IRAP, but thereafter simply 
maintain ‘correct’ responding. In other words, participants can respond correctly across 
latter trials that require mutual entailment, but they are not relating relational networks. 
Overall therefore, it maybe the case that the IRAP as a methodology is, by its own 
structure, limited in its ability to capture perspective-taking ‘in flight’.  
 
Conclusions  
In hindsight, the aim of the current thesis to develop an IRAP that could capture 
perseptvie-taking ‘in flight’ was extremely ambitious. The results from the eleven 
experiments reported here suggest that the IRAP, in its current format, is limited in its 
ability to capture genuine perspective-taking. However, as a journey towards 
understanding, in considerable technical detail, why this is the case, we have learned a 
great deal both about the IRAP itself and ultimately about the potential behavioural 
processes involved in perspective-taking as derived relational responding. We have also 
gained new insights into the wide inconsistencies that have marred the huge mainstream 
literature on persepective-taking. In these respects, this journey has been more than 
worthwhile, although frustrating at times. Going forward, it appears vital that we 
develop a clear functional analysis of what participants are required to do when 
presented with a perspective-taking task. The General Discussion of the current thesis 
has provided an initial attempt to do just that. The empirical work and discussion here 
also indicated that funcational analyses of the IRAP must continue, if we are to 
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understand the effects observed using this procedure. The on-going conceptual 
developments with RFT, of which the current thesis is one strand, are essential in this 
regard. 
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English Summary 
Introduction 
Perspective-taking has been broadly defined as the ability to interpret and predict 
the thoughts, emotions or behaviours of oneself and of others (Carpendale & Lewis, 
2006) in terms of being able to ‘assume an alternative perspective’ where necessary. In 
mainstream psychology, the broad concept of perspective-taking has been sub-divided 
into visual perspective-taking, emotional perspective-taking and cognitive perspective-
taking (usually referred to as ToM). Although these domains are often studied 
independently, all three appear to be involved, to varying degrees, in the ability to take 
the perspective of another. Visual perspective-taking has been observed as early as 12 
months. Affective perspective-taking emerges later, usually around age two, and 
cognitive perspective-taking (ToM) comes even later around age four, with false belief 
understanding observed around age six. However, there have been wide variations in 
the ages at which these skills are first observed, with outcomes apparently sensitive to 
both methodological variations and broader individual differences, especially in 
executive functioning. There is evidence of weaker perspective-taking performances in 
samples with a diagnosis of ASD, BPD or schizophrenia, but these too appear to be 
influenced by task-specific features, and broader executive functioning abilities.  
In traditional behaviour analysis, the ability to respond to one’s own responding 
(i.e. acquire self-awareness) as an essential pre-cursor to perspective-taking, is shaped 
through a history of interacting with other members of the social/verbal community, 
although empirical support for this interpretation of self-awareness has tended to come 
from research with non-humans. Indeed, little behaviour-analytic research has explicitly 
attempted to connect the concept of self with perspective-taking skills in humans. While 
some researchers have offered behavioural interpretations of ToM performances in 
terms of equivalence relations and operant stimulus control, most research has focused 
on remediating deficits in perspective-taking through the provision of appropriate 
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learning histories. The outcomes show that video modeling interventions have enabled 
children with ASD to pass the Sally-Anne Test, although generalisation is more robust 
when training exemplars are included. Incorporating training prompts into the Sally-
Anne Test has also produced positive outcomes, but appear to be necessary or less 
effective for participants with language deficits. Developmental behavioural researchers 
have devoted considerable attention to joint attention and social referencing as pre-
cursors to perspective-taking. There is evidence that joint attention responding and 
initiation can be established in children with ASD, although the latter (initiation) is more 
likely to be deficient and more difficult to establish, and generalisation is not always 
observed. In general, as one might expect, there has been a far greater emphasis in 
behavioural psychology on prediction-and-influence of perspective-taking, which in a 
broad sense further complicates the literature in this area. That is, research from the 
mainstream literature has tended to produce relatively inconsistent results in attempting 
to tie deficits in perspective-taking to specific ages, populations and syndromes. The 
fact that behaviour-analytic research also shows that perspective-taking deficits are 
relatively amenable to change when targeted by behavioural interventions makes it even 
more difficult to draw firm conclusions about the very concept of perspective-taking 
itself.  
Behavioural researchers working under the rubric of Relational Frame Theory 
(RFT) have proposed a distinction between verbal self-discrimination as observed in 
humans and non-verbal self-discrimination observed with non-humans. According to 
RFT, verbal self-discrimination and perspective-taking comprise repertoires of 
arbitrarily applicable relational responding (AARR). For RFT, perspective-taking is 
AARR that becomes abstracted across multiple exemplars of talking about your 
perspective in relation to others. The core relations involved in perspective-taking are 
referred to as deictic relations, and include responding from one’s own perspective in 
terms of interpersonal relations, spatial relations and temporal relations. Most of the 
empirical research on deictic relational responding has employed various iterations of a 
developmental protocol. This research supports the distinctions among the three types 
of deictic relations, and the finding that these relations vary on a continuum of 
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complexity from simple relations to reversed relations and double reversed relations. In 
general, accuracies in performances on the deictic relational protocol increase as a 
function of age. However, even adults produce considerable error rates and some adult 
performances are better on double reversals than reversals. Once established via 
multiple-exemplar training (MET), perspective-taking repertoires can generalise to both 
new stimuli and contexts. Studies assessing patterns of deictic relational responding in 
atypical populations have found that children with ASD produce somewhat weaker 
patterns than their peers. Results with atypical adults have found that performances on 
the deictic protocol correlate with verbal ability and IQ. Participants with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia have been shown to produce significantly weaker results on reversed and 
double reversed relations than typically-developing counterparts. Several researchers 
have raised concerns about using the protocol to assess deictic relational repertoires in 
adult samples.   
A considerable number of studies have assessed the relationship between 
performances on the deictic protocol and traditional ToM tasks, and found evidence of 
a functional overlap between deictic relational responding on the protocol and ToM with 
numerous samples. Several studies have systematically adapted trials from the deictic 
protocol to create tasks that closely resemble the attribution of true and false beliefs as 
targeted by traditional ToM tasks. The evidence indicates that accuracy on both types 
of trials increases as a function of age, but there are no differences in accuracy between 
true and false belief attribution. Related research has compared responding to self versus 
other in adapted false belief tasks and found no difference in overall accuracies, but has 
observed significantly longer latencies on trials involving the perspective of other versus 
self. In studies with atypical samples, those with high social anhedonia have been found 
to perform significantly more poorly than controls on false belief attributions to others. 
Similarly, participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia have performed significantly 
worse than controls on self-attributions of false belief.  
Much of the work conducted in the area of deictic relational responding has 
focused on assessing the presence of these patterns of relational responding in a 
dichotomous manner. That is, participants were typically assessed for the presence of 
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deictic relational responding, and if found to be deficient, these relations were trained 
and tested to determine if they produced predicted outcomes. However, little research 
has focused on the relative strength of a pattern once it was observed and there have 
been recent calls for analyses that focus on the relative strength or persistence of derived 
relational responding, rather than simply its presence versus absence (e.g. Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2016). In an attempt to develop methodologies for assessing the relative 
strength of derived relational responding, researchers have explored alternative 
methodologies, such as the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; e.g. 
Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2008; Hussey, et al., 2015).  
The IRAP requires participants to emit two opposing patterns of relational 
responding and the ease with which one pattern may be emitted relative to the other 
provides a measure of response strength. Specifically, the procedure typically presents 
label and target stimuli (e.g. the label word “puppy” with the target word “pleasant”) 
and requires participants to respond “True” (e.g. puppy-pleasant) or “False” (e.g. puppy-
unpleasant) to the stimulus pairs. An IRAP typically comprises four trial types (e.g. 
Puppy-Positive, Puppy-Negative, Spider-Positive and Spider-Negative) that are 
generally analysed independently in terms of the difference in response latencies 
between responding that is deemed consistent versus inconsistent with a participant’s 
verbal history. In general, response latencies are expected to be shorter during blocks of 
trials that require history-consistent versus history-inconsistent responding. 
The body of empirical research employing the IRAP has grown considerably, 
with an increasing focus on clinically relevant phenomena (Vahey et al., 2015). Using 
the IRAP to assess deictic relational responding, particularly in the clinical domain, 
would provide an alternative to the Barnes-Holmes (2001) protocol. A recent study in 
which the IRAP was used to target responding to self versus others is particularly 
relevant (Barbero-Rubio et al., 2016). 
This original study presented participants with their own names and the name 
of the researcher as label stimuli, and statements pertaining to specific characteristics of 
the self versus other as targets (e.g. “is in front of the laptop”). There were two response 
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options (“Yes” and “No”) on each trial. The four trial types in this study were referred 
to as: I-I (participant name-participant characteristics), Other-Other (researcher name-
researcher characteristics), I-Other (participant name-researcher characteristics) and 
Other-I (researcher name-participant characteristics). In general, the pattern of IRAP 
effects reported by Barbero-Rubio et al. (2016) indicated that participants’ response 
latencies showed significantly more rapid responding on the I-I trial type relative to the 
other three trial types during history-consistent blocks (i.e. responding “True” on I-I and 
Other-Other trial types, and responding “False” on I-Other and Other-I trial types). In 
addition, the difference in response latencies between consistent and inconsistent blocks 
for each trial type was in the predicted direction (i.e. shorter on history-consistent 
relative to history-inconsistent trials), and these differences were significant in terms of 
the normalised DIRAP-scores. 
 
Overview of the Empirical Chapters 
Chapter 2. Following on a review of the literature (summarised above), Chapter 
2 attempted to systematically replicate previous research by Barbero-Rubio et al. 
(2016). This involved returning to a traditional IRAP format that presented label stimuli 
at the top of the screen and target stimuli in the centre. Specifically, participants were 
presented with an IRAP that contained each participant’s own name (self) versus the 
name of the researcher (other) as label stimuli, and statements describing specific 
characteristics of the self (e.g. “is in front of the laptop”) versus other (e.g. “is standing 
up”) as targets, along with “Yes” and “No” as response options. In an extension of the 
research by Barbero-Rubio et al., the current work included a Control Condition in 
which no responding to self was involved, only to others. That is, the Control Condition 
involved an IRAP in which none of the trial types required responding to self, but only 
responding to two other separate individuals (i.e. the researcher and a picture of another 
unknown participant). If the comparison between self and other in a deictic IRAP is an 
important variable, one might expect a different pattern of results in a Control Condition 
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in which there is no contrast between self and other. One final way in which this research 
extended the Barbero-Rubio et al. study was the inclusion of self-report measures of 
self-esteem and the presence of psychotic-like experiences. We also retained one 
measure of perspective-taking employed in the original study. These were included on 
an exploratory basis. The results from Experiment 1 yielded significant IRAP effects 
for two of the trial types in both the deictic and control IRAPs, whereas four significant 
effects were observed in Barbero-Rubio et al. in which there was no Control Condition. 
A correlation matrix was calculated to determine if any of the DIRAP-scores from the 
deictic IRAP predicted self-reported psychotic experiences (on the Community 
Assessment of Psychic Experiences; CAPE), self-esteem (on the Rosenberg Self-esteem 
Scael; RSES) or perspective-taking (on the Perspective Taking sub-scale of the 
Interpersonal Reactitivity Index; IRI). The only significant correlations involved the 
Other-Other trial type with the overall CAPE frequency, and the CAPE positive subs-
cale, but neither remained significant after Bonferroni corrections. 
 A second experiment involved a novel method for collecting IRAP data, which 
had been shown to yield significant effects for all four trial types in a separate line of 
research being conducted by our group (Finn et al., 2018). The read-aloud procedure 
required participants to read aloud the label, target and chosen response option at the 
time of selection on each IRAP trial throughout the entire procedure. Given the 
differences between the results of Experiment 1 and those found by Barbero-Rubio et 
al. (2016), we investigated whether introduction of the read-aloud procedure would 
produce a pattern of effects similar to the original study. The data from Experiment 2 
once again showed relatively strong IRAP effects on the I-I and Other-Other trial types, 
replicating our findings from Experiment 1 and those from Barbero-Rubio et al., 
although we no longer found significant differences between these two trial types. On 
balance, Experiment 2 now replicated the effects on I-Other and Other-I reported in the 
original study (i.e. they were both significantly different from zero). The additional 
analyses we conducted, however, indicated that they were both significantly weaker 
than the I-I and Other-Other trial types. The control IRAP also yielded significant 
effects for all four trial types, although two of the trial types (Researcher-Researcher 
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and Other-Other) continued to be significantly stronger than the two remaining trial 
types. Finally, in contrast to Experiment 1, all of the significant correlations between 
the deictic IRAP and the questionnaires were recorded for the I-I trial type (rather than 
Other-Other). Again, however, these did not remain significant after Bonferroni 
corrections. 
Chapter 3. This chapter attempted to develop IRAPs that taregeted deictic 
relational responding with regard to the mental states of self and other. Developing such 
an IRAP would necessarily involve inserting complex relational networks into the 
procedure. This was pursed in a series of experiments that employed a novel version of 
the IRAP, known as the Natural Language-IRAP (NL-IRAP). The use of the NL-IRAP 
allowed for the presentation of relatively complex statements that required participants 
to infer the thoughts or beliefs of others on a trial-by-trial basis within the IRAP. Across 
a sequence of six experiments, a ‘self-focused IRAP’ required participants to respond 
to both positive and negative statements about themselves, whilst an ‘other-focused 
IRAP’ required participants to respond to similar statements about others. Experiments 
1 and 2 investigated perspective-taking with regard to an unspecified other. In addition, 
correlational analyses were condutced to determine the extent to which the two NL-
IRAPs correlated, or failed to correlate, with each other and with a range of self-report 
measures that were deemed to be relevant to perspective-taking. Experiments 3-6 
investigated perspective-taking with regard to a specified other, with the specified 
relationship between self and other manipulated across experiments. The results from 
the first two experiments indicated that there were significant differences between the 
self- versus other-focused IRAPs, when the other remained unspecified. The remaining 
four experiments, however, indicated that when the other was specified there was 
limited evidence that performances on the two IRAPs differed significantly. The 
correlational analyses between the IRAPs and the self-report measures yielded very few 
significant effects (and none at all after Bonferroni corrections). Finally, the 
correlational analyses between the two IRAPs in each experiment were significant in 
some studies(Experiments 2, 3 and 5), but not others (Experiments 1, 4 and 6). Overall, 
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the findings from Chapter 3 could be seen as encouraging because each experiment 
produced performances that would be deemed consistent with the pre-experimental 
histories of the participants. That is, the IRAP effects for the most part, were in the 
predicted direction (e.g. participants confirmed more rapidly than they denied that when 
positive events occur, they react positively, but when negative events occur, they react 
negatively).  
The results were also encouraging because we observed a possibly important 
distinction in perspective-taking when it applied to a general unspecified other versus 
someone well known to the participant (see DeBernardis et al., 2014). On balance, the 
results could be seen as somewhat disappointing because we failed to find strong 
evidence of perspective-taking when other was specified, at least in terms of different 
performances across the two IRAPs, or in correlations among the IRAPs and the self-
report measures. Perhaps, therefore, there was some sensitivity to self versus other, but 
the use of complex statements in the NL-IRAPs potentially undermined or reduced the 
impact of deictic relational responding per se. That is, in presenting such complex 
stimuli or reational networks in the IRAP, participants more or less interpreted the task 
as a sense-making or problem-solving task, in which the self versus other had little or 
no impact, particularly when the other was specified. 
Chapter 4. In reflecting upon the results obtained in the two previous empirical 
chapters, Chapter 4 attempted to develop IRAPs that maintained the deictic functions 
of self and other, in the context of perspective-taking rather than simple sense-making. 
The primary objective of Experiment 1 in this chapter was to determine if it was feasible 
to use matched pictures of self versus other across two IRAPs. In both IRAPs, the 
contrast categories were pen-related stimuli. In general, the pattern of effects indicated 
that pictures of faces could be incorporated into the IRAP, thus supporting the feasibility 
of using photographs of self versus other in IRAP perspective-taking studies. However, 
two effects did emerge that were worthy of further consideration, but these were 
thereafter addressed in the final Discussion chapter of the thesis because the effects were 
also observed in studies presented in other chapters.  
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The primary objective of Experiment 2 in Chapter 4 was to determine if the 
presentation of a false belief vignette before exposure to a single IRAP would influence 
performance in a vignette-consistent direction. The results of this study were 
inconclusive for a number of reasons. First, no clear differences emerged between the 
active vignette and the Control Condition (and the latter could have been interpreted as 
being ambiguous for participants). Second, the use of a familiarisation IRAP, instead of 
requiring participants to complete practice blocks in the belief IRAP, likely contributed 
to high rates of attrition, thus restricting data analyses to the final pair of test blocks. 
Third, the order in which IRAP blocks were presented (i.e. vignette-consistent-first 
versus vignette-inconsistent-first) was not counterbalanced and thus it was difficult to 
determine if the vignette and/or the block sequence was the primary controlling variable 
in determining the observed IRAP effects.  
The primary aim of Experiment 3 in Chapter 4 was to rectify the three main 
problems described above. The experiment thus involved an active control design in 
which the two vignettes specified the opposite states of affairs; the familiarisation IRAP 
was removed from the experiment, but the belief IRAP included practice blocks; and 
the block sequence of the IRAP was counterbalanced. The results of this study were 
more conclusive than those of the second, in indicating that the primary controlling 
variable was the sequence in which the IRAP blocks were presented, rather than the 
content of the vignettes. On balance, post-hoc analyses of performance of the first 
practice block pairs indicated that the block sequence and vignettes did interact with 
each other, but only when the vignette and the initial contingencies of the IRAP cohered 
with each other.  
 Chapter 5. At this stage in the doctoral research programme, 11 individual 
experiments had been completed and there was limited evidence that an IRAP had been 
developed that showed clear and unambiguous sensitivity to perspective-taking. On 
balance, the research contributed considerably to the on-going development of a 
conceptual analysis of perspective-taking and the dynamics of AARR, more generally. 
And thus, the current findings are highly valuable in that regard. The General Discussion 
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presented a discussion of these conceptual developments and their relationship to the 
current empirical work. 
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Nederlandstalinge Samenvattig 
Empirische en conceptuele analyse van perspectief-nemen:  
A gedrags-analytische benadering 
 
In een poging om de methodologieën voor het bestuderen van deictische relationele 
respons uit breiden, gebruikt men in recent onderzoek de Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure (IRAP) om deictische relationele respons met betrekking tot zelf 
ten opzichte van OTHER te meten (Barbero-Rubio et al., 2016). Het primaire doel van 
het huidige proefschrift was om verder te bouwen op de kleine hoeveelheid werk die 
hieromtrent bestaat en om het potentiële nut van de IRAP in verband met perspectief-
nemen te bepalen. Met andere woorden, onderzoeken of de IRAP perspectief-nemen 
'tijdens de vlucht' kan vastleggen? Het oorspronkelijke doel van hoofdstuk 2 was om 
het oorspronkelijke onderzoek van Barbero-Rubio et al. gedeeltelijk te repliceren en uit 
te breiden. Deze uitbreiding omvatte het opnemen van een controle-conditie waarbij het 
niet nodig was te reageren op zichzelf, maar alleen op anderen. De resultaten leverden 
significante IRAP-effecten op voor twee van de vier proeftypen in zowel de deictische 
als controle-IRAP's. Experiment 2 betrof een nieuwe methode voor het verzamelen van 
IRAP-gegevens (een lees-hardop procedure), waarvan werd aangetoond dat het 
significante effecten opleverde voor alle vier de proeftypen, en vier significante effecten 
werden inderdaad geregistreerd voor zowel deictic als controle IRAP's. 
Hoofdstuk 3 trachtte IRAP's te ontwikkelen die deictische relationele responsen met 
betrekking tot de mentale toestanden van zichzelf en van anderen konden meten. Dit 
werd nagestreefd in een reeks experimenten met een nieuwe versie van de IRAP, bekend 
als de Natural Language-IRAP (NL-IRAP). In een reeks van zes experimenten vereiste 
een ‘zelfgerichte IRAP’ dat deelnemers moesten reageren op zowel positieve als 
negatieve uitspraken over zichzelf, terwijl een ‘andere gerichte IRAP’ deelnemers 
verplichtte te reageren op soortgelijke uitspraken over anderen. Experimenten 1 en 2 
onderzochten perspectief-nemen met betrekking tot een niet-gespecificeerde andere. 
Experimenten 3-6 onderzochten perspectief nemen met betrekking tot een 
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gespecifieerde andere, waarbij de gespecificeerde relatie tussen zichzelf en de andere 
gemanipuleerd werd in experimenten. De resultaten van de eerste twee experimenten 
gaven aan dat er significante verschillen waren tussen de zelf- versus andere-gerichte 
IRAP's, wanneer de andere niet gespecificeerd bleef. De resterende vier experimenten 
gaven echter aan dat wanneer de andere gespecifieerd was, er slechts beperkte 
aanwijzingen waren dat de prestaties op de twee IRAP's aanzienlijk verschilden. Over 
het algemeen kunnen de bevindingen als bemoedigend worden beschouwd omdat elk 
experiment performances opleverde die als consistent werden beschouwd met de pre-
experimentele geschiedenis van de deelnemers. Over het algemeen waren de resultaten 
evenwel enigszins teleurstellend omdat we geen sterk bewijs van perspectief-nemen 
konden vinden wanneer andere werd gespecificeerd, althans in termen van verschillende 
prestaties tussen de twee IRAP's, of in correlaties tussen de IRAP's en de 
zelfrapportagemaatregelen. Een mogelijke verklaring is dat er enige gevoeligheid voor 
zichzelf versus anderen was, maar dat het gebruik van complexe uitspraken in de IRAP's 
de impact van deictic relationele respons op zich ondermijnde of verminderde. 
Na het reflecteren over de resultaten verkregen in de twee voorgaande empirische 
hoofdstukken, probeerde we in hoofdstuk 4 IRAP's te ontwikkelen die de deictische 
functies van zichzelf en anderen in stand hielden in de context van perspectief nemen, 
in plaats van eenvoudig zin-makend te zijn. Experiment 1 beoordeelde de haalbaarheid 
van het gebruik van gelijkaardige foto's van zichzelf versus andere over twee IRAP's. 
Over het algemeen gaf het patroon van effecten aan dat afbeeldingen van gezichten in 
de IRAP konden worden opgenomen, waardoor de haalbaarheid van het gebruik van 
foto's van zichzelf versus andere in perspectiefstudies met IRAP werd ondersteund. 
Experiment 2 probeerde te bepalen of de presentatie van een false-belief vignet vóór 
blootstelling aan een enkele IRAP de prestaties in een vignet-consistente richting zou 
beïnvloeden. De resultaten waren echter om een aantal redenen niet doorslaggevend. 
Ten eerste zijn er geen duidelijke verschillen naar voren gekomen tussen het actieve 
vignet en de controle-conditie (en de laatste kon dubbelzinnig geïnterpreteerd worden 
door de deelnemer). Het primaire doel van experiment 3 was om enkele problemen die 
in eerdere onderzoeken naar voren kwamen, weg te nemen. Het experiment omvatte dus 
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een actief besturingsontwerp waarin de twee vignetten de tegenovergestelde stand van 
zaken specificeerden; de familiarisatie IRAP werd verwijderd uit het experiment, maar 
oefenblokken werden toegevoegd aan de overtuiging IRAP; en de bloksequentie van de 
IRAP werd gecounterbalanceerd. De resultaten van het derde experiment waren meer 
overtuigend, omdat ze aangaven dat de primaire controlevariabele de volgorde was 
waarin de IRAP-blokken werden gepresenteerd in plaats van de inhoud van de 
vignetten. Over het algemeen gaven post-hoc analyses van de prestaties van de eerste 
oefenblokparen aan dat de bloksequentie en vignetten met elkaar in wisselwerking 
stonden, maar alleen wanneer het vignet en de initiële contingenties van de IRAP met 
elkaar in overeenstemming waren. 
Over de 11 individuele experimenten die in dit proefschrift zijn voltooid, was er beperkt 
bewijs dat er succesvol een IRAP was ontwikkeld die een duidelijke en ondubbelzinnige 
gevoeligheid voor perspectief-nemen vertoonde. Over het algemeen heeft het onderzoek 
aanzienlijk bijgedragen aan de voortdurende ontwikkeling van een conceptuele analyse 
van perspectief-nemen en de dynamiek van willekeurig toepasbare relationele 
antwoorden, in het algemeen. En dus zijn de huidige bevindingen in dat opzicht zeer 
waardevol. De algemene discussie presenteerde een bespreking van deze conceptuele 
ontwikkelingen en hun relatie tot het huidige empirische werk. 
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Data Storage Fact Sheet for Chapter 2 
Name/identifier study: The On-going search for perspective-taking IRAPs: Exploring 
the Potential of the Natural Language IRAP 
Author: Deirdre Kavanagh 
Date: 11th February 2019 
1. Contact details 
1a. Main researcher 
Name: Deirdre Kavanagh 
Address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
E-mail: deirdre.kavanagh@ugent.be 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
Name: Prof. dr Dermot Barnes-Holmes 
Address: Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium 
E-mail: Dermot.Barnes-Holmes@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an email 
to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported:  
Kavanagh, D., Roelandt, A., Van Raemdonck, L., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, 
D., McEnteggart, C. (2019). The On-going search for perspective-taking IRAPs: 
Exploring the potential of the natural language IRAP.The Psychological Record. 
Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
It refers to all studies that are reported in Chapter 2 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
3a. Raw data 
Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X ] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: N/A 
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On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X ] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
3b. Other files 
Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: ... 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: ... 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
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  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
4. Reproduction  
Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
Name:                                            Address:  
Affiliation:                                     E-mail: 
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Data Storage Fact Sheet for Chapter 3 
Name/identifier study: Exploring differntial trial-type effect and the imapct of a read-
aloud proceudre on deictic relational responidng on the IRAP. 
Author: Deirdre Kavanagh 
Date: 24th April 2019 
1. Contact details 
1a. Main researcher 
Name:  Deirdre Kavanagh 
Address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
E-mail: deirdre.kavanagh@ugent.be 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
Name: Prof. dr Dermot Barnes-Holmes 
Address: Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium 
E-mail: Dermot.Barnes-Holmes@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported:  
Kavanagh, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, P. M. D., McEnteggart, C., & 
Finn, M. (2018). Exploring differential trial-type effects and the impact of a 
read-aloud procedure On deictic relational responding on the IRAP. The 
Psychological Record, 68(2), 163–176. 
 
Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
It refers to all studies that are reported in Chapter 3 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
3a. Raw data 
      212 
Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [ X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: N/A 
On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
3b. Other files 
Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify:  
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: ... 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
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  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
4. Reproduction  
Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
Name:                                            Address:  
Affiliation:                                     E-mail: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      214 
Data Storage Fact Sheet for Chapter 4 
 
 
Name/identifier study: Chapter 4 
Author: Deirdre Kavanagh 
Date: 1st June 2019 
1. Contact details 
1a. Main researcher 
Name:  Deirdre Kavanagh 
Address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
E-mail: deirdre.kavanagh@ugent.be 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
Name: Prof. dr Dermot Barnes-Holmes 
Address: Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium 
E-mail: Dermot.Barnes-Holmes@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
 
Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
It refers to all studies that are reported in Chapter 4 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
3a. Raw data 
Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [ X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: N/A 
On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
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  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
3b. Other files 
Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify:  
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: ... 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
      216 
4. Reproduction  
Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
Name:                                            Address:  
Affiliation:                                     E-mail: 
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Appendix A 
 
Chapter 2: Descriptive statistics for questionnaires in Experiment 1 
Questionnaire M SD 
CAPE (weighted scores)   
        Overall Frequency 1.68 .26 
        Frequency of Positive Symptoms 1.38 .26 
        Frequency of Negative Symptoms 1.92 .46 
        Frequency of Depressive Symptoms 2.03 .46 
        Overall Distress 1.05 .37 
        Distress associated with Positive Symptoms 1.81 .51 
        Distress associated with Negative Symptoms 3.04 .86 
        Distress associated with Depressive Symptoms 2.39 .65 
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSES) 13.82 4.46 
Perspective-taking sub-scale of the IRI 17.96    3.13 
Note: The maximum weighted score for all CAPE sub-scales is 4.00. The CAPE has no 
formal clinical cut-off. The maximum score for the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale is 40 
and the measure has no formal clinical cut-off. The maximum score for the Perspective-
taking subscale of the IRI is 28 and the measure has no formal clinical cut-off. 
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Appendix B 
 
Chapter 2:  Descriptive statistics for questionnaires in Experiment 2 
Questionnaire M SD 
CAPE (weighted scores)   
        Overall Frequency 1.69 .35 
        Frequency of Positive Symptoms 1.4 .31 
        Frequency of Negative Symptoms 1.75 .48 
        Frequency of Depressive Symptoms 2.22 .62 
        Overall Distress 2.05 .62 
        Distress associated with Positive Symptoms 1.85 1.09 
        Distress associated with Negative Symptoms 2.10 .51 
        Distress associated with Depressive Symptoms 4.87 4.15 
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSES) 8.23 5.56 
Perspective-taking sub-scale of the IRI 18.12    3.52 
Note: See Appendix A. 
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Appendix C 
 
Chapter 3: Descriptive statistics for questionnaires in Experiment 1 
Questionnaire M SD 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II) 17.1
6 
7.14 
CAPE (weighted scores)   
        Overall Frequency 1.5 .19 
        Frequency of Positive Symptoms 1.32 .23 
        Frequency of Negative Symptoms 1.57 .34 
        Frequency of Depressive Symptoms 1.83 .41 
        Overall Distress 2.04 .45 
        Distress associated with Positive Symptoms 1.68 .53 
        Distress associated with Negative Symptoms 2.13 .86 
        Distress associated with Depressive Symptoms 2.33 .62 
Note: The maximum weighted score for all CAPE sub-scales is 4.00. The CAPE has no 
formal clinical cut-off. The maximum score for the AAQ-II is 49 and the measure has a 
suggested clinical cut-off of ≥24. 
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Appendix D 
 
Chapter 3: Descriptive statistics for questionnaires in Experiment 2 
 
Questionnaire M SD 
Self-warmth Thermometer       56.65 22.02 
Psychological Flexibility Index (PFI)    355.31 27.19 
CAPE (weighted scores)   
        Overall Frequency 1.72  .32 
        Frequency of Positive Symptoms 1.43        .34 
        Frequency of Negative Symptoms 1.94  .44 
        Frequency of Depressive Symptoms 2.08 .52 
        Overall Distress 2.15 .54 
        Distress associated with Positive 
Symptoms 
1.66 .44 
        Distress associated with Negative 
Symptoms 
2.07 .58 
        Distress associated with Depressive 
Symptoms 
2.54 .73 
ECR-RS   
        Attachment-related avoidance (Mother)        19.82       9.47 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Mother)        5.33        3.51 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Father)        23.65        9.55 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Father)        6.41        4.61 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Partner)       11.45        5.55  
        Attachment-related anxiety (Partner)         9.02        4.79 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Best 
Friend) 
      14.12        6.33 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Best Friend)       7.69         4.6 
EOSS   
        Overall EOSS       72.82       15.97 
        Casual acquaintances-absent        17.47          5.3 
        Casual acquaintances-present       23.98        4.54 
        Close relationships-absent         11        6.19 
        Close relationships-present       20.38        6.02 
      222 
IOS   
        Best friend        4.71        1.34 
        Other people        2.98        1.13 
Note: The maximum score is 100 for the Self-warmth Thermometer. The maximum 
score for the PFI is 492. The maximum weighted score for all CAPE sub-scales is 4.00. The 
maximum score for each of the EC-RS attachment related avoidance sub-scales is 42 and the 
Attachment related anxiety sub-scale is 21. The maximum overall EOSS score is 140 with the 
maximum score for each sub-scale at 35. Finally, the maximum score for each of the IOS scales 
is 7.  None of the scales have formal clinical cut-offs 
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Appendix E 
 
Chapter 3: Descriptive statistics for questionnaires in Experiment 3 
 
Questionnaires  M SD 
Self-warmth Thermometer 53.54     22.77 
Psychological Flexibility Index (PFI) 323.42 23.99 
Overall Other-focusing Task Score 24.94 3.18 
CAPE (weighted scores)   
        Overall Frequency 1.71 .44 
        Frequency of Positive Symptoms 1.39       .4 
        Frequency of Negative Symptoms 1.93 .54 
        Frequency of Depressive Symptoms 2.09 .62 
        Overall Distress 2.09 .58 
        Distress associated with Positive Symptoms 1.66 .51 
        Distress associated with Negative Symptoms 2.06 .55 
        Distress associated with Depressive Symptoms 2.35 .93 
ECR-RS   
        Attachment-related avoidance (Mother) 18.24      9.75 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Mother) 4.56      2.75 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Father) 22.52      8.64 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Father) 5.52      3.89 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Partner) 11.61      4.61 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Partner) 9.21      5.18 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Best Friend) 13.88      4.61 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Best Friend) 6.91      4.03 
EOSS   
        Overall EOSS 75.7      13.28 
        Casual acquaintances-absent  17.33       5.53 
        Casual acquaintances-present 24.97       4.83 
        Close relationships-absent 10.82       5.57 
        Close relationships–present 22.58       5.04 
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IOS   
        Best friend          5.06       1.14 
        Other people          3.24       1.0 
Note:  See note for Appendix D. 
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Appendix F 
 
Chapter 3: Descriptive statistics for questionnaires in Experiment 4 
 
Questionnaire M SD 
Self-warmth Thermometer 49.73 24.41 
Psychological Flexibility Index (PFI) 346.73 24.64 
CAPE (weighted scores)   
        Overall Frequency 1.53 .38 
        Frequency of Positive Symptoms 1.33 .35 
        Frequency of Negative Symptoms 1.81 .49 
        Frequency of Depressive Symptoms 1.75 .52 
        Overall Distress 1.83 .55 
        Distress associated with Positive Symptoms 1.48 .65 
        Distress associated with Negative Symptoms 1.81 .61 
        Distress associated with Depressive 
Symptoms 
2.16 .69 
ECR-RS   
        Attachment-related avoidance (Mother) 16.57 7.99 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Mother) 4.5 2.7 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Father) 23.93 10.3 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Father) 6.97 5.8 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Partner) 11.1 4.71 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Partner) 8.23 4.88 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Best Friend) 12.83 5.32 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Best Friend) 6.1 3.47 
EOSS   
        Overall EOSS 72.37 16.65 
        Casual acquaintances-absent  16.6 4.97 
        Casual acquaintances-present 23.33 4.72 
        Close relationships-absent 12.53 6.46 
        Close relationships-present 19.9 6.49 
IOS   
        Best friend 4.3 1.09 
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        Other people 2.7 1.08 
Note: See note for Appendix D. 
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Appendix G 
 
Chapter 3: Descriptive statistics for questionnaires in Experiment 5 
 
Questionnaire M SD 
Self-warmth Thermometer 47.43 27.18 
Psychological Flexibility Index (PFI) 358.1 23.93 
CAPE (weighted scores)   
        Overall Frequency 1.76 .36 
        Frequency of Positive Symptoms 1.46 .28 
        Frequency of Negative Symptoms 1.97 .53 
        Frequency of Depressive Symptoms 2.13 .59 
        Overall Distress 2.15 .47 
        Distress associated with Positive Symptoms 1.7 .5 
        Distress associated with Negative Symptoms 2.45 .77 
        Distress associated with Depressive Symptoms 2.01 .56 
ECR-RS   
        Attachment-related avoidance (Mother) 17.9 7.9 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Mother) 6.13 3.5 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Father) 24.03 9.26 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Father) 8.3 5.37 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Partner) 12.03 5.51 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Partner) 10.33 5.2 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Best Friend) 14.07 6.03 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Best Friend) 7.73 4.17 
EOSS   
        Overall EOSS 74.93 14.96 
        Casual acquaintances-absent  17.27 6.25 
        Casual acquaintances-present 24.63 4.25 
        Close relationships-absent 12.03 5.73 
        Close relationships-present 21 6.26 
IOS   
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        Best friend 4.43 1.25 
        Other people 2.7 1.06 
Note: See note for Appendix D. 
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Appendix H 
 
Chapter 3: Descriptive statistics for questionnaires in Experiment 6 
 
Questionnaire M SD 
Self-warmth Thermometer 49.91 26.2 
Psychological Flexibility Index (PFI) 363.13 25.44 
CAPE (weighted scores)   
        Overall Frequency 1.86 .37 
        Frequency of Positive Symptoms 1.62 .41 
        Frequency of Negative Symptoms 1.98 .45 
        Frequency of Depressive Symptoms 2.23 .49 
        Overall Distress 2.24 .46 
        Distress associated with Positive Symptoms 1.84 .49 
        Distress associated with Negative Symptoms 1.99 .52 
        Distress associated with Depressive Symptoms 2.72 .57 
ECR-RS   
        Attachment-related avoidance (Mother) 16.07 8.93 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Mother) 4.83 3.13 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Father) 23.07 10.70 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Father) 6.17 4.69 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Partner) 11.07 4.28 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Partner) 9.2 4.77 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Best Friend) 11.77 4.94 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Best Friend) 6.1 4.11 
EOSS   
        Overall EOSS 76.6 15.07 
        Casual acquaintances-absent  18.23 5.35 
        Casual acquaintances-present 25.77 3.53 
        Close relationships-absent 11.67 6.42 
        Close relationships–present 20.93 6.38 
IOS   
        Best friend 5.10 1.40 
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        Other people 3.13 1.22 
Note: See note for Appendix D. 
 Appendix I 
 
Chapter 4: Descriptive statistics for questionnaires in Experiment 1 
  
Questionnaire M SD 
Self-warmth Thermometer 56.72 22.82 
Psychological Flexibility Index (PFI) 353.59 27.15 
CAPE (weighted scores)   
        Overall Frequency 1.76 .35 
        Frequency of Positive Symptoms 1.49 .42 
        Frequency of Negative Symptoms 1.93 .39 
        Frequency of Depressive Symptoms 2.14 .51 
        Overall Distress 2.26 .51 
        Distress associated with Positive Symptoms 1.8 .54 
        Distress associated with Negative Symptoms 2.15 .58 
        Distress associated with Depressive Symptoms 2.73 .68 
ECR-RS   
        Attachment-related avoidance (Mother) 17.94 9.15 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Mother) 5.313 3.92 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Father) 21.84 9.61 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Father) 6.38 4.26 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Partner) 10.34 4.48 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Partner) 8.53 4.64 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Best Friend) 12.13 5.72 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Best Friend) 6.34 3.34 
EOSS   
        Overall EOSS 74.63 15.08 
        Casual acquaintances-absent  18.13 5.64 
        Casual acquaintances-present 24.25 4.26 
        Close relationships-absent 11.19 6.08 
        Close relationships–present 21.06 4.59 
IOS   
        Best friend 5.06 1.31 
        Other people 3.22 1.34 
Note: See note for Appendix D. 
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Appendix J 
 
Strategy Questionnaire: 
1. How successful were you at taking the perspective of the other person? * 
 
1                       2                            3                              4                          5 
 
  Not successful                                                                                Very successful                                                                                                    
 
2. How much of your responding on the computer task was influenced by 
the scenario that you read before and throughout the task? 
 
1                       2                            3                              4                          5 
   Not much                          A lot 
 
3. Did you have a strategy to complete the task? 
 
 
 
*Question 1 was only presented to participants in the False Belief Condition 
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Similarity Questionnaire: 
The following questions are about the two pictures that you brought with you today. 
1. How similar do you think you look the other person in the second picture 
that you brought with you today? 
 
1                       2                            3                              4                          5 
Not similar at all                                                                         Very similar                                                                                                    
How similar are each of these characteristics?                                                             
                              Not similar at all                 Very similar                          
Hair color   1  2  3  4  5 
Age       1  2  3  4  5 
Eye color   1  2  3  4  5         
Skin color   1  2  3  4  5           
Facial expression  1  2  3  4  5 
 
How attractive would you rate yourself? 
1                       2                            3                              4                          5 
not attractive                                                                           very attractive                                                                                                    
How attractive would you rate the person in the second picture? 
1                       2                            3                              4                          5 
not attractive                                                                           very attractive                                                                                                   
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Appendix K 
 
 
Chapter 4: Descriptive statistics for questionnaires in the False Belief Condition for 
Experiment 2 
 
Questionnaire M SD 
Self-warmth Thermometer 58.17        18.76 
Psychological Flexibility Index (PFI) 343.72 31.18 
CAPE (weighted scores)   
        Overall Frequency 1.75 .28 
        Frequency of Positive Symptoms 1.52 .31 
        Frequency of Negative Symptoms 1.9 .37 
        Frequency of Depressive Symptoms 2.02 .33 
        Overall Distress 2.10 .38 
        Distress associated with Positive Symptoms 1.77 .43 
        Distress associated with Negative Symptoms 2.06 .65 
        Distress associated with Depressive Symptoms 2.47 .55 
ECR-RS   
        Attachment-related avoidance (Mother) 19.69 8.5 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Mother) 6.31 4.34 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Father) 24.41 9.79 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Father) 6.59 4.21 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Partner) 11.24 4.73 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Partner) 8.41 4.10 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Best Friend) 12.86 4.22 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Best Friend) 7.03 4.03 
EOSS   
        Overall EOSS 72.69 20.05 
        Casual acquaintances-absent  18.93 15.85 
        Casual acquaintances-present 22.24 4.55 
        Close relationships-absent 11.14 5.57 
        Close relationships–present 20.38 6.28 
IOS   
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        Best friend 4.55 1.40 
        Other people 3.07 1.39 
Strategy Questionnaire   
How successful were you at taking the                                
perspective of the other person? (only asked in 
False Belief Condition) 
3.83 .65 
       How much of your responding on the computer 
task was controlled by the vignette?  
3.87 1.11 
Similarity Questionnaire   
How similar do you think you look to the other   
person? 
3.2 .71 
       Similar hair colour 4.07 .87 
Similarity in age 3.57 .94 
      Similar eye colour 3.37 .99 
      Similar skin colour 4.33 .88 
      Similar facial expression 3.43 1.10 
      How attractive are you? 3.37 .77 
      How attractive is the other person? 3.9 .65 
   Note: Minimum possible score for the Similarity and Strategy questions was 1 and the 
maximum score was 5. See Appendix D for all other minimun and maximum scores. 
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Chapter 4: Descriptive statistics for questionnaires in the Control Condition for 
Experiment 2 
 
Questionnaire M SD 
Self-warmth Thermometer 56.55        19.69 
Psychological Flexibility Index (PFI) 350.17 26.51 
CAPE (weighted scores)   
        Overall Frequency 1.75 .29 
        Frequency of Positive Symptoms 1.52 .28 
        Frequency of Negative Symptoms 1.88 .44 
        Frequency of Depressive Symptoms 2.09 .43 
        Overall Distress 2.03 .49 
        Distress associated with Positive Symptoms 1.73 .52 
Distress associated with Negative Symptoms 1.91 .76 
        Distress associated with Depressive Symptoms 2.40 .59 
ECR-RS   
        Attachment-related avoidance (Mother) 20.72 10.02 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Mother) 6.76 5.55 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Father) 22.55 10.04 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Father) 6.1 4.97 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Partner) 11.03 3.95 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Partner) 8.38 4.44 
        Attachment-related avoidance (Best Friend) 14.35 6.77 
        Attachment-related anxiety (Best Friend) 6.89 3.9 
EOSS   
        Overall EOSS 73.17 11.94 
        Casual acquaintances-absent  15.86 5.104 
        Casual acquaintances-present 24.66 3.22 
        Close relationships-absent 12.07 6.65 
        Close relationships–present 20.59 5.07 
IOS   
        Best friend 4.52 1.43 
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        Other people 3.03 1.38 
Strategy Questionnaire   
How successful were you at taking the                                
perspective of the other person? (only asked in 
False Belief Condition) 
  
       How much of your responding on the computer 
task was controlled by the vignette? 
3.63 1.35 
 
Similarity Questionnaire 
  
How similar do you think you look to the other   
person? 
3.04 .69 
       Similar hair color 4.13 .9 
Similarity in age 3.79 .69 
      Similar eye color 3.67 1.24 
      Similar skin color 4.5 .59 
      Similar facial expression 3.42 .97 
      How attractive are you? 3.21 .59 
      How attractive is the other person? 3.52 .73 
Note: See Appendix D. 
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Appendix L 
Chapter 4: Themes that emerged from the open-ended strategy question in Experiment 
2 
 
Theme False Belief 
Condition 
Control 
Condition 
Linked the object words and pictures together 15 10 
Focused only on the object word and didn’t read the 
full sentence 
4 6 
Rehearsed the link between the object and person 
before the IRAP 
4 1 
Focused on the color of the picture 2 1 
Relied on the IRAP feedback to aid their performance 3 0 
Focused on the scenario 0 2 
Initially relied on the scenario but then switched 0 1 
Trial and error to respond 1 0 
Ignored the Scenario 0 1 
Other 3 1 
No details provided 1 1 
Note: The responses from some participants included several categories. 
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Appendix M 
 
Chapter 4: Descriptive statistics for the scarf-glove sequence/vignette-consistent first 
condition in Experiment 3 
 
Questionnaire M SD 
Strategy Questionnaire   
How successful were you at taking the                                  
perspective of the other person? 
3.71 .92 
How much of your responding on the computer 
task was controlled by the vignette? 
3.18 1.07 
 
Similarity Questionnaire 
  
How similar do you think you look to the other   
person? 
3.06 .66 
Similar hair colour 3.69 1.08 
Similarity in age 3.77 .90 
Similar eye colour 3.18 .95 
        Similar skin colour 4.18 .81 
Similar facial expression 3.29 .99 
How attractive are you? 3.24 .66 
How attractive is the other person? 3.71 .99 
Note: See Appendix K for the possible maximum and minimum scores. 
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Chapter 4: Descriptive statistics for the scarf-glove sequence/vignette-inconsistent first 
condition in Experiment 3 
 
 
Questionnaire M SD 
Strategy Questionnaire   
How successful were you at taking the                                  
perspective of the other person? 
3.93 .59 
        How much of your responding on the computer 
task was controlled by the vignette?  
3.67 1.18 
Similarity Questionnaire   
How similar do you think you look to the other 
person? 
3.43 .51 
Similar hair colour 4.14 1.03 
Similarity in age 3.21 .98 
Similar eye colour 3.36 1.28 
Similar skin colour 4.43 .76 
Similar facial expression 3.29 .91 
How attractive are you? 3.07 .48 
How attractive is the other person? 4.07 .62 
Note: See Appendix K for the possible maximum and minimum scores. 
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Chapter 4: Descriptive statistics for the glove-scarf sequence/vignette-consistent first 
condition in Experiment 3 
 
Questionnaire M SD 
Strategy Questionnaire   
How successful were you at taking the                                  
perspective of the other person? 
4.06 .85 
How much of your responding on the computer 
task was controlled by the vignette?  
2.75 1.18 
Similarity Questionnaire   
How similar do you think you look to the other   
person? 
3.2 .41 
Similar hair colour 4.13 .81 
Similarity in age 3.88 1.09 
Similar eye colour 3.38 1.2 
Similar skin colour 4.13 .81 
Similar facial expression 3.25 .78 
How attractive are you? 3.18 .40 
How attractive is the other person? 4.06 .68 
Note: See Appendix K for the possible maximum and minimum scores. 
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Chapter 4: Descriptive statistics for the glove-scarf sequence/vignette-inconsistent first 
condition in Exoeriment 3 
 
Questionnaire M SD 
Strategy Questionnaire   
How successful were you at taking the                                  
perspective of the other person? 
3.56 .96 
How much of your responding on the computer 
task was controlled by the vignette?  
2.75 1.53 
Similarity Questionnaire   
How similar do you think you look to the other 
person? 
3.06 .57 
Similar hair colour 4.31 .70 
Similarity in age 4.13 .81 
Similar eye colour 3.06 1.34 
Similar skin colour 4.31 .70 
Similar facial expression 3.07 1.58 
How attractive are you? 3.06 .68 
How attractive is the other person? 3.56 1.03 
Note: See Appendix K for the possible maximum and minimum scores. 
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Appendix N 
 
Chapter 4: Themes that emerged from the open-ended strategy question in Experiment 
3 
 
Theme Consistent 
Rule First 
Inconsistent 
Rule First 
Linked the object words and pictures together 7 9 
Focused only on the object word and didn’t read the 
full sentence 
7 4 
Rehearsed the link between the object and person 
before the IRAP 
8 1 
Focused on the colour of the picture 1 0 
Relied on the IRAP feedback to aid their performance 5 9 
Focused on the scenario 6 10 
Initially relied on the scenario but then switched 1 1 
Trial and error to respond 2 3 
Ignored the scenario 5 3 
Other 5 1 
No details provided 0 0 
Focused on what they had 1 0 
Note: The responses from some participants included several categories.  
 
